

# The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology \*

An Introduction to Phenomenology

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by

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# Contents

22	Locke's naturalistic-epistemological psychology.	7
23	Berkeley. David Hume's psychology as fictionalistic theory of knowledge: the "bankruptcy" of philosophy and science.	9
24	The genuine philosophical motif hidden in the absurdity of Hume's skepticism: the shaking of objectivism.	10
25	The "transcendental" motif in rationalism: Kant's conception of a transcendental philosophy.	12
26	Preliminary discussion of the concept of the "transcendental" which guides us here.	16
27	The philosophy of Kant and his followers seen from the perspective of our guiding concept of the "transcendental." The task of taking a critical position.	17
28	Kant's unexpressed "presupposition": the surrounding world of life, taken for granted as valid.	20
29	The life-world can be disclosed as a realm of subjective phenomena which have remained "anonymous."	27
30	The lack of an intuitive exhibiting method as the reason for Kant's mythical constructions.	29
31	Kant and the inadequacy of the psychology of his day. The opaqueness of the distinction between transcendental subjectivity and soul.	31
32	The possibility of a hidden truth in Kant's transcendental philosophy: the problem of a "new dimension." The antagonism between the "life of the plane" and the "life of depth."	32
33	The problem of the "life-world" as a partial problem within the general problem of objective science.	34

34	Exposition of the problem of a science of the life-world.	36
35	Analysis of the transcendental epoche. First step: The epoche of objective science.	45
36	How can the life-world, after the epoche of the objective sciences, become the subject matter of a science? The distinction in principle between the objective-logical a priori and the a priori of the life-world.	47
37	The formal and most general structures of the life-world: thing and world on the one side, thing-consciousness on the other.	50
38	The two possible fundamental ways of making the life-world thematic: the naive and natural straightforward attitude and the idea of a consistently reflective attitude toward the “how” of the subjective manner of givenness of life-world and life-world objects.	51
39	The peculiar character of the transcendental epoche as a total change of the natural attitude of life.	54
40	The difficulties surrounding the genuine sense of performing the total epoche. The temptation to misconstrue it as a withholding of all individual validities, carried out step by step.	55
41	The genuine transcendental epoche makes possible the “transcendental reduction” the discovery and investigation of the transcendental correlation between world and world-consciousness.	57
42	The task of concretely plotting ways in which the transcendental reduction can actually be carried out.	58
43	Characterization of a new way to the reduction, as contrasted with the “Cartesian way.”	59
44	The life-world as subject matter for a theoretical interest determined by a universal epoche in respect to the actuality of the things of the life-world.	60
45	Beginnings of a concrete exposition of what is given in sense-intuition	

purely as such.	61
46 The universal a priori of correlation.	63
47 Indication of further directions of inquiry: the basic subjective phenomena of kinesthesia, alteration of validity, horizon-consciousness, and the communalization of experience.	64
48 Anything that is-whatever its meaning and to whatever region it belongs-is an index of a subjective system of correlations.	67
49 Preliminary concept of transcendental constitution as “original formation of meaning.” The restricted character of the exemplary analyses carried out so far; an indication of further horizons of exposition.	69
50 First ordering of all working problems under the headings ego-cogito-cogitatum.	71
51 The task of an “ontology of the life-world.”	73
52 The emergence of paradoxical enigmas. The necessity of new radical reflections.	74
53 The paradox of human subjectivity: being a subject for the world and at the same time being an object in the world.	77
54 The resolution of the paradox.	80
55 The correction in principle of our first application of the epoche by reducing it to the absolutely unique, ultimately functioning ego.	83
56 Characterization of the philosophical development after Kant from the perspective of the struggle between physicalistic objectivism and the constantly reemerging “transcendental motif.”	86
57 The fateful separation of transcendental philosophy and psychology.	91

- 58 The alliance and the difference between psychology and transcendental philosophy. Psychology as the decisive field. 95
- 59 Analysis of the reorientation from the psychological attitude into the transcendental attitude. Psychology “before” and “after” the phenomenological reduction. (The problem of “flowing in.”) 98
- 60 The reason for the failure of psychology: dualistic and physicalistic presuppositions. 100
- 61 Psychology in the tension between the (objectivistic-philosophical) idea of science and empirical procedure: the incompatibility of the two directions of psychological inquiry (the psychophysical and that of “psychology based on inner experience”). 102
- 62 Preliminary discussion of the absurdity giving equal status in principle to souls and bodies as realities; indication of the difference in principle between the temporality, the causality, and the individuation of natural things and those of souls. 103
- 63 The questionable character of the concepts of “outer” and “inner” experience. Why has the experience of the bodily thing in the life-world, as the experience of something “merely subjective,” not previously been included in the subject matter of psychology? 106
- 64 Cartesian dualism as the reason for the parallelisation. Only the formal and most general features of the schema “descriptive vs. explanatory science” are justified. 107
- 65 Testing the legitimacy of an empirically grounded dualism by familiarising oneself with the factual procedure of the psychologist and the physiologist. 109
- 66 The world of common experience: its set of regional types and the possible universal abstractions within it: “nature” as correlate of a universal abstraction; the problem of “complementary abstractions.” 111
- 67 The dualism of the abstractions grounded in experience. The continuing historical influence of the empiricist approach (from Hobbes to Wundt); Critique of data-empiricism. 113

68 The task of a pure explication of consciousness as such: the universal problem of intentionality. (Brentano's attempt at a reform of psychology.) 115

## Part II. Clarification of the Origin of the Modern Opposition between Physicalistic Objectivism and Transcendental Subjectivism.

### 22 Locke's naturalistic-epistemological psychology.

IT IS IN THE EMPIRICIST development, as we know, that the new psychology, which was required as a correlate to pure natural science when the latter was separated off, is brought to its first concrete execution, Thus it is concerned with investigations of introspective psychology in the field of the soul, which has now been separated from the body, as well as with physiological and psychophysical explanations. On the other hand, this psychology is of service to a theory of knowledge which, compared with the Cartesian one, is completely new and very differently worked out. In Locke's great work this is the actual intent from the start. It offers itself as a new attempt to accomplish precisely what Descartes's Meditations intended to accomplish: an epistemological grounding of the objectivity of the objective sciences. The skeptical posture of this intent is evident from the beginning in questions like those of the scope, the extent, and the degrees of certainty of human knowledge. Locke senses nothing of the depths of the Cartesian epoche [critique] and of the reduction to the ego. He simply takes over the ego as soul, which becomes acquainted, in the self-evidence of self-experience, with its inner states, acts, and capacities. Only what inner self-experience shows, only our own "ideas," are immediately, self-evidently given. Everything in the external world is inferred.

What comes first, then, is the internal-psychological analysis purely on the basis of the inner experience — whereby use is made, quite naively, of the experiences of other human beings and of the conception of self experience as what belongs to me one human being among human beings; that is, the objective validity of inferences to others is used; just as, in general, the whole investigation proceeds as an objective psychological one, indeed even has recourse to the physiological — when it is precisely all this objectivity, after all, which is in question.

The actual problem of Descartes, that of transcending egological (interpreted as internal-psychological) validities, including all manners of inference pertaining to the external world, the question of how these, which are, after all, themselves cogitationes in the encapsuled soul, are able to justify assertions about extra-psychic being — these problems disappear in Locke or turn into the problem of the psychological genesis of the real experiences of validity or of the faculties belonging to them. That sense-data, extracted from the arbitrariness of their production, are affections from the outside and announce bodies in the external world, is not a problem for him but something taken for granted.

Especially portentous for future psychology and theory of knowledge is the fact that Locke makes no use of the Cartesian first introduction of the cogitatio as cogitatio of cogitata — that is, intentionality; he does not recognize it as a subject of investigation (indeed the

most authentic subject of the foundation-laying investigations) . He is blind to the whole distinction. The soul is something self-contained and real by itself, as is a body; in naive naturalism the soul is now taken to be like an isolated space, like a writing tablet, in his famous simile, on which psychic data come and go. This data-sensationalism, together with the doctrine of outer and inner sense, dominates psychology and the theory of knowledge for centuries, even up to the present day; and in spite of the familiar struggle against “psychic atomism,” the basic sense of this doctrine does not change. Of course one speaks quite unavoidably, even in the Lockean terminology, of perceptions, representations “of” things, or of believing “in something,” willing “something,” and the like. But no consideration is given to the fact that in the perceptions, in the experiences of consciousness themselves, that of which we are conscious is included as such that the perception is in itself a perception of something, of “this tree.”

How is the life of the soul, which is through and through a life of consciousness, the intentional life of the ego, which has objects of which it is conscious, deals with them through knowing, valuing, etc. — how is it supposed to be seriously investigated if intentionality is overlooked? How can the problems of reason be attacked at all? Can they be attacked at all as psychological problems? In the end, behind the psychological-epistemological problems, do we not find the problems of the “ego” of the Cartesian epoche, touched upon but not grasped by Descartes? Perhaps these are not unimportant questions, which give a direction in advance to the reader who thinks for himself. In any case they are an indication of what will become a serious problem in later parts of this work, or rather will serve as a way to a philosophy which can really be carried through “without prejudice,” a philosophy with the most radical grounding in its setting of problems, in its method, and in work which is systematically accomplished.

It is also of interest that the Lockean skepticism in respect to the rational ideal of science, and its limitation of the scope of the new sciences (which are supposed to retain their validity), leads to a new sort of agnosticism. It is not that the possibility of science is completely denied, as in ancient skepticism, although again unknowable things-in-themselves are assumed. But our human science depends exclusively on our representations and concept-formations; by means of these we may, of course, make inferences extending to what is transcendent; but in principle we cannot obtain actual representations of the things-in-themselves, representations which adequately express the proper essence of these things. We have adequate representations and knowledge only of what is in our own soul.



## 23 Berkeley. David Hume's psychology as fictionalistic theory of knowledge: the "bankruptcy" of philosophy and science.

LOCKE'S NAVETS and inconsistencies lead to a rapid further development of his empiricism, which pushes toward a paradoxical idealism and finally ends in a consummated absurdity. The foundation continues to be sensationalism and what appears to be obvious, i.e., that the sole indubitable ground of all knowledge is self-experience and its realm of immanent data. Starting from here, Berkeley reduces the bodily things which appear in natural experience to the complexes of sense-data themselves through which they appear. No inference is thinkable, according to Berkeley, through which conclusions could be drawn from these sense-data about anything but other such data. It could only be inductive inference, i.e., inference growing out of the association of ideas. Matter existing in itself, a *je ne sais quoi*, according to Locke, is for Berkeley a philosophical invention. It is also significant that at the same time he dissolves the manner in which rational natural science builds concepts and transforms it into a sensationalistic critique of knowledge.

In this direction, Hume goes on to the end. All categories of objectivity — the scientific ones through which an objective, extrapsychic world is thought in scientific life, and the prescientific ones through which it is thought in everyday life — are fictions. First come the mathematical concepts: number, magnitude, continuum, geometrical figure, etc. We would say that they are methodically necessary idealisations of what is given intuitively. For Hume, however, they are fictions; and the same is true, accordingly, of the whole of supposedly apodictic mathematics. The origin of these fictions can be explained perfectly well psychologically (i.e., in terms of immanent sensationalism), namely, through the immanent lawfulness of the associations and the relations between ideas. But even the categories of the prescientific world, of the straightforwardly intuited world — those of corporeity (i.e., the identity of persisting bodies supposedly found in immediate, experiencing intuition), as well as the supposedly experienced identity of the person — are nothing but fictions. We say, for example, "that" tree over there, and distinguish from it its changing manners of appearing. But immanently, psychically, there is nothing there but these "manners of appearing." These are complexes of data, and again and again other complexes of data — "bound together," regulated, to be sure, by association, which explains the illusion of experiencing something identical. The same is true of the person: an identical "I" is not a datum but a ceaselessly changing bundle of data. Identity is a psychological fiction. To the fictions of this sort also belongs causality, or necessary succession. Immanent experience exhibits only a *post hoc*. The *propter hoc*, the necessity of the succession, is a fictive misconstruction. Thus, in Hume's *Treatise*, the world in general, nature, the universe of identical bodies, the world of identical persons, and accordingly also objective science, which knows these in their objective truth, are transformed into fiction. To be consistent, we must say: reason, knowledge, including that of true values, of pure ideals of every sort, including the ethical — all this is fiction.

This is indeed, then, a bankruptcy of objective knowledge. Hume ends up, basically, in a solipsism. For how could inferences from data to other data ever reach beyond the immanent sphere? Of course, Hume did not ask the question, or at least did not say a word, about the status of the reason — Hume’s — which established this theory as truth, which carried out these analyses of the soul and demonstrated these laws of association. How do rules of associative ordering “bind”? Even if we knew about them, would not that knowledge itself be another datum on the tablet?

Like all skepticism, all irrationalism, the Humean sort cancels itself out. Astounding as Hume’s genius is, it is the more regrettable that a correspondingly great philosophical ethos is not joined with it. This is evident in the fact that Hume takes care, throughout his whole presentation, blandly to disguise or interpret as harmless his absurd results, though he does paint a picture (in the final chapter of Volume I of the *Treatise*) of the immense embarrassment in which the consistent theoretical philosopher gets involved. Instead of taking up the struggle against absurdity, instead of unmasking those supposedly obvious views upon which this sensationalism, and psychologism in general, rests, in order to penetrate to a coherent self-understanding and a genuine theory of knowledge, he remains in the comfortable and very impressive role of academic skepticism. Through this attitude he has become the father of a still effective, unhealthy positivism which hedges before philosophical abysses, or covers them over on the surface, and comforts itself with the successes of the positive sciences and their psychologistic elucidation.

## **24 The genuine philosophical motif hidden in the absurdity of Hume’s skepticism: the shaking of objectivism.**

LET US STOP FOR A MOMENT. Why does Hume’s *Treatise* (in comparison to which the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* is badly watered down) represent such a great historical event? What happened there? The Cartesian radicalism of presuppositionlessness, with the goal of tracing genuine scientific knowledge back to the ultimate sources of validity and of grounding it absolutely upon them, required reflections directed toward the subject, required the regression to the knowing ego in his immanence. No matter how little one may have approved of Descartes’s epistemological procedure, one could no longer escape the necessity of this requirement. But was it possible to improve upon Descartes’s procedure? Was his goal, that of grounding absolutely the new philosophical rationalism, still attainable after the skeptical attacks? Speaking in favor of this from the start was the immense force of discoveries in mathematics and natural science that were proceeding at breakneck speed. And so all who themselves took part in these sciences through research or study were already certain that its truth, its method, bore the stamp of finality and exemplariness. And now empiricist skepticism brings to light what was already present in the Cartesian fundamental

investigation but was not worked out, namely, that all knowledge of the world, the prescientific as well as the scientific, is an enormous enigma. It was easy to follow Descartes, when he went back to the apodictic ego, in interpreting the latter as soul, in taking the primal self-evidence to be the self-evidence of “inner perception.” And what was more plausible than the way in which Locke illustrated the reality of the detached soul and the history running its course within it, its internal genesis, by means of the “white paper” and thus naturalised this reality? But now, could the “idealism” of Berkeley and Hume, and finally skepticism with all its absurdity, be avoided? What a paradox! Nothing could cripple the peculiar force of the rapidly growing and, in their own accomplishments, unassailable exact sciences or the belief in their truth. And yet, as soon as one took into account that they are the accomplishments of the consciousness of knowing subjects, their self-evidence and clarity were transformed into incomprehensible absurdity. No offense was taken if, in Descartes, immanent sensibility engendered pictures of the world; but in Berkeley this sensibility engendered the world of bodies itself; and in Hume the entire soul, with its “impressions” and “ideas,” the forces belonging to it, conceived of by analogy to physical forces, its laws of association (as parallels to the law of gravity!), engendered the whole world, the world itself, not merely something like a picture — though, to be sure, this product was merely a fiction, a representation put together inwardly which was actually quite vague. And this is true of the world of the rational sciences as well as that of *experientia vaga*.

Was there not, here, in spite of the absurdity which may have been due to particular aspects of the presuppositions, a hidden and unavoidable truth to be felt? Was this not the revelation of a completely new way of assessing the objectivity of the world and its whole ontic meaning and, correlatively, that of the objective sciences, a way which did not attack their own validity but did attack their philosophical or metaphysical claim, that of absolute truth? Now at last it was possible and necessary to become aware of the fact — which had remained completely unconsidered in these sciences — that the life of consciousness is a life of accomplishment: the accomplishment, right or wrong, of ontic meaning, even sensibly intuited meaning, and all the more of scientific meaning. Descartes had not pondered the fact that, just as the sensible world, that of everyday life, is the *cogitatum* of sensing cogitationes, so the scientific world is the *cogitatum* of scientific cogitationes; and he had not noticed the circle in which he was involved when he presupposed, in his proof of the existence of God, the possibility of inferences transcending the ego, when this possibility, after all, was supposed to be established only through this proof. The thought was quite remote from him that the whole world could itself be a *cogitatum* arising out of the universal synthesis of the variously flowing cogitationes and that, on a higher level, the rational accomplishment of the scientific cogitationes, built upon the former ones, could be constitutive of the scientific world. But was this thought not suggested, now, by Berkeley and Hume — under the presupposition that the absurdity of their empiricism lay only in a belief that was supposedly obvious, through which immanent reason had been driven out in advance? Through Berkeley’s and Hume’s revival and radicalisation of the Cartesian fundamental problem, “dogmatic” objectivism was, from the point of view of our critical presentation, shaken to the foundations. This is

true not only of the mathematising objectivism, so inspiring to people of the time, which actually ascribed to the world itself a mathematical-rational in-itself (which we copy, so to speak, better and better in our more or less perfect theories); it was also true of the general objectivism which had been dominant for millennia.

## **25 The “transcendental” motif in rationalism: Kant’s conception of a transcendental philosophy.**

AS IS KNOWN, Hume has a particular place in history also because of the turn he brought about in the development of Kant’s thinking. Kant himself says, in the much-quoted words, that Hume roused him from his dogmatic slumbers and gave his investigations in the field of speculative philosophy a different direction. Was it, then, the historical mission of Kant to experience the shaking of objectivism, of which I just spoke, and to undertake in his transcendental philosophy the solution of the task before which Hume drew back? The answer must be negative. It is a new sort of transcendental subjectivism which begins with Kant and changes into new forms in the systems of German idealism. Kant does not belong to the development which expands in a continuous line from Descartes through Locke, and he is not the successor of Hume. His interpretation of the Humean skepticism and the way in which he reacts against it are determined by his own provenance in the Wolffian school. The “revolution of the way of thinking” motivated by Hume’s impulse is not directed against empiricism but against post-Cartesian rationalism’s way of thinking, whose great consummator was Leibniz and which was given its systematic textbook-like presentation, its most effective and by far most convincing form, by Christian Wolff.

First of all, what is the meaning of the “dogmatism,” taken quite generally, that Kant uproots? Although the Meditations continued to have their effect on post-Cartesian philosophy, the passionate radicalism which drove them was not passed on to Descartes’s successors. They were quite prepared to accept what Descartes only wished to establish, and found so hard to establish, by inquiring back into the ultimate source of all knowledge: namely, the absolute metaphysical validity of the objective sciences, or, taking these together, of philosophy as the one objective universal science; or, what comes to the same thing, the right of the knowing ego to let its rational constructs, in virtue of the self-evidences occurring in its mens, count as nature with a meaning transcending this ego. The new conception of the world of bodies, self-enclosed as nature, and the natural sciences related to them, the correlative conception of the self-enclosed souls and the task, related to them, of a new psychology with a rational method according to the mathematical model — all this had established itself. In every direction rational philosophy was under construction; of primary interest were discoveries, theories, the rigor of their inferences, and correspondingly the general problem of method and its perfection. Thus knowledge was very much discussed, and from a scientifically general point of view. This reflection on knowledge, however, was not

transcendental reflection but rather a reflection on the praxis of knowledge and was thus similar to the reflection carried out by one who works in any other practical sphere of interest, the kind which is expressed in the general propositions of a technology. It is a matter of what we are accustomed to call logic, though in a traditional, very narrow, and limited sense. Thus we can say quite correctly (broadening the meaning): it is a matter of a logic as a theory of norms and a technology with the fullest universality, to the end of attaining a universal philosophy.

The thematic direction was thus twofold: on the one hand, toward a systematic universe of “logical laws,” the theoretical totality of the truths destined to function as norms for all judgments which shall be capable of being objectively true — and to this belongs, in addition to the old formal logic, also arithmetic, all of pure analytic mathematics, i.e., the *mathesis universalis* of Leibniz, and in general everything that is purely a priori.

On the other hand, the thematic direction was toward general considerations about those who make judgments as those striving for objective truth: how they are to make normative use of those laws so that the self-evidence through which a judgment is certified as objectively true can appear, and similarly about the ways and temptations of failure, etc.

Now clearly, in all the laws which are in the broader sense “logical,” beginning with the principle of non-contradiction, metaphysical truth was contained *eo ipso*. The systematically worked-out theory of these laws had, of itself, the meaning of a general ontology. What happened here scientifically was the work of pure reason operating exclusively with concepts innate in the knowing soul. That these concepts, that logical laws, that pure rational lawfulness in general contained metaphysical-objective truth was “obvious.” Occasionally appeal was made to God as a guarantee, in remembrance of Descartes, with little concern for the fact that it was rational metaphysics which first had to establish God’s existence.

Over against the faculty of pure a priori thinking, that of pure reason, stood that of sensibility, the faculty of outer and inner experience. The subject, affected in outer experience from “outside,” thereby becomes certain of affecting objects, but in order to know them in their truth he needs pure reason, i.e., the system of norms in which reason displays itself, as the “logic” for all true knowledge of the objective world. Such is the typical rationalist conception.

As for Kant, who had been influenced by empiricist psychology: Hume had made him sensitive to the fact that between the pure truths of reason and metaphysical objectivity there remained a gulf of incomprehensibility, namely, as to how precisely these truths of reason could really guarantee the knowledge of things. Even the model rationality of the mathematical natural sciences was transformed into an enigma. That it owed its rationality, which was in fact quite indubitable — that is, its method — to the normative a priori of pure logico-mathematical reason, and that the latter, in its disciplines, exhibited an unassailable pure rationality, remained unquestioned. Natural science is, to be sure, not purely rational insofar as it has need of outer experience, sensibility; but everything in it that is rational it

owes to pure reason and its setting of norms; only through them can there be rationalised experience. As for sensibility, on the other hand, it had generally been assumed that it gives rise to the merely sensible data, precisely as a result of affection from the outside. And yet one acted as if the experiential world of the prescientific man — the world not yet logicised by mathematics — was the world pre-given by mere sensibility.

Hume had shown that we naively read causality into this world and think that we grasp necessary succession in intuition. The same is true of everything that makes the body of the everyday surrounding world into an identical thing with identical properties, relations, etc. (and Hume had in fact worked this out in detail in the *Treatise*, which was unknown to Kant). Data and complexes of data come and go, but the thing, presumed to be simply experienced sensibly, is not something sensible which persists through this alteration. The sensationalist thus declares it to be a fiction.

He is substituting, we shall say, mere sense-data for perception, which after all places things (everyday things) before our eyes. In other words, he overlooks the fact that mere sensibility, related to mere data of sense, cannot account for objects of experience. Thus he overlooks the fact that these objects of experience point to a hidden mental accomplishment and to the problem of what kind of an accomplishment this can be. From the very start, after all, it must be a kind which enables the objects of prescientific experience, through logic, mathematics, mathematical natural science, to be knowable with objective validity, i.e., with a necessity which can be accepted by and is binding for everyone.

But Kant says to himself: undoubtedly things appear, but only because the sense-data, already brought together in certain ways, in concealment, through a priori forms, are made logical in the course of their alteration — without any appeal to reason as manifested in logic and mathematics, without its being brought into normative function. Now is this quasi-logical function something that is psychologically accidental? If we think of it as absent, can a mathematics, a logic of nature, ever have the possibility of knowing objects through mere sense-data?

These are, if I am not mistaken, the inwardly guiding thoughts of Kant. Kant now undertakes, in fact, to show, through a regressive procedure, that if common experience is really to be experience of objects of nature, objects which can really be knowable with objective truth, i.e., scientifically, in respect to their being and non-being, their being-such and being-otherwise, then the intuitively appearing world must already be a construct of the faculties of “pure intuition” and “pure reason,” the same faculties that express themselves in explicit thinking in mathematics and logic.

In other words, reason has a twofold way of functioning and showing itself. One way is its systematic self-exposition, self-revelation in free and pure mathematising, in the practice of the pure mathematical sciences. Here it presupposes the forming character of “pure intuition,” which belongs to sensibility itself. The objective result of both faculties is pure mathematics as theory. The other way is that of reason constantly functioning in con-

cealment, reason ceaselessly rationalising sense-data and always having them as already rationalised. Its objective result is the sensibly intuited world of objects — the empirical presupposition of all natural-scientific thinking, i.e., the thinking which, through manifest mathematical reason, consciously gives norms to the experience of the surrounding world. Like the intuited world of bodies, the whole world of natural science (and with it the dualistic world which can be known scientifically) is a subjective construct of our intellect, only the material of the sense-data arises from a transcendent affection by “things in themselves.” The latter are in principle inaccessible to objective scientific knowledge. For according to this theory, man’s science, as an accomplishment bound by the interplay of the subjective faculties “sensibility” and “reason” (or, as Kant says here, “understanding”), cannot explain the origin, the “cause,” of the factual manifolds of sense-data. The ultimate presuppositions of the possibility and actuality of objective knowledge cannot be objectively knowable.

Whereas natural science had pretended to be a branch of philosophy, the ultimate science of what is, and had believed itself capable of knowing, through its rationality, what is in itself, beyond the subjectivity of the factualities of knowledge, for Kant, now, objective science, as an accomplishment remaining within subjectivity, is separated off from his philosophical theory. The latter, as a theory of the accomplishments necessarily carried out within subjectivity, and thus as a theory of the possibility and scope of objective knowledge, reveals the naivete of the supposed rational philosophy of nature-in-itself.

We know how this critique is for Kant nevertheless the beginning of a philosophy in the old sense, for the universe of being, thus extending even to the rationally unknowable in-itself — how, under the titles “critique of practical reason” and “critique of judgment,” he not only limits philosophical claims but also believes he is capable of opening ways toward the “scientifically” unknowable in-itself. Here we shall not go into this. What interests us now is — speaking in formal generality — that Kant, reacting against the data-positivism of Hume (as he understands it) outlines a great, systematically constructed, and in a new way still scientific philosophy in which the Cartesian turn to conscious subjectivity works itself out in the form of a transcendental subjectivism.

Irrespective of the truth of the Kantian philosophy, about which we need not pass judgment here, we must not pass over the fact that Hume, as he is understood by Kant, is not the real Hume.

Kant speaks of the “Humean problem.” What is the actual problem, the one which drives Hume himself? We find it when we transform Hume’s skeptical theory, his total claim, back into his problem, extending it to those consequences which do not quite find their complete expression in the theory — although it is difficult to suppose that a genius with a spirit like Hume’s did not see these consequences, which are not expressly drawn and not theoretically treated. If we proceed in this way, we find nothing less than this universal problem:

How is the naive obviousness of the certainty of the world, the certainty in which we live — and, what is more, the certainty of the everyday world as well as that of the sophisticated

theoretical constructions built upon this everyday world — to be made comprehensible?

What is, in respect to sense and validity, the “objective world,” objectively true being, and also the objective truth of science, once we have seen universally with Hume (and in respect to nature even with Berkeley) that “world” is a validity which has sprung up within subjectivity, indeed — speaking from my point of view, who am now philosophising — one which has sprung up within my subjectivity, with all the content it ever counts as having for me?

The naivete of speaking about “objectivity” without ever considering subjectivity as experiencing, knowing, and actually concretely accomplishing, the naivete of the scientist of nature or of the world in general, who is blind to the fact that all the truths he attains as objective truths and the objective world itself as the substratum of his formulae (the everyday world of experience as well as the higher-level conceptual world of knowledge) are his own life-construct developed within himself — this naivete is naturally no longer possible as soon as life becomes the point of focus. And must this liberation not come to anyone who seriously immerses himself in the Treatise and, after unmasking Hume’s naturalistic presuppositions, becomes conscious of the power of his motivation?

But how is this most radical subjectivism, which subjectivises the world itself, comprehensible? The world-enigma in the deepest and most ultimate sense, the enigma of a world whose being is being through subjective accomplishment, and this with the self-evidence that another world cannot be at all conceivable — that, and nothing else, is Hume’s problem.

Kant, however, for whom, as can easily be seen, so many presuppositions are “obviously” valid, presuppositions which in the Humean sense are included within this world-enigma, never penetrated to the enigma itself. For his set of problems stands on the ground of the rationalism extending from Descartes through Leibniz to Wolff.

In this way, through the problem of rational natural science which primarily guides and determines Kant’s thinking, we seek to make understandable Kant’s position, so difficult to interpret, in relation to his historical setting. What particularly interests us now — speaking first in formal generality — is the fact that in reaction to the Humean data-positivism, which in his fictionalism gives up philosophy as a science, a great and systematically constructed scientific philosophy appears for the first time since Descartes — a philosophy which must be called transcendental subjectivism.

## **26 Preliminary discussion of the concept of the “transcendental” which guides us here.**

I SHOULD LIKE TO NOTE the following right away: the expression “transcendental philosophy” has been much used since Kant, even as a general title for universal philosophies



whose concepts are oriented toward those of the Kantian type. I myself use the word “transcendental” in the broadest sense for the original motif, discussed in detail above, which through Descartes confers meaning upon all modern philosophies, the motif which, in all of them, seeks to come to itself, so to speak — seeks to attain the genuine and pure form of its task and its systematic development. It is the motif of inquiring back into the ultimate source of all the formations of knowledge, the motif of the knower’s reflecting upon himself and his knowing life in which all the scientific structures that are valid for him occur purposefully, are stored up as acquisitions, and have become and continue to become freely available. Working itself out radically, it is the motif of a universal philosophy which is grounded purely in this source and thus ultimately grounded. This source bears the title I-myself, with all of my actual and possible knowing life and, ultimately, my concrete life in general. The whole transcendental set of problems circles around the relation of this, my “I” — the “ego” — to what it is at first taken for granted to be — my soul — and, again, around the relation of this ego and my conscious life to the world of which I am conscious and whose true being I know through my own cognitive structures.

Of course this most general concept of the “transcendental” cannot be supported by documents; it is not to be gained through the internal exposition and comparison of the individual systems. Rather, it is a concept acquired by pondering the coherent history of the entire philosophical modern period: the concept of its task which is demonstrable only in this way, lying within it as the driving force of its development, striving forward from vague dynamis towards its energeia.

This is only a preliminary indication, which has already been prepared to a certain extent by our historical analysis up to this point; our subsequent presentations are to establish the justification for our kind of “teleological” approach to history and its methodical function for the definitive construction of a transcendental philosophy which satisfies its most proper meaning. This preliminary indication of a radical transcendental subjectivism will naturally seem strange and arouse skepticism. I welcome this, if this skepticism bespeaks, not the prior resolve of rejection, but rather a free withholding of any judgment.

## **27 The philosophy of Kant and his followers seen from the perspective of our guiding concept of the “transcendental.” The task of taking a critical position.**

RETURNING AGAIN TO KANT: his system can certainly be characterised, in the general sense defined, as one of “transcendental philosophy,” although it is far from accomplishing a truly radical grounding of philosophy, the totality of all sciences. Kant never permitted himself to enter the vast depths of the Cartesian fundamental investigation, and his own set of problems never caused him to seek in these depths for ultimate groundings and de-

cisions. Should I, in the following presentations, succeed — as I hope — in awakening the insight that a transcendental philosophy is the more genuine, and better fulfills its vocation as philosophy, the more radical it is and, finally, that it comes to its actual and true existence, to its actual and true beginning, only when the philosopher has penetrated to a clear understanding of himself as the subjectivity functioning as primal source, we should still have to recognise, on the other hand, that Kant's philosophy is on the way to this, that it is in accord with the formal, general sense of a transcendental philosophy in our definition. It is a philosophy which, in opposition to prescientific and scientific objectivism, goes back to knowing subjectivity as the primal locus of all objective formations of sense and ontic validities, undertakes to understand the existing world as a structure of sense and validity, and in this way seeks to set in motion an essentially new type of scientific attitude and a new type of philosophy. In fact, if we do not count the negativistic, skeptical philosophy of a Hume, the Kantian system is the first attempt, and one carried out with impressive scientific seriousness, at a truly universal transcendental philosophy meant to be a rigorous science in a sense of scientific rigor which has only now been discovered and which is the only genuine sense.

Something similar holds, we can say in advance, for the great continuations and revisions of Kantian transcendentalism in the great systems of German Idealism. They all share the basic conviction that the objective sciences (no matter how much they, and particularly the exact sciences, may consider themselves, in virtue of their obvious theoretical and practical accomplishments, to be in possession of the only true method and to be treasure houses of ultimate truths) are not seriously sciences at all, not cognitions ultimately grounded, i.e., not ultimately, theoretically responsible for themselves — and that they are not, then, cognitions of what exists in ultimate truth. This can be accomplished according to German Idealism only by a transcendental-subjective method and, carried through as a system, transcendental philosophy. As was already the case with Kant, the opinion is not that the self-evidence of the positive-scientific method is an illusion and its accomplishment an illusory accomplishment but rather that this self-evidence is itself a problem; that the objective-scientific method rests upon a never questioned, deeply concealed subjective ground whose philosophical elucidation will for the first time reveal the true meaning of the accomplishments of positive science and, correlatively, the true ontic meaning of the objective world — precisely as a transcendental-subjective meaning.

Now in order to be able to understand the position of Kant and of the systems of transcendental idealism proceeding from him, within modern philosophy's teleological unity of meaning, and thus to make progress in our own self-understanding, it is necessary to critically get closer to the style of Kant's scientific attitude and to clarify the lack of radicalism we are attacking in his philosophising. It is with good reason that we pause over Kant, a significant turning point in modern history. The critique to be directed against him will reflect back and elucidate all earlier philosophical history, namely, in respect to the general meaning of scientific discipline which all earlier philosophies strove to realize — as the only meaning which lay and could possibly lie within their spiritual horizon. Precisely in this way

a more profound concept — the most important of all — of “objectivism” will come to the fore (more important than the one we were able to define earlier), and with it the genuinely radical meaning of the opposition between objectivism and transcendentalism.

Yet, over and above this, the more concrete critical analyses of the conceptual structures of the Kantian turn, and the contrast between it and the Cartesian turn, will set in motion our own concurrent thinking in such a way as to place us, gradually and of its own accord, before the final turn and the final decisions. We ourselves shall be drawn into an inner transformation through which we shall come face to face with, to direct experience of, the long-felt but constantly concealed dimension of the transcendental.” The ground of experience, opened up in its infinity, will then become the fertile soil of a methodical working philosophy, with the self-evidence, furthermore, that all conceivable philosophical and scientific problems of the past are to be posed and decided by starting from this ground.

## **Part III. The Clarification of the Transcendental Problem and the Related Function of Psychology**

1. The appendix to the German edition contains a manuscript entitled “Foreword to the Continuation of the Crisis,” which begins with the following paragraph :

“Herewith appears, unfortunately very much delayed, the continuation of this work which was begun in the first volume of *Philosophia* with two introductory sections. Insurmountable inhibitions, the effects of my faltering health, forced me to neglect drafts which were long since ready. With this there arose a pause which is dangerous for the understanding of the teleological-historical way attempted here to the conception of the idea and method of transcendental phenomenology. The resulting situation has become somewhat similar to that which would arise if the presentation of a great musical work were to break off with the conclusion of the overture, and indeed in such a way that the actual work (the opera itself) to which it points the way, and which it has created a vital readiness to understand, was then to be performed sometime later without repetition of the overture” (*Krisis*, p. 435).

The rest of this “Foreword” (some 11 pages) reveals that it was destined for a revision of Part III which was never made. It gives reasons for postponing the further critique of Kant promised at the end of Part II in favor of a nonhistorical exposition, presumably that of the life-world; whereas the extant version of Part III does deal with Kant at the beginning. It is for this reason that I have not included a full translation of this text. Some interesting passages are quoted in the Translator’s Introduction, pp. xxviii f. (See also p. xviii, note 5.)

### **A. The Way into Phenomenological Transcendental Philosophy by Inquiring Back From the Pre-given Life-World**

#### **28 Kant’s unexpressed “presupposition”: the surrounding world of life, taken for granted as valid.**

KANT IS CERTAIN that his philosophy will bring the dominant rationalism to its downfall by exhibiting the inadequacy of its foundations. He rightly reproaches rationalism for neglecting questions which should have been its fundamental questions; that is, it had never penetrated to the subjective structure of our world-consciousness prior to and within scientific knowledge and thus had never asked how the world, which appears straightforwardly to us men, and to us as scientists, comes to be knowable a priori-how, that is, the exact science of nature is possible, the science for which, after all, pure mathematics, together with a further pure a priori, is the instrument of all knowledge which is objective, [i.e.,] unconditionally valid for everyone who is rational (who thinks logically).

But Kant, for his part, has no idea that in his philosophizing he stands on unquestioned presuppositions and that the undoubtedly great discoveries in his theories are there only in concealment; that is, they are not there as finished results, just as the theories themselves are not finished theories, i.e., do not have a definitive scientific form. What he offers demands new work and, above all, critical analysis. An example of a great discovery — a merely preliminary discovery—is the “understanding”

which has, in respect to nature, two functions<sup>1</sup> : understanding interpreting itself, in explicit self-reflection, as normative laws, and, on the other hand, understanding ruling in concealment, i.e., ruling as constitutive of the always already developed and always further developing meaning-configuration “intuitively given surrounding world.” This discovery could never be actually grounded or even be fully comprehensible in the manner of the Kantian theory, i.e., as a result of his merely regressive method. In the “transcendental deduction” of the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason Kant makes an approach to a direct grounding, one which descends to the original sources, only to break off again almost at once without arriving at the genuine problems of foundation which are to be opened up from this supposedly psychological side.

We shall begin our considerations by showing that Kant’s inquiries in the critique of reason have an unquestioned ground of presuppositions which codetermine the meaning of his questions. Sciences to whose truths and methods Kant attributes actual validity become a problem, and with them the spheres of being [Seinssphären] themselves to which these sciences refer. They become a problem in virtue of certain questions which take knowing subjectivity, too, into account, questions which find their answer in theories about transcendently forming subjectivity, about the transcendental achievements of sensibility, of the understanding, etc., and, on the highest level, theories about functions of the “I” of “transcendental apperception.” What had become an enigma, the achievement of mathematical natural science and of pure mathematics (in our broadened sense) as its logical method, was supposed to have been made comprehensible through these theories; but the theories also led to a revolutionary reinterpretation of the actual ontic meaning of nature as the world of possible experience and possible knowledge and thus correlatively to the reinterpretation of the actual truth — meaning of the sciences concerned.

Naturally, from the very start in the Kantian manner of posing questions, the everyday surrounding world of life is presupposed as existing—the surrounding world in which all of us (even I who am now philosophizing) consciously have our existence; here are also the sciences, as cultural facts in this world, with their scientists and theories. In this world we are objects among objects in the sense of the life-world, namely, as being

1. Reading “. . . ist der hinsichtlich der Natur doppelt fungierende Verstand. . . .”

here and there, in the plain certainty of experience, before anything that is established scientifically, whether in physiology, psychology, or sociology. On the other hand, we are subjects for this world, namely, as the ego-subjects experiencing it, contemplating it, valuing

it, related to it purposefully; for us this surrounding world has only the ontic meaning given to it by our experiencings, our thoughts, our valuations, etc.; and it has the modes of validity (certainty of being, possibility, perhaps illusion, etc.) which we, as the subjects of validity, at the same time bring about or else possess from earlier on as habitual acquisitions and bear within us as validities of such and such a content which we can reactualize at will. To be sure, all this undergoes manifold alterations, whereas “the” world, as existing in a unified way, persists throughout, being corrected only in its content.

Clearly the content-alteration of the perceived object, being change or motion perceived as belonging to the object itself, is distinguished with self-evidence from the alteration of its manners of appearing (e.g., the perspectives, the near and far appearances) through which something objective of this type exhibits itself as being itself present. We see this in the change of [our] attitude. [If we are] directed straightforwardly toward the object and what belongs to it, [our] gaze passes through the appearances toward what continuously appears through their continuous unification: the object, with the ontic validity of the mode “itself present.” In the reflective attitude, [by contrast,] we have not a one but a manifold. Now the sequence of the appearances themselves is thematic, rather than what appears in them. Perception is the primal mode of intuition [Anschauung]; it exhibits with primal originality, that is, in the mode of self-presence. In addition, there are other modes of intuition which in themselves consciously have the character of [giving us] modifications of this “itself there” as themselves present. These are presentifications, modifications of presentations<sup>2</sup>; they make us conscious of the modalities of time, e.g., not that which is-itself-there but that which was-itself-there or that which is in the future, that which will-be-itself-there. Presentifying intuitions “recapitulate” — in certain modifications belonging to them — all the manifolds of appearance through which what is objective exhibits itself perceptively. Recollecting intuition, for example,

2. Vergegenwärtigungen, i.e., modifications of Gegenwärtigungen. The former are explicit acts of rendering consciously present that which is not “itself present,” as in the case of recollection or imagination.

shows the object as having-been-itself-there, recapitulating the perspectivization and other manners of appearing, though in recollective modifications. I am now conscious of this perspectivization as one which has been, a sequence of subjective “exhibitions of,” having-been in my earlier ontic validities.

Here we can now clarify the very limited justification for speaking of a sense-world, a world of sense-intuition, a sensible world of appearances. In all the verifications of the life of our natural interests, which remain purely in the life-world, the return to “sensibly” experiencing intuition plays a prominent role. For everything that exhibits itself in the life-world as a concrete thing obviously has a bodily character, even if it is not a mere body, as, for example, an animal or a cultural object, i.e., even if it also has psychic or otherwise spiritual properties. If we pay attention now purely to the bodily aspect of the things, this obviously exhibits itself perceptively only in seeing, in touching, in hearing, etc., i.e., in

visual, tactual, acoustical, and other such aspects. Obviously and inevitably participating in this is our living body, which is never absent from the perceptual field, and specifically its corresponding “organs of perception” (eyes, hands, ears, etc.). In consciousness they play a constant role here; specifically they function in seeing, hearing, etc., together with the ego’s motility belonging to them, i.e., what is called kinesthesia. All kinestheses, each being an “I move,” “I do,” [etc.] are bound together in a comprehensive unity — in which kinesthetic holding-still is [also] a mode of the “I do.” Clearly the aspect-exhibitions of whatever body is appearing in perception, and the kinestheses, are not processes [simply running] alongside each other; rather, they work together in such a way that the aspects have the ontic meaning of, or the validity of, aspects of the body only through the fact that they are those aspects continually required by the kinestheses — by the kinesthetic-sensual total situation in each of its working variations of the total kinesthesia by setting in motion this or that particular kinesthesia — and that they correspondingly fulfill the requirement.

Thus sensibility, the ego’s active functioning of the living body or the bodily organs, belongs in a fundamental, essential way to all experience of bodies. It proceeds in consciousness not as a mere series of body-appearances, as if these in themselves, through themselves alone and their coalescences, were appearance of bodies; rather, they are such in consciousness only in combination with the kinesthetically functioning living body [Leiblichkeit], the ego functioning here in a peculiar sort of activity and habituality. In a quite unique way the living body is constantly in the perceptual field quite immediately, with a completely unique ontic meaning, precisely the meaning indicated by the word “organ” (here used in its most primitive sense), [namely, as] that through which I exist in a completely unique way and quite immediately as the ego of affection and actions, [as that] in which I hold sway quite immediately, kinesthetically — articulated into particular organs through which I hold sway, or potentially hold sway, in particular kinestheses corresponding to them. And this “holding-sway,” here exhibited as functioning in all perception of bodies — the familiar, total system of kinestheses available to consciousness — is actualized in the particular kinesthetic situation [and] is perpetually bound to a [general] situation in which bodies appear, i.e., that of the field of perception. To the variety of appearances through which a body is perceivable as this one-and-the-same body correspond, in their own way, the kinestheses which belong to this body; as these kinestheses are allowed to run their course, the corresponding required appearances must show up in order to be appearances of this body at all, i.e., in order to be appearances which exhibit in themselves this body with its properties.

Thus, purely in terms of perception, physical body and living body [Körper and Leib] 4 are essentially different; living body, that is, [understood] as the only one which is actually given [to me as such] in perception: my own living body. How the consciousness originates through which my living body nevertheless acquires the ontic validity of one physical body among others, and how, on the other hand, certain physical bodies in my perceptual field come to count as living bodies, living bodies of “alien” ego-subjects-these are now necessary questions.

In our reflections we confined ourselves to the perceiving consciousness of things, to one's own perceiving of them, to my perceptual field. Here my own living body alone, and never an alien living body, can be perceived as living; the latter is perceived

3. *walten*. "Holding sway" is somewhat awkward in English, but it seems to best approximate Husserl's use of this archaic term. The latter is often used in religious language (*Gottes Walten*) to signify God's rule and power over the world and his intervention in its affairs. The English "wield" is related to it but is transitive. Husserl uses the term primarily in connection with the living body (unlike Heidegger, who resurrected it for a different purpose), meaning one's "wielding" of the body and its organs so as to have some control of one's surroundings.

4. See §g, note 15.

only as a physical body. In my perceptual field I find myself holding sway as ego through my organs and generally through everything belonging to me as an ego in my ego-acts and faculties. However, though the objects of the life-world, if they are to show their very own being, necessarily show themselves as physical bodies, this does not mean that they show themselves only in this way; and [similarly] we, though we are related through the living body to all objects which exist for us, are not related to them solely as a living body. Thus if it is a question of objects in the perceptual field, we are perceptually also in the field<sup>5</sup>; and the same is true, in modification, of every intuitive field, and even of every nonintuitive one, since we are obviously capable of "representing" to ourselves everything which is nonintuitively before us (though we are sometimes temporally limited in this). [Being related] "through the living body" clearly does not mean merely [being related] "as a physical body"; rather, the expression refers to the kinesthetic, to functioning as an ego in this peculiar way, primarily through seeing, hearing, etc.; and of course other modes of the ego belong to this (for example, lifting, carrying, pushing, and the like).

But being an ego through the living body [*die leibliche Ichlichkeit*] is of course not the only way of being an ego, and none of its ways can be severed from the others; throughout all their transformations they form a unity. Thus we are concretely in the field of perception, etc., and in the field of consciousness, however broadly we may conceive this, through our living body, but not only in this way, as full ego-subjects, each of us as the full-fledged "I-the-man." Thus in whatever way we may be conscious of the world as universal horizon, as coherent universe of existing objects, we, each "I-the-man" and all of us together, belong to the world as living with one another in the world; and the world is our world, valid for our consciousness as existing precisely through this "living together." We, as living in wakeful world-consciousness, are constantly active on the basis of our passive having of the world; it is from there, by objects pregiven in consciousness, that we are affected; it is to this or that object that we pay attention, according to our interests; with them we deal actively in different ways; through our acts they are "thematic" objects. As an example I give the observant explication of the properties of something which appears perceptively, or our activity of combining, relating, actively identifying and distinguishing,

5. I.e., as a physical body (*Körper*).



or our active evaluation, our projection of plans, our active realization of the planned means and ends.

As subjects of acts (ego-subjects) we are directed toward thematic objects in modes of primary and secondary, and perhaps also peripheral, directedness. In this preoccupation with the objects the acts themselves are not thematic. But we are capable of coming back and reflecting on ourselves and our current activity: it now becomes thematic and objective through a new act, the vitally functioning one, which itself is now unthematic.

The consciousness of the world, then, is in constant motion; we are conscious of the world always in terms of some objectcontent or other, in the alteration of the different ways of being conscious (intuitive, nonintuitive, determined, undetermined, etc.) and also in the alteration of affection and action, in such a way that there is always a total sphere of affection and such that the affecting objects are now thematic, now unthematic; here we also find ourselves, we who always and inevitably belong to the affective sphere, always functioning as subjects of acts but only occasionally being thematically objective as the object of preoccupation with ourselves.

Obviously this is true not only for me, the individual ego; rather we, in living together, have the world pregiven in this “together,” as the world valid as existing for us and to which we, together, belong, the world as world for all, pregiven with this ontic meaning. Constantly functioning in wakeful life, we also function together, in the manifold ways of considering, together, objects pregiven to us in common, thinking together, valuing, planning, acting together. Here we find also that particular thematic alteration in which the we-subjectivity, somehow constantly functioning, becomes a thematic object, whereby the acts through which it functions also become thematic, though always with a residuum which remains unthematic-remains, so to speak, anonymous-namely, the reflections which are functioning in connection with this theme.\*

\* Naturally all activity, and thus also this reflecting activity, gives rise to its habitual acquisitions. In observing, we attain habitual knowledge, acquaintance with the object which exists for us in terms of its previously unknown characteristics-and the same is true of self-knowledge through self-observation. In the evaluation of ourselves and the plans and actions related to ourselves and our fellows, we likewise attain self-values and ends concerning ourselves [which become] our habitually persisting validities. But all knowledge in general, all value-validities and ends in general, are, as having been acquired through our activity, at the same time persisting properties of ourselves as ego-subjects, as persons, and can be found in the reflective attitude as making up our own being.

Considering ourselves in particular as the scientists that we here factually find ourselves to be, what corresponds to our particular manner of being as scientists is our present functioning in the manner of scientific thinking, putting questions and answering them theoretically in relation to nature or the world of the spirit; and [the latter are] at first nothing other than the one or the other aspect of the life-world which, in advance, is already valid, which we experience or are otherwise conscious of either prescientifically or scientifically. Cofunctioning

here are the other scientists who, united with us in a community of theory, acquire and have the same truths or, in the communalization of accomplishing acts, are united with us in a critical transaction aimed at critical agreement. On the other hand, we can be for others, and they for us, mere objects; rather than being together in the unity of immediate, driving, common theoretical interest, we can get to know one another observingly, taking note of others' acts of thought, acts of experiencing, and possibly other acts as objective facts, but "disinterestedly," without joining in performing these acts, without critically assenting to them or taking exception to them.

Naturally, all these things are the most obvious of the obvious. Must one speak about them, and with so much ado? In life certainly not. But not as a philosopher either? Is this not the opening-up of a realm, indeed an infinite realm, of always ready and available but never questioned ontic validities? Are they not constant presuppositions of scientific and, at the highest level, philosophical thinking? Not, however, that it would or could ever be a matter of utilizing these ontic validities in their objective truth.

It belongs to what is taken for granted, prior to all scientific thought and all philosophical questioning, that the world is-always is in advance-and that every correction of an opinion, whether an experiential or other opinion, presupposes the already existing world, namely, as a horizon of what in the given case is indubitably valid as existing, and presupposes within this horizon something familiar and doubtlessly certain with which that which is perhaps canceled out as invalid came into conflict. Objective science, too, asks questions only on the ground of this world's existing in advance through prescientific life. Like all praxis, objective science presupposes the being of this world, but it sets itself the task of transposing knowledge which is imperfect and prescientific in respect of scope and constancy into perfect knowledge-in accord with an idea of a correlative which is, to be sure, infinitely distant, i.e., of a world which in itself is fixed and determined and of truths which are idealiter scientific ("truths-in-themselves") and which predicatively interpret this world. To realize this in a systematic process, in stages of perfection, through a method which makes possible a constant advance: this is the task.

For the human being in his surrounding world there are many types of praxis, and among them is this peculiar and historically late one, theoretical praxis. It has its own professional methods; it is the art of theories, of discovering and securing truths with a certain new ideal sense which is foreign to prescientific life, the sense of a certain "final validity," "universal validity."

Here we have again offered an example of exhibiting what is "obvious," but this time in order to make clear that in respect to all these manifold validities-in-advance, i.e., "presuppositions" of the philosopher, there arise questions of being in a new and immediately highly enigmatic dimension. These questions, too, concern the obviously existing, ever intuitively pre-given world; but they are not questions belonging to that professional praxis and technique (techne) which is called objective science, not questions belonging to that art of grounding and broadening the realm of objectively scientific truths about this surrounding

world; rather, they are questions of how the object, the prescientifically and then the scientifically true object, stands in relation to all the subjective elements which everywhere have a voice in what is taken for granted in advance.

## **29 The life-world can be disclosed as a realm of subjective phenomena which have remained “anonymous.”**

WHEN WE PROCEED, philosophizing with Kant, not by starting from his beginning and moving forward in his paths but by inquiring back into what was thus taken for granted (that of which Kantian thinking, like everyone’s thinking, makes use as unquestioned and available), when we become conscious of it as “presuppositions” and accord these their own universal and theoretical interest, there opens up to us, to our growing astonishment, an infinity of ever new phenomena belonging to a new dimension, coming to light only through consistent penetration into the meaning and validity-implications of what was thus taken for granted — an infinity, because continued penetration shows that every phenomenon attained through this unfolding of meaning, given at first in the life-world as obviously existing, itself contains meaning- and validity-implications whose exposition leads again to new phenomena, and so on. These are purely subjective phenomena throughout, but not merely facts involving psychological processes of sense-data; rather, they are mental [geistige] processes which, as such, exercise with essential necessity the function of constituting forms of meaning [Sinnesgestalten]. But they constitute them in each case out of mental “material” which [itself] proves in turn, with essential necessity, to be mental form, i.e., to be constituted; just as any newly developed form [of meaning] is destined to become material, namely, to function in the constitution of [some new] form.

No objective science, no psychology — which, after all, sought to become the universal science of the subjective — and no philosophy has ever made thematic and thereby actually discovered this realm of the subjective-not even the Kantian philosophy, which sought, after all, to go back to the subjective conditions of the possibility of an objectively experienceable and knowable world. It is a realm of something subjective which is completely closed off within itself, existing in its own way, functioning in all experiencing, all thinking, all life, thus everywhere inseparably involved; yet it has never been held in view, never been grasped and understood.

Does philosophy fulfill the sense of its primal establishment as the universal and ultimately grounding science if it leaves this realm to its “anonymity”? Can it do this, can any science do this which seeks to be a branch of philosophy, i.e., which would tolerate no presuppositions, no basic sphere of beings beneath itself of which no one knows, which no one interrogates scientifically, which no one has mastered in a knowing way? I called the

sciences in general branches of philosophy, whereas it is such a common conviction that the objective, the positive, sciences stand on their own, are self-sufficient in virtue of their supposedly fully grounding and thus exemplary method. But in the end is not the teleological unifying meaning running through all attempted systems in the whole history of philosophy that of achieving a breakthrough for the insight that science is only possible at all as universal philosophy, the latter being, in all the sciences, yet a single science, possible only as the totality of all knowledge? And did this not imply that they all repose upon one single ground [Grund], one to be investigated scientifically in advance of all the others? And can this ground be, I may add, any other than precisely that of the anonymous subjectivity we mentioned? But one could and can realize this only when one finally and quite seriously inquires into that which is taken for granted, which is presupposed by all thinking, all activity of life with all its ends and accomplishments, and when one, by consistently interrogating the ontic and validity-meaning of these ends and accomplishments, becomes aware of the inviolable unity of the complex of meaning and validity running through all mental accomplishments. This applies first of all to all the mental accomplishments which we human beings carry out in the world, as individual, personal, or cultural accomplishments. Before all such accomplishments there has always already been a universal accomplishment, presupposed by all human praxis and all prescientific and scientific life. The latter have the spiritual acquisitions of this universal accomplishment as their constant substratum, and all their own acquisitions are destined to flow into it. We shall come to understand that the world which constantly exists for us through the flowing alteration of manners of givenness is a universal mental acquisition, having developed as such and at the same time continuing to develop as the unity of a mental configuration, as a meaning-construct [Sinngestalt]- as the construct of a universal, ultimately functioning 1 subjectivity. It belongs essentially to this worldconstituting accomplishment that subjectivity objectifies itself as human subjectivity, as an element of the world. All objective consideration of the world is consideration of the “exterior” and grasps only “externals,” objective entities [Objektivitäten]. The radical consideration of the world is the systematic and purely internal consideration of the subjectivity which “expresses” [or “externalizes”]<sup>2</sup> itself in the exterior. It is like the unity of a living organism, which one can certainly consider and dissect from the outside but which one can understand only if one goes back to its hidden roots and systematically pursues the life

1. letztfungierende, i.e., functioning at the ultimate or deepest level.

2. der sich selbst im Aussen “ussernden” Subjektivität.

which, in all its accomplishments, is in them and strives upward from them, shaping from within. But is this not simply a metaphor? Is it not in the end our human being, and the life of consciousness belonging to it, with its most profound world — problematics, which is the place where all problems of living inner being and external exhibition are to be decided?

### 30 The lack of an intuitive exhibiting method as the reason for Kant's mythical constructions.

THERE IS SOME COMPLAINT about the obscurities of the Kantian philosophy, about the incomprehensibility of the evidences of his regressive method, his transcendental-subjective "faculties," "functions," "formations," about the difficulty of understanding what transcendental subjectivity actually is, how its function, its accomplishment, comes about, how this is to make all objective science understandable. And in fact Kant does get involved in his own sort of mythical talk, whose literal meaning points to something subjective, but a mode of the subjective which we are in principle unable to make intuitive to ourselves, whether through factual examples or through genuine analogy. If we try to do it with the intuitively negotiable meaning to which the words refer, we find ourselves in the psychological sphere of the human person, the soul. But then we remember the Kantian doctrine of inner sense, according to which everything that can be exhibited in the self-evidence of inner experience has already been formed by a transcendental function, that of temporalization [Zeitigung]. But how are we supposed to arrive at a clear meaning for concepts of something transcendently subjective, out of which the scientifically true world constitutes itself as objective "appearance," if we cannot give to "inner perception" some meaning other than the psychological one — if it is not a truly apodictic meaning which ultimately furnishes the experiential ground (a ground like that of the Cartesian ego cogito), [available to us] through a type of experience which is not Kantian scientific experience and does not have the certainty of objective being in the sense of science, as in physics, but is a truly apodictic certainty, that of a universal ground which finally can be exhibited as the apodictically necessary and ultimate ground of all scientific objectivity and makes the latter understandable? This is where the source of all ultimate concepts of knowledge must lie; here is the source of essential, general insights through which any objective world can become scientifically understandable and through which an absolutely self-supporting philosophy can achieve systematic development.

Perhaps a deeper critique could show that Kant, though he attacks empiricism, still remains dependent upon this very empiricism in his conception of the soul and the range of tasks of a psychology, that what counts for him as the soul is the soul which is made part of nature and conceived of as a component of the psychophysical human being within the time of nature, within space-time. Hence the transcendently subjective could certainly not be [identical with] the psychic. But is truly apodictic inner perception (self-perception reduced to the truly apodictic) to be identified with the self-perception of this naturalized soul, with its [supposed] self-evidence of the "writing tablet" and its data and even of its faculties as the powers ascribed to it in the manner of natural powers? Because he understands inner perception in this empiricist, psychological sense and because, warned by Hume's skepticism, he fears every recourse to the psychological as an absurd perversion of the genuine problem of the understanding, Kant gets involved in his mythical conceptformation. He forbids his readers to transpose the results of his regressive procedure into intuitive concepts, forbids every attempt to carry out a progressive construction which begins with original and

purely self-evident intuitions and proceeds through truly self-evident individual steps. His transcendental concepts are thus unclear in a quite peculiar way, such that for reasons of principle they can never be transposed into clarity, can never be transformed into a formation of meaning which is direct and procures self-evidence.

The clarity of all [these] concepts and problems posed would have been quite different if Kant, instead of being a child of his time, completely bound by its naturalistic psychology (as pat-terned after natural science and as its parallel), had tackled in a truly radical way the problem of a priori knowledge and its methodical function in rational objective knowledge. This would have required a fundamentally and essentially different regressive method from that of Kant, which rests on those unquestioned assumptions: not a mythically, constructively inferring [schliessende] method, but a thoroughly intuitively disclosing [erschliessende] method, intuitive in its point of departure and in everything it discloses — even though the concept of intuitiveness may have to undergo a considerable expansion in comparison to the Kantian one, and indeed even though intuition, here, may lose its usual sense altogether through a new attitude, taking on only the general sense of original self-exhibition, but precisely only within the new sphere of being.

Thus one must quite systematically inquire back into those things taken for granted which, not only for Kant but for all philosophers, all scientists, make up an unspoken ground [Grund] of their cognitive accomplishments, hidden in respect to its deeper mediating functions. Further, there must be a systematic disclosure of the intentionality which vitally holds sway and is sedimented in this ground — in other words, there must be a genuine, i.e., an “intentional analysis” of mental being in its absolute ultimate peculiarity and of that which has come to be in and through the mind, an analysis which does not permit the reigning psychology to substitute for it a realistic [reale] analysis of a naturalistically conceived soul, [which would be] alien to the essence of the mental.\*

\* Yet this [fault] does not lie in [a psychological] beginning. [In fact,] the first thing Kant [should have done, if he] had taken the everyday world as the world of human consciousness, was to pass through psychology-but a psychology which allowed the subjective experiences of world-consciousness actually to come to expression as they showed themselves experientially. This would have been possible if Descartes’s seminal hints about cogitata qua cogitata had been brought to germination as intentional psychology instead of being overlooked by the dominant Lockean philosophy. [This note derives from a stenographic marginal comment, and Biemel’s version of the first two sentences makes little sense. I have given what I hope is an understandable interpretation.-TRANS.]

### 31 Kant and the inadequacy of the psychology of his day. The opaqueness of the distinction between transcendental subjectivity and soul.

IN ORDER TO MAKE palpably understandable what is concretely meant here and in this way to illuminate the situation which was peculiarly opaque to that whole historical epoch, we shall initiate a reflection which admittedly belongs to a very late fulfillment of the sense of the historical process.

The pre-given point of departure for all the enigmas of knowledge was that of the development of a modern philosophy in accord with its own peculiar rationalistic ideal of science (systematically expanding itself into its special sciences). This thrust in the development of sometimes clearly successful, sometimes hopefully attempted special sciences was suddenly checked. In the construction of one of these sciences, psychology, enigmas emerged which put all of philosophy in question.

Naturally, the psychology of Locke — with the natural science of a Newton before it as a model — found particularly interesting subjects for study in the merely subjective aspects of the appearances (which had been maligned since Galileo) and likewise generally in everything coming from the subjective side that interfered with rationality: the lack of clarity in concepts, the vagueness of judgmental thinking, the faculties of the understanding and of reason in all their forms. It was, of course, a matter of the human being's faculties for psychic accomplishments — precisely those accomplishments which were supposed to procure genuine science and with it a genuine practical life of reason. Thus, questions of the essence and the objective validity of purely rational knowledge, of logical and mathematical knowledge, and the peculiar nature of natural-scientific and metaphysical knowledge belong in this sphere. Looked at in this general way, was this not actually required? Without doubt it was right and a good thing that Locke understood the sciences as psychic accomplishments (though he also directed his gaze too much at what occurs in the individual soul) and everywhere posed questions of origin. After all, accomplishments can be understood only in terms of the activity that accomplishes them. To be sure, in Locke this was done with a superficiality, an unmethodical confusion, and indeed even a naturalism that resulted precisely in Humean fictionalism.

Thus, obviously, Kant could not simply go back and take up the psychology of Locke. But was it for this reason correct to drop the general idea of the Lockean — the psychological-epistemological — approach? Was not every question inspired by Hume first and quite correctly to be taken as a psychological question? If rational science becomes a problem, if the claim of the purely a priori sciences to have unconditional objective validity, and thus to be the possible and necessary method for rational sciences of fact, becomes a problem, it should first be taken into consideration (as we emphasized above) that science in general is a human accomplishment, an accomplishment of human beings who find themselves in the

world, the world of general experience, [and that it is] one among other types of practical accomplishments which is aimed at spiritual structures of a certain sort called theoretical. Like all praxis, this one is related, in a sense which is its own and of which the practitioner of it is conscious, to the pre-given world of experience and at the same time takes its ordered place within this world. Thus enigmas about how a spiritual accomplishment comes to pass can be clarified, one will say, only through psychological demonstrations, and they remain thus within the pre-given world. If Kant, on the other hand, in the questions he posed and in his regressive method, also naturally makes use of the pre-given world but at the same time constructs a transcendental subjectivity through whose concealed transcendental functions, with unswerving necessity, the world of experience is formed, he runs into the difficulty that a particular quality of the human soul (which itself belongs to the world and is thus presupposed with it) is supposed to accomplish and to have already accomplished a formative process which shapes this whole world. But as soon as we distinguish this transcendental subjectivity from the soul, we get involved in something incomprehensibly mythical.

## **32 The possibility of a hidden truth in Kant's transcendental philosophy: the problem of a "new dimension." The antagonism between the "life of the plane" and the "life of depth."**

WERE THE BANTIAN THEORY nevertheless to contain some truth, a truth to be made actually accessible to insight — which is indeed the case — it would be possible only through the fact that the transcendental functions which are supposed to explain the above-mentioned enigmas concerning objectively valid knowledge belong to a dimension of the living spirit that had to remain hidden, because of very natural inhibitions, from humanity and even from the scientists of the ages — whereas this dimension can be made accessible to scientific understanding, through a method of disclosure appropriate to it, as a realm of experiential and theoretical self-evidence. The fact that this dimension remained hidden through the ages, the fact that, even after it made itself felt, it never aroused a habitual and consistent theoretical interest, can (and will) be explained by displaying a peculiar antagonism between the entry into this dimension and the preoccupations involved in all the interests which make up the naturally normal human world-life.

Since this is to be a matter of spiritual functions which exercise their accomplishments in all experiencing and thinking, indeed in each and every preoccupation of the human world-life, functions through which the world of experience, as the constant horizon of existing things, values, practical plans, works, etc., has meaning and validity for us, it would certainly be understandable that all objective sciences would lack precisely the knowledge of what is most fundamental, namely, the knowledge of what could procure meaning and validity for



the theoretical constructs of objective knowledge and [which] thus first gives them the dignity of a knowledge which is ultimately grounded.

This schema for a possible clarification of the problem of objective science reminds us of Helmholtz' well-known image of the plane-beings, who have no idea of the dimension of depth, in which their plane-world is a mere projection. Everything of which men — the scientists and all the others — can become conscious in their natural world-life (experiencing, knowing, practically planning, acting) as a field of external objects — as ends, means, processes of action, and final results related to these objects — and on the other hand, also, in self-reflection, as the spiritual life which functions thereby — all this remains on the “plane,” which is, though unnoticed, nevertheless only a plane within an infinitely richer dimension of depth. But this [image] is universally valid whether it concerns a life which is merely practical in the usual sense or a theoretical life, [i.e.,] scientific experiencing, thinking, planning, acting, or scientific experiential data, ideas, goals of thinking, premises, true results.

This explanatory schema, of course, leaves several pressing questions open. How could the development of the positive sciences purely upon the “plane” appear for so long in the form of a superabundant success? Why was it so late before, in the need for complete transparency in its methodical accomplishments, the difficulties, indeed incomprehensibilities, announced themselves, such that not even the most painstaking construction of logical technique could improve the situation? Why did the later attempts at an “intuitionistic” deepening, which in fact touched upon the higher dimension, and all efforts to clarify the situation in this way not lead to unanimously accepted, truly compelling scientific results? It is not the case that this is a matter of merely turning our gaze toward a sphere which up to now has simply not been noticed but which is accessible without further effort to theoretical experience and experiential knowledge. Everything experienceable in this way is the object and domain of possible positive knowledge; it lies on the “plane,” in the world of actual and possible experience, experience in the natural sense of the word. We shall soon understand what extraordinary difficulties — grounded in the essence of the matters involved — greeted the methodical efforts actually to approach the depth-sphere, to approach first of all the possibility of its pure grasp of itself in the manner of experiencing proper to it; and it will become clear thereby how great the antagonism is between the “patent” life of the plane and the “latent” life of depth. Of course the power of historical prejudices also plays a constant role here, especially of those which, coming from the origin of the modern positive sciences, dominate us all. It is of the very essence of such prejudices, drilled into the souls even of children, that they are concealed in their immediate effects. The abstract general will to be without prejudice changes nothing about them.

Nevertheless, these are the slightest difficulties compared to those which have their ground in the essence of the new dimension and its relation to the old familiar field of life. Nowhere else is the distance so great from unclearly arising needs to goal-determined plans, from vague questionings to first working problems — through which actual working science first begins. Nowhere else is it so frequent that the explorer is met by logical ghosts emerging out of the

dark, formed in the old familiar and effective conceptual patterns, as paradoxical antinomies, logical absurdities. Thus nowhere is the temptation so great to slide into logical aporetics and disputation, priding oneself on one's scientific discipline, while the actual substratum of the work, the phenomena themselves, is forever lost from view.

All this will be confirmed as I now leave the reference to Kant behind and attempt to show, to those willing to understand, one of the paths I have actually taken; as a path actually taken, it offers itself as one that can at any time be taken again. Indeed, it is a path which at every step allows just this self-evidence to be renewed and tested as apodictic, i.e., the self-evidence of a path capable of being taken repeatedly at will and capable of being followed further at will in repeatedly verifiable experiences and cognitions.

### **33 The problem of the “life-world” as a partial problem within the general problem of objective science.**

BRIEFLY REMINDING OURSELVES of our earlier discussions, let us recall the fact we have emphasized, namely, that science is a human spiritual accomplishment which presupposes as its point of departure, both historically and for each new student, the intuitive surrounding world of life, pre-given as existing for all in common. Furthermore, it is an accomplishment which, in being practiced and carried forward, continues to presuppose this surrounding world as it is given in its particularity to the scientist. For example, for the physicist it is the world in which he sees his measuring instruments, hears timebeats, estimates visible magnitudes, etc.-the world in which, furthermore, he knows himself to be included with all his activity and all his theoretical ideas.

When science poses and answers questions, these are from the start, and hence from then on, questions resting upon the ground of, and addressed to, the elements of this pre-given world in which science and every other life-praxis is engaged. In this life-praxis, knowledge, as prescientific knowledge, plays a constant role, together with its goals, which are in general satisfactorily achieved in the sense which is intended and in each case usually in order to make practical life possible. But a new civilization (philosophical, scientific civilization), rising up in Greece, saw fit to recast the idea of “knowledge” and “truth” in natural existence and to ascribe to the newly formed idea of “objective truth” a higher dignity, that of a norm for all knowledge. In relation to this, finally, arises the idea of a universal science encompassing all possible knowledge in its infinity, the bold guiding idea of the modern period. If we have made this clear to ourselves, then obviously an explicit elucidation of the objective validity and of the whole task of science requires that we first inquire back into the pre-given world. It is pre-given to us all quite naturally, as persons within the horizon of our fellow men, i.e., in every actual connection with others, as “the” world common to us all. Thus it is, as we have explained in detail, the constant ground of validity, an ever available source of what is taken for granted, to which we, whether as practical men or as scientists, lay claim as a

matter of course.

Now if this pregiven world is to become a subject of investigation in its own right, so that we can arrive, of course, at scientifically defensible assertions, this requires special care in preparatory reflections. It is not easy to achieve clarity about what kind of peculiar scientific and hence universal tasks are to be posed under the title “life-world” and about whether something philosophically significant will arise here. Even the first attempt to understand the peculiar ontic sense of the life-world, which can be taken now as a narrower, now as a broader one, causes difficulties.

The manner in which we here come to the life-world as a subject for scientific investigation makes this subject appear an ancillary and partial one within the full subject of objective science in general. The latter has become generally, that is, in all its particular forms (the particular positive sciences), incomprehensible as regards the possibility of its objective accomplishment. If science becomes a problem in this way, then we must withdraw from the operation of it and take up a standpoint above it, surveying in generality its theories and results in the systematic context of predicative thoughts and statements, and on the other side we must also survey the life of acts practiced by working scientists, working with one another — their setting of goals, their termination in a given goal, and the terminating self-evidence. And what also comes under consideration here is precisely the scientists’ repeated recourse, in different general manners, to the life-world with its ever available intuited data; to this we can immediately add the scientists’ statements, in each case simply adapted to this world, statements made purely descriptively in the same prescientific manner of judging which is proper to the “occasional”<sup>1</sup> statements of practical, everyday life. Thus the problem of the life-world, or rather of the manner in which it functions and must function for scientists, is only a

1. okkasionelle. A term from the second of the *Logische Untersuchungen*, §26 (1913 ed., Vol. II, p. 81) : an expression is “essentially subjective and occasional” if its actual meaning depends “on the occasion [Gelegenheit], the person speaking, and his situation.”

partial subject within the above-designated whole of objective science (namely, in the service of its full grounding).

It is clear, however, that prior to the general question of its function for a self-evident grounding of the objective sciences there is good reason to ask about the life-world’s own and constant ontic meaning for the human beings who live in it. These human beings do not always have scientific interests, and even scientists are not always involved in scientific work; also, as history teaches us, there was not always in the world a civilization that lived habitually with long-established scientific interests. The life-world was always there for mankind before science, then, just as it continues its manner of being in the epoch of science. Thus one can put forward by itself the problem of the manner of being of the life-world; one can place oneself completely upon the ground of this straightforwardly intuited world, putting out of play all objective-scientific opinions and cognitions, in order to consider

generally what kind of “scientific” tasks, i.e., tasks to be resolved with universal validity, arise in respect to this world’s own manner of being. Might this not yield a vast theme for study? Is it not the case that, in the end, through what first appears as a special subject in the theory of science, that “third dimension” is opening up, immediately destined in advance to engulf the whole subject matter of objective science (as well as all other subject matters on the “plane”)? At first this must appear peculiar and unbelievable. Many paradoxes will arise; yet they will be resolved. What imposes itself here and must be considered before everything else is the correct comprehension of the essence of the life-world and the method of a “scientific” treatment appropriate to it, from which “objective” scientific treatment, however, is excluded.

## **34 Exposition of the problem of a science of the life-world.**

### **a. The difference between objective science and science in general.**

Is not the life-world as such what we know best, what is always taken for granted in all human life, always familiar to us in its typology through experience? Are not all its horizons of the unknown simply horizons of what is just incompletely known, i.e., known in advance in respect of its most general typology? For prescientific life, of course, this type of acquaintance suffices, as does its manner of converting the unknown into the known, gaining “occasional” knowledge on the basis of experience (verifying itself internally and thereby excluding illusion) and induction. This suffices for everyday praxis. If, now, something more can be and is to be accomplished, if a “scientific” knowledge is supposed to come about, what can be meant other than what objective science has in view and does anyway? Is scientific knowledge as such not “objective” knowledge, aimed at a knowledge substratum which is valid for everyone with unconditioned generality? And yet, paradoxically, we uphold our assertion and require that one not let the handed-down concept of objective science be substituted, because of the century-old tradition in which we have all been raised, for the concept of science in general.

The title “life-world” makes possible and demands perhaps various different, though essentially interrelated, scientific undertakings; and perhaps it is part of genuine and full scientific discipline that we must treat these all together, though following their essential order of founding, rather than treating, say, just the one, the objective-logical one (this particular accomplishment within the life-world) by itself, leaving the others completely out of scientific consideration. There has never been a scientific inquiry into the way in which the life-world constantly functions as subsoil, into how its manifold pre-logical validities act as grounds for the logical ones, for theoretical truths. And perhaps the scientific discipline which this life-world as such, in its universality, requires is a peculiar one, one which is

precisely not objective and logical but which, as the ultimately grounding one, is not inferior but superior in value. But how is this completely different sort of scientific discipline, for which the objective sort has always been substituted up to now, to be realized? The idea of objective truth is predetermined in its whole meaning by the contrast with the idea of the truth in pre- and extrascientific life. This latter truth has its ultimate and deepest source of verification in experience which is “pure” in the sense

1. This whole paragraph is crossed out in the MS.
2. This sentence was added by Fink. It does not seem to fit in, and it breaks the continuity between the preceding and following sentences.

designated above, in all its modes of perception, memory, etc. These words, however, must be understood actually as prescientific life understands them; thus one must not inject into them, from current objective science, any psychophysical, psychological interpretation. And above all — to dispose of an important point right away — one must not go straight back to the supposedly immediately given “sense-data,” as if they were immediately characteristic of the purely intuitive data of the life-world. What is actually first is the “merely subjective-relative” intuition of prescientific world-life. For us, to be sure, this “merely” has, as an old inheritance, the disdainful coloring of the doxa. In prescientific life itself, of course, it has nothing of this; there it is a realm of good verification and, based on this, of well-verified predicative cognitions and of truths which are just as secure as is necessary for the practical projects of life that determine their sense. The disdain with which everything “merely subjective and relative” is treated by those scientists who pursue the modern ideal of objectivity changes nothing of its own manner of being, just as it does not change the fact that the scientist himself must be satisfied with this realm whenever he has recourse, as he unavoidably must have recourse, to it.

## **b. The use of subjective-relative experiences for the objective sciences, and the science of them.**

The sciences build upon the life-world as taken for granted in that they make use of whatever in it happens to be necessary for their particular ends. But to use the life-world in this way is not to know it scientifically in its own manner of being. For example, Einstein uses the Michelson experiments and the corroboration of them by other researchers, with apparatus copied from Michelson's, with everything required in the way of scales of measurement, coincidences established, etc. There is no doubt that everything that enters in here — the persons, the apparatus, the room in the institute, etc.- can itself become a subject of investigation in the usual sense of objective inquiry, that of the positive sciences. But Einstein could make no use whatever of a theoretical psychological-psychophysical construction of the objective being of Mr. Michelson; rather, he made use of the human being who was accessible to him, as to everyone else in the prescientific world, as an object of straightfor-

ward experience, the human being whose existence, with this vitality, in these activities and creations within the common life-world, is always the presupposition for all of Einstein's objective-scientific lines of inquiry, projects, and accomplishments pertaining to Michelson's experiments. It is, of course, the one world of experience, common to all, that Einstein and every other researcher knows he is in as a human being, even throughout all his activity of research. [But] precisely this world and everything that happens in it, used as needed for scientific and other ends, bears, on the other hand, for every natural scientist in his thematic orientation toward its "objective truth," the stamp "merely subjective and relative." The contrast to this determines, as we said, the sense of the "objective" task. This "subjective-relative" is supposed to be "overcome"; one can and should correlate with it a hypothetical being-in-itself, a substrate for logical-mathematical "truths-in-themselves" that one can approximate through ever newer and better hypothetical approaches, always justifying them through experiential verification. This is the one side. But while the natural scientist is thus interested in the objective and is involved in his activity, the subjective-relative is on the other hand still functioning for him, not as something irrelevant that must be passed through but as that which ultimately grounds the theoretical-logical ontic validity for all objective verification, i.e., as the source of self-evidence, the source of verification. The visible measuring scales, scale-markings, etc., are used as actually existing things, not as illusions; thus that which actually exists in the life-world, as something valid, is a premise.

### **c. Is the subjective-relative an object for psychology?**

Now the question of the manner of being of this subjective sphere, or the question of the science which is to deal with it in its own universe of being, is normally disposed of by the natural scientist by referring to psychology. But again one must not allow the intrusion of what exists in the sense of objective science when it is a question of what exists in the life-world. For what has always gone under the name of psychology, at any rate since the founding of modern objectivism regarding knowledge of the world, naturally has the meaning of an "objective" science of the subjective, no matter which of the attempted historical psychologies we may choose. Now in our subsequent reflections the problem of making possible an objective psychology will have to become the object of more detailed discussions. But first we must grasp clearly the contrast between objectivity and the subjectivity of the life-world as a contrast which determines the fundamental sense of objective-scientific discipline itself, and we must secure this contrast against the great temptations to misconstrue it.

**d. The life-world as universe of what is intuitable in principle; the “objective-true” world as in principle nonintuitable “logical” substruction.**

Whatever may be the chances for realizing, or the capacity for realizing, the idea of objective science in respect to the mental world (i.e., not only in respect to nature), this idea of objectivity dominates the whole *universitas* of the positive sciences in the modern period, and in the general usage it dominates the meaning of the word “science.” This already involves a naturalism insofar as this concept is taken from Galilean natural science, such that the scientifically “true,” the objective, world is always thought of in advance as nature, in an expanded sense of the word. The contrast between the subjectivity of the life-world and the “objective,” the “true” world, lies in the fact that the latter is a theoretical-logical substruction, the substruction of something that is in principle not perceivable, in principle not experienceable in its own proper being, whereas the subjective, in the life-world, is distinguished in all respects precisely by its being actually experienceable.\*

\* In life the verification of being, terminating in experience, yields a full conviction. Even when it is inductive, the inductive anticipation is of a possible experienceability which is ultimately decisive. Inductions can be verified by other inductions, working together. Because of their anticipations of experienceability, and because every direct perception itself includes inductive moments (anticipation of the sides of the object which are not yet experienced), everything is contained in the broader concept of “experience” or “induction.” [Cf. p. 51, above].

3. Husserl’s use of *Evidenz* does not permit of its always being translated in the same way. But when used in its most special or technical sense, as it is here, “self-evidence” is better than simply “evidence.” As can be seen from the context here, it means “self-givenness”; whereas the English word “evidence” usually has a very different meaning, that of something testifying to the existence of something else (e.g., evidence in a trial).

The life-world is a realm of original self-evidences<sup>3</sup>. That which is self-evidently given is, in perception, experienced as “the thing itself,”<sup>4</sup> in immediate presence, or, in memory, remembered as the thing itself; and every other manner of intuition is a presentification of the thing itself. Every mediate cognition belonging in this sphere — broadly speaking, every manner of induction — has the sense of an induction of something intuitable, something possibly perceivable as the thing itself or rememberable as having-been-perceived, etc. All conceivable verification leads back to these modes of self-evidence because the “thing itself” (in the particular mode) lies in these intuitions themselves as that which is actually, intersubjectively experienceable and verifiable and is not a substruction of thought; whereas such a substruction, insofar as it makes a claim to truth, can have actual truth only by being related back to such self-evidences.

It is of course itself a highly important task, for the scientific opening-up of the life-world, to bring to recognition the primal validity of these self-evidences and indeed their higher dignity in the grounding of knowledge compared to that of the objective-logical self-

evidences. One must fully clarify, i.e., bring to ultimate self-evidence, how all the self-evidence of objective-logical accomplishments, through which objective theory (thus mathematical and natural-scientific theory) is grounded in respect of form and content, has its hidden sources of grounding in the ultimately accomplishing life, the life in which the self-evident givenness of the life-world forever has, has attained, and attains anew its prescientific ontic meaning. From objective-logical selfevidence (mathematical “insight,” natural-scientific, positive-scientific “insight,” as it is being accomplished by the inquiring and grounding mathematician, etc.), the path leads back, here, to the primal self-evidence in which the life-world is ever pre-given.

One may at first find strange and even questionable what has been simply asserted here, but the general features of the contrast among levels of self-evidence are unmistakable. The empiricist talk of natural scientists often, if not for the most part, gives the impression that the natural sciences are based on the

4. “es selbst.” The use of the word “thing” in this expression is not out of place as long as Husserl is talking about perception. But in another context that which is “itself” given might not be a “thing”; it could be an ideal state of affairs, for example in mathematical or logical intuition.

experience of objective nature. But it is not in this sense true that these sciences are experiential sciences, that they follow experience in principle, that they all begin with experiences, that all their inductions must finally be verified through experiences; rather, this is true only in that other sense whereby experience [yields] a self-evidence taking place purely in the life-world and as such is the source of self-evidence for what is objectively established in the sciences, the latter never themselves being experiences of the objective. The objective is precisely never experienceable as itself; and scientists themselves, by the way, consider it in this way whenever they interpret it as something metaphysically transcendent, in contrast to their confusing empiricist talk. The experienceability of something objective is no different from that of an infinitely distant geometrical construct and in general no different from that of all infinite ideas, including, for example, the infinity of the number series. Naturally, rendering ideas intuitive in the manner of mathematical or natural-scientific “models” is hardly intuition of the objective itself but rather a matter of life-world intuitions which are suited to make easier the conception of the objective ideals in question. Many [such] conceptual intermediaries are often involved, [especially since] the conception itself does not always occur so immediately, cannot always be made so self-evident in its way, as is the case in conceiving of geometrical straight lines on the basis of the life-world self-evidence of straight table-edges and the like.

As can be seen, a great deal of effort is involved here in order to secure even the pre-suppositions for a proper inquiry, i.e., in order first to free ourselves from the constant misconstructions which mislead us all because of the scholastic dominance of objective-scientific ways of thinking.



**e. The objective sciences as subjective constructs — those of a particular praxis, namely, the theoretical-logical, which itself belongs to the full concreteness of the life-world.**

If the contrast [under discussion] has been purified, we must now do justice to the essential interrelatedness [of the elements contrasted] : objective theory in its logical sense (taken universally: science as the totality of predicative theory, of the system of statements meant “logically” as “propositions in themselves,” “truths in themselves,” and in this sense logically joined) is rooted, grounded in the life-world, in the original self-evidences belonging to it. Thanks to this rootedness objective science has a constant reference of meaning to the world in which we always live, even as scientists and also in the total community of scientists — a reference, that is, to the general life-world. But at the same time, as an accomplishment of scientific<sup>5</sup> persons, as individuals and as joined in the community of scientific activity, objective science itself belongs to the life-world. Its theories, the logical constructs, are of course not things in the life-world like stones, houses, or trees. They are logical wholes and logical parts made up of ultimate logical elements. To speak with Bolzano, they are “representations-in-themselves” [“Vorstellungen an sich”] “propositions in themselves,” inferences and proofs “in themselves,” ideal unities of signification whose logical ideality is determined by their telos, “truth in itself.”

But this or any other ideality does not change in the least the fact that these are human formations, essentially related to human actualities and potentialities, and thus belong to this concrete unity of the life-world, whose concreteness thus extends farther than that of things. Exactly the same thing is true, correlative to this, of scientific activities — those of experiencing, those of arriving at logical formations “on the basis of” experience — activities through which these formations appear in original form and original modes of variation in the individual scientists and in the community of scientists: the original status of the proposition or demonstration dealt with by all.

But here we enter an uncomfortable situation. If we have made our contrast with all necessary care, then we have two different things: life-world and objective-scientific world, though of course [they are] related to each other. The knowledge of the objective-scientific world is “grounded” in the self-evidence of the life-world. The latter is pregiven to the scientific worker, or the working community, as ground; yet, as they build upon this, what is built is something new, something different. If we cease being immersed in our scientific thinking, we become aware that we scientists are, after all, human beings and as such are among the components of the life-world which always exists for us, ever pregiven; and thus all of science is pulled, along with us, into the

5. The text reads “prescientific persons,” which must be a mistake.

- merely subjective-relative — life-world. And what becomes of the objective world itself? What happens to the hypothesis of being-in-itself, related first to the “things” of the life-

world, the “objects,” the “real” bodies, real animals, plants, and also human beings within the “space-time” of the life-world — all these concepts being understood, now, not from the point of view of the objective sciences but as they are in prescientific life?

Is it not the case that this hypothesis, which in spite of the ideality of scientific theories has direct validity for the scientific subjects (the scientists as human beings), is but one among the many practical hypotheses and projects which make up the life of human beings in this life-world-which is at all times consciously pregiven to them as available? Do not all goals, whether they are “practical” in some other, extrascientific sense or are practical under the title of “theory,” belong eo ipso to the unity of the life-world, if only we take the latter in its complete and full concreteness?

On the other hand, we have seen also that the propositions, the theories, the whole edifice of doctrine in the objective sciences are structures attained through certain activities of scientists bound together in their collaborative work-or, to speak more exactly, attained through a continued building-up of activities, the later of which always presuppose the results of the earlier. And we see further that all these theoretical results have the character of validities for the life-world, adding themselves as such to its own composition and belonging to it even before that as a horizon of possible accomplishments for developing science. The concrete life-world, then, is the grounding soil [der gründende Boden] of the “scientifically true” world and at the same time encompasses it in its own universal concreteness. How is this to be understood? How are we to do justice systematically — that is, with appropriate scientific discipline-to the all-encompassing, so paradoxically demanding, manner of being of the life-world?

We are posing questions whose clarifying answers are by no means obvious. The contrast and the inseparable union [we have been exploring] draw us into a reflection which entangles us in more and more troublesome difficulties. The paradoxical interrelationships of the “objectively true world” and the “life-world” make enigmatic the manner of being of both. Thus [the idea of a] true world in any sense, and within it our own being, becomes an enigma in respect to the sense of this being. In our attempts to attain clarity we shall suddenly become aware, in the face of emerging paradoxes, that all of our philosophizing up to now has been without a ground. How can we now truly become philosophers?

We cannot escape the force of this motivation. It is impossible for us to evade the issue here through a preoccupation with aporia and argumentation nourished by Kant or Hegel, Aristotle or Thomas.

## **f . The problem of the life-world not as a partial problem but rather as a universal problem for philosophy.**

Of course, it is a new sort of scientific discipline that is required for the solution of the enigmas which now disquiet us: it is not mathematical, nor logical at all in the historical

sense; it cannot already have before it, as an available norm, a finished mathematics, logic, or logistic, since these are themselves objective sciences in the sense which is presently problematical and, as included in the problem, cannot be presuppositions used as premises. At first, as long as one only makes contrasts, is only concerned with oppositions, it could appear that nothing more than or different from objective science is needed, just as everyday practical life undertakes its rational reflections, both particular and general, without needing a science for them. It just is this way, a fact familiar to all, unthinkingly accepted rather than being formulated as a fundamental fact and thought through as a subject for thinking in its own right — namely, that there are two sorts of truth: on the one side, everyday practical situational truths, relative, to be sure, but, as we have already emphasized, exactly what praxis, in its particular projects, seeks and needs; on the other side there are scientific truths, and their grounding leads back precisely to the situational truths, but in such a way that scientific method does not suffer thereby in respect to its own meaning, since it wants to use and must use precisely these truths.

Thus it could appear — if one allows oneself to be carried along by the thoughtless naiveté of life even in the transition from the extralogical to the logical, to the objective-scientific praxis of thinking — that a separate investigation under the title “life-world” is an intellectualistic enterprise born of a mania, peculiar to modern life, to theorize everything. But, on the other hand, it has at least become apparent that we cannot let the matter end with this naiveté, that paradoxical enigmas announce themselves here: merely subjective relativity is supposedly overcome by objective-logical theory, yet the latter belongs, as the theoretical praxis of human beings, to the merely subjective and relative and at the same time must have its premises, its sources of self-evidence, in the subjective and relative. From here on this much is certain: that all problems of truth and of being, all methods, hypotheses, and results conceivable for these problems—whether for worlds of experience or for metaphysical higher worlds—can attain their ultimate clarity, their evident sense or the evidence of their nonsense, only through this supposed intellectualistic hypertrophy. This will then include, certainly, all ultimate questions of legitimate sense and of nonsense in the busy routine of the “resurrected metaphysics” that has become so vocal and so bewitching of late.

Through this last series of considerations the magnitude, the universal and independent significance, of the problem of the life-world has become intelligible to us in an anticipatory insight. In comparison with this the problem of the “objectively true” world or that of objective-logical science—no matter how pressing it may repeatedly become, and properly so—appears now as a problem of secondary and more specialized interest. Though the peculiar accomplishment of our modern objective science may still not be understood, nothing changes the fact that it is a validity for the life-world, arising out of particular activities, and that it belongs itself to the concreteness of the life-world. Thus in any case, for the sake of clarifying this and all other acquisitions of human activity, the concrete life-world must first be taken into consideration; and it must be considered in terms of the truly concrete universality whereby it embraces, both directly and in the manner of horizons, all the built-up levels of validity acquired by men for the world of their common life and whereby it has the totality of

these levels related in the end to a world-nucleus to be distilled by abstraction, namely, the world of straightforward intersubjective experiences. To be sure, we do not yet know how the life-world is to become an independent, totally self-sufficient subject of investigation, how it is supposed to make possible scientific statements — which as such, after all, must have their own “objectivity,” even if it is in a manner different from that of our sciences, i.e., a necessary validity to be appropriated purely methodically, which we and everyone can verify precisely through this method. We are absolute beginners, here, and have nothing in the way of a logic designed to provide norms; we can do nothing but reflect, engross ourselves in the still not unfolded sense of our task, and thus secure, with the utmost care, freedom from prejudice, keeping our undertaking free of alien interferences (and we have already made several important contributions to this) ; and this, as in the case of every new undertaking, must supply us with our method. The clarification of the sense of the task is, indeed, the self-evidence of the goal qua goal; and to this self-evidence belongs essentially the self-evidence of the possible “ways” to it. The intricacy and difficulty of the preliminary reflections which are still before us will justify themselves, not only because of the magnitude of the goal, but also because of the essential strangeness and precariousness of the ideas which will necessarily become involved.

Thus what appeared to be merely a problem of the fundamental basis of the objective sciences or a partial problem within the universal problem of objective science has indeed (just as we announced in advance that it would) proven to be the genuine and most universal problem. It can also be put this way: the problem first appears as the question of the relation between objective-scientific thinking and intuition; it concerns, on the one hand, then, logical thinking as the thinking of logical thoughts, e.g., the physicist’s thinking of physical theory, or purely mathematical thinking, in which mathematics has its place as a system of doctrine, as a theory. And, on the other hand, we have intuiting and the intuited, in the life-world prior to theory. Here arises the ineradicable illusion of a pure thinking which, unconcerned in its purity about intuition, already has its self-evident truth, even truth about the world — the illusion which makes the sense and the possibility, the “scope,” of objective science questionable. Here one concentrates on the separateness of intuiting and thinking and generally interprets the nature of the “theory of knowledge” as theory of science, carried out in respect to two correlative sides<sup>6</sup> (whereby science is always understood in terms of the only concept of science available, that of objective science). But as soon as the empty and vague notion of intuition — instead of being something negligible and insignificant compared to the supremely significant logical sphere in which one supposedly already has genuine truth — has become the problem of the life-world, as soon as the magnitude and difficulty of this investigation take on enormous proportions as one seriously penetrates it, there occurs the great transformation

6. I.e., the subjective and the objective.

of the “theory of knowledge” and the theory of science whereby, in the end, science as a problem and as an accomplishment loses its self-sufficiency and becomes a mere partial

problem.

What we have said also naturally applies to logic, as the a priori theory of norms for everything “logical” — in the overarching sense of what is logical, according to which logic is a logic of strict objectivity, of objective-logical truths. No one ever thinks about the predications and truths which precede science, about the ‘logic’ which provides norms within this sphere of relativity, or about the possibility, even in the case of these logical structures conforming purely descriptively to the life-world, of inquiring into the system of principles that give them their norms a priori. As a matter of course, traditional objective logic is substituted as the a priori norm even for this subjective-relative sphere of truth.

### **35 Analysis of the transcendental epoche. First step: The epoche of objective science.**

BECAUSE OF THE PECULIAR nature of the task which has arisen for us, the method of access to the new science’s field of work—which must be attained before the working problems of the science are given—is articulated into a multiplicity of steps, each of which has, in a new way, the character of an epoche, a withholding of natural, naive validities and in general of validities already in effect. The first necessary epoche, i.e., the first methodical step, has already come into view through the preliminary reflections hitherto carried out. But an explicit, universal formulation is needed. Clearly required before everything else is the epoche in respect to all objective sciences. This means not merely an abstraction from them, such as an imaginary transformation, in thought, of present human existence, such that no science appeared in the picture. What is meant is rather an epoche of all participation in the cognitions of the objective sciences, an epoche of any critical position-taking which is interested in their truth or falsity, even any position on their guiding idea of an objective knowledge of the world. In short, we carry out an epoche in regard to all objective theoretical interests, all aims and activities belonging to us as objective scientists or even simply as [ordinary] people desirous of [this kind of] knowledge. Within this epoche, however, neither the sciences nor the scientists have disappeared for us who practice the epoche. They continue to be what they were before, in any case: facts in the

unified context of the pre-given life-world; except that, because of the epoche, we do not function as sharing these interests, as coworkers, etc. We establish in ourselves just one particular habitual direction of interest, with a certain vocational attitude, to which there belongs a particular “vocational time.”<sup>1</sup> We find the same thing here as elsewhere: when we actualize one of our habitual interests and are thus involved in our vocational activity (in the accomplishment of our work), we assume a posture of epoche toward our other life-interests, even though these still exist and are still ours. Everything has “its proper time,” and in shifting [activities] we say something like: “Now it is time to go to the meeting, to the election,” and the like.

In a special sense, of course, we call science, art, military service, etc., our “vocation,” but as normal human beings we are constantly (in a broadened sense) involved in many “vocations” (interested attitudes) at the same time: we are at once fathers, citizens, etc. Every such vocation has its time of actualizing activities. Accordingly, this newly established vocational interest, whose universal subject matter is called the “life-world,” finds its place among the other life-interests or vocations and it has “its proper time” within the one personal time, the form of the various exercised vocational times.

Of course, to equate the new science in this way with all “bourgeois” [bürgerliche] vocations, or even with the objective sciences, is a sort of trivialization, a disregard for the greatest value-distinction there can be between sciences. Understood in this way, it was so happily criticized by the modern irrationalistic philosophers. This way of looking at it makes it appear as if, once again, a new, purely theoretical interest, a new “science” with a new vocational technique, is to be established, carried on either as an intellectualistic game with very ideal pretensions or as a higher-level intellectual technique in the service of the positive sciences, useful for them, while they themselves, in turn, have their only real value in their usefulness for life. One is powerless against the misrepresentations of hurried readers and listeners who in the end hear only what they want to hear; but in any case they are part of the indifferent mass audience of the

1. *Berufszeit*, colloq., “working hours.” But I have translated it literally as “vocational time” in order to preserve the notion of *Beruf*, a calling.

philosopher. The few, for whom one [really] speaks, will know how to restrain such a suspicion, especially after what we have said in earlier lectures. They will at least wait to see where our path leads them.

There are good reasons for my stressing so sharply the vocational character of even the “phenomenologist’s” attitude. One of the first things to be described about the *epoche* in question is that it is a habitual *epoche* of accomplishment, one with periods of time in which it results in work, while other times are devoted to other interests of work or play; furthermore, and most important, the suspension of its accomplishment in no way changes the interest which continues and remains valid within personal subjectivity — i.e., its habitual directedness toward goals which persist as its validities — and it is for this very reason that it can be actualized again and again, at different times, in this identical sense. This by no means implies, however, that the life-world *epoche* — to which further significant moments belong, as we shall show — means no more for human existence, practically and “existentially,” than the vocational *epoche* of the cobbler, or that it is basically a matter of indifference whether one is a cobbler or a phenomenologist, or, also, whether one is a phenomenologist or a positive scientist. Perhaps it will even become manifest that the total phenomenological attitude and the *epoche* belonging to it are destined in essence to effect, at first, a complete personal transformation, comparable in the beginning to a religious conversion, which then, however, over and above this, bears within itself the significance of the greatest existential transformation which is assigned as a task to mankind as such.

## 36 How can the life-world, after the epoche of the objective sciences, become the subject matter of a science? The distinction in principle between the objective-logical a priori and the a priori of the life-world.

IF OUR INTEREST is exclusively in the “life-world,” we must ask: Has the life-world, through the epoche in respect to objective science, already been laid open as a universal scientific subject matter? \*

\* First let us recall that what we call science is, within the constantly valid world, as life-world, a particular type of purposeful activities and purposeful accomplishments like all human vocations in the usual sense of the word; to this sphere also belong those practical intentions of a higher level which do not involve types of vocation or goal-oriented interrelations and accomplishments at all, the more or less isolated, incidental, more or less fleeting interests. All these are, from the human point of view, peculiarities of human life and of human habitualities, and they all lie within the universal framework of the life-world into which all accomplishments flow and to which all human beings and all accomplishing activities and capacities always belong. Of course, the new theoretical interest in the universal life-world itself, in its own manner of being, requires a certain epoche in regard to all these interests, i.e., in regard to the pursuit of our ends, in regard to all the criticism, always belonging to the purposeful life, of the means and the goals or ends themselves, e.g., whether we should factually persist in them, whether certain paths should be taken as general directives, etc. Living toward our ends, which are valid for us habitually, we do, of course, live in the horizon of the lifeworld, no matter which ends are “having their turn”; everything that happens and develops here exists in the life-world and in the manner of the life-world; but being oriented toward what exists within the life-world is not the same as focusing on the [life-world] as the universal horizon, not the same as making thematic the end in view as a being within this horizon, the newly thematic life-world. Thus the first thing we must do is refrain from the pursuit of all scientific and other interests. But the epoche alone is not enough: even all setting of ends, all projecting, presupposes something worldly; the wherewith, i.e., the life-world, is given prior to all ends. [This last sentence is only a rough guess at the sense of this somewhat garbled stenographic note. — trans.]

Do we already have thereby, the subject matter for statements that are generally valid scientifically, statements about facts that are to be established scientifically? How do we have the life-world as a universal field, fixed in advance, of such establishable facts? It is the spatio-temporal world of things as we experience them in our pre- and extrascientific life and as we know them to be experienceable beyond what is [actually] experienced. We have a world-horizon as a horizon of possible thing-experience [Dingerfahrung]. Things: that is, stones, animals, plants, even human beings and human products; but everything here is subjective and relative, even though normally, in our experience and in the social

group united with us in the community of life, we arrive at “secure” facts; within a certain range this occurs of its own accord, that is, undisturbed by any noticeable disagreement; sometimes, on the other hand, when it is of practical importance, it occurs in a purposive knowing process, i.e., with the goal of [finding] a truth which is secure for our purposes. But when we are thrown into an alien social sphere, that of the Negroes in the Congo, Chinese peasants, etc., we discover that their truths, the facts that for them are fixed, generally verified or verifiable, are by no means the same as ours. But if we set up the goal of a truth about the objects which is unconditionally valid for all subjects, beginning with that on which normal Europeans, normal Hindus, Chinese, etc., agree in spite of all relativity — beginning, that is, with what makes objects of the life-world, common to all, identifiable for them and for us (even though conceptions of them may differ), such as spatial shape, motion, sense-quality, and the like—then we are on the way to objective science. When we set up this objectivity as a goal (the goal of a “truth in itself”) we make a set of hypotheses through which the pure life-world is surpassed. We have precluded this [type of] “surpassing” through the first epoche (that which concerns the objective sciences), and now we have the embarrassment of wondering what else can be undertaken scientifically, as something that can be established once and for all and for everyone.

But this embarrassment disappears as soon as we consider that the life-world does have, in all its relative features, a general structure. This general structure, to which everything that exists relatively is bound, is not itself relative. We can attend to it in its generality and, with sufficient care, fix it once and for all in a way equally accessible to all. As life-world the world has, even prior to science, the “same” structures that the objective sciences presuppose in their substruction of a world which exists “in itself” and is determined through “truths in themselves” (this substruction being taken for granted due to the tradition of centuries); these are the same structures that they presuppose as a priori structures and systematically unfold in a priori sciences, sciences of the logos, the universal methodical norms by which any knowledge of the world existing “in itself, objectively” must be bound. Prescientifically, the world is already a spatiotemporal world; to be sure, in regard to this spatiotemporality there is no question of ideal mathematical points, of “pure” straight lines or planes, no question at all of mathematically infinitesimal continuity or of the “exactness” belonging to the sense of the geometrical a priori. The bodies familiar to us in the life-world are actual bodies, but not bodies in the sense of physics. The same thing is true of causality and of spatiotemporal infinity. [These] categorical features of the life-world have the same names but are not concerned, so to speak, with the theoretical idealizations and the hypothetical substructions of the geometrician and the physicist. As we already know, physicists, who are men like other men, who know themselves as living in the life-world, the world of their human interests, have, under the title of physics, a particular sort of questions and (in a broader sense) practical projects directed toward the things of the life-world, and their “theories” are the practical results. just as other projects, practical interests, and their realizations belong to the life-world, presuppose it as ground, and enrich it with their activity, so it is with science, too, as a human project and praxis. And this includes, as we have said,



everything objectively a priori, with its necessary reference back to a corresponding a priori of the life-world. This reference-back is one of a founding of validity [Geltungsfundierung]. A certain idealizing accomplishment is what brings about the higher-level meaning-formation and ontic validity of the mathematical and every other objective a priori on the basis of the life-world a priori. Thus the latter ought first to become a subject of scientific investigation in its peculiarity and purity, and then one ought to set the systematic task of understanding how, on this basis and in what manners of new meaning-formation, the objective a priori comes about as a mediated theoretical accomplishment. What is needed, then, would be a systematic division of the universal structures — universal life-world a priori and universal “objective” a priori — and then also a division among the universal inquiries according to the way in which the “objective” a priori is grounded in the “subjective-relative” a priori of the life-world or how, for example, mathematical self-evidence has its source of meaning and source of legitimacy in the self-evidence of the life-world.

This consideration has a particular interest for us even though we have already detached our problem of a science of the life-world from the problem of objective science in that we, caught up through our schooling in the traditional objectivistic metaphysics, at first have no means of access whatever to the idea of a universal a priori belonging purely to the life-world. What we need first is a separation in principle of the latter from the objective a priori which is [always] immediately substituted for it. It is this very separation that is effected by the first epoche of all objective sciences, if we understand it also as the epoche of all objective a priori sciences and make it complete through the considerations we have just carried out. The latter provide us, in addition, with the fundamental insight that the universal a priori of the objective-logical level — that of the mathematical sciences and all others which are a priori in the usual sense — is grounded in a universal a priori which is in itself prior, precisely that of the pure life-world. Only through recourse to this a priori, to be unfolded in an a priori science of its own, can our a priori sciences, the objective-logical ones, achieve a truly radical, a seriously scientific, grounding, which under the circumstances they absolutely require.

Here we can also say: The supposedly completely self-sufficient logic which modern mathematical logicians [Logistiker] think they are able to develop, even calling it a truly scientific philosophy, namely, as the universal, a priori, fundamental science for all objective sciences, is nothing but *nalvete*. Its self-evidence lacks scientific grounding in the universal life-world a priori, which it always presupposes in the form of things taken for granted, which are never scientifically, universally formulated, never put in the general form proper to a science of essence. Only when this radical, fundamental science exists can such a logic itself become a science. Before this it hangs in mid-air, without support, and is, as it has been up to now, so very naive that it is not even aware of the task which attaches to every objective logic, every a priori science in the usual sense, namely, that of discovering how this logic itself is to be grounded, hence no longer “logically” but by being traced back to the universal pre-logical a priori through which everything logical, the total edifice of objective theory in all its methodological forms, demonstrates its legitimate sense and from which, then, all logic

itself must receive its norms.

Yet this insight surpasses the interest in the life-world which governs us now; for this, as we have said, all that counts is the distinction in principle between the objective-logical and the life-world a priori; and the purpose of this is to be able to set in motion a radical reflection upon the great task of a pure theory of essence of the life-world.

### **37 The formal and most general structures of the life-world: thing and world on the one side, thing-consciousness on the other.**

IF WE SEEK OUT, simply looking around us, what is formal and general, what remains invariant in the life-world throughout all alterations of the relative, we involuntarily stop at what alone determines for us in life the sense of talking about the world: the world is the universe of things, which are distributed within the world-form of space-time and are “positional” in two senses (according to spatial position and temporal position) — the spatiotemporal *onta*. Here would thus be found the task of a life-world ontology, understood as a concretely general doctrine of essence for these *onta*. For our interest in the present context it suffices to have indicated this. Rather than spend our time here, we prefer to move on to a task which is much greater, as will soon be seen—one which in fact encompasses such a doctrine. In order to prepare the way for this new subject of investigation, which also essentially concerns the life-world but is not ontological, we shall undertake a general reflection—we, that is, as waking, living human beings in the life-world (and thus naturally within the *epoche* regarding all interference of positive scientific discipline).

This general reflection will at the same time have the function of making evident an essential distinction among the possible ways in which the pre-given world, the ontic universe [*das ontische Universum*], can become thematic for us. Calling to mind what has repeatedly been said: the life-world, for us who wakeningly live in it, is always already there, existing in advance for us, the “ground” of all praxis whether theoretical or extra-theoretical. The world is pre-given to us, the waking, always somehow practically interested subjects, not occasionally but always and necessarily as the universal field of all actual and possible praxis, as horizon. To live is always to live-in-certainty-of-the-world. Waking life is being awake to the world, being constantly and directly “conscious” of the world and of oneself as living in the world, actually experiencing [*erleben*] and actually effecting the ontic certainty of the world. The world is pre-given thereby, in every case, in such a way that individual things are given. But there exists a fundamental difference between the way we are conscious of the world and the way we are conscious of things or objects (taken in the broadest sense, but still purely in the sense of the life-world), though together the two make up an inseparable unity. Things, objects (always understood purely in the sense of the life-world), are “given” as being valid

for us in each case (in some mode or other of ontic certainty) but in principle only in such a way that we are conscious of them as things or objects within the world-horizon. Each one is something, “something of” the world of which we are constantly conscious as a horizon. On the other hand, we are conscious of this horizon only as a horizon for existing objects; without particular objects of consciousness it cannot be actual [aktuell]. Every object has its possible varying modes of being valid, the modalizations of ontic certainty. The world, on the other hand, does not exist as an entity, as an object, but exists with such uniqueness that the plural makes no sense when applied to it. Every plural, and every singular drawn from it, presupposes the world-horizon. This difference between the manner of being of an object in the world and that of the world itself obviously prescribes fundamentally different correlative types of consciousness for them.

### **38 The two possible fundamental ways of making the life-world thematic: the naive and natural straightforward attitude and the idea of a consistently reflective attitude toward the “how” of the subjective manner of givenness of life-world and life-world objects.**

THESE MOST GENERAL features of waking life make up the formal framework within which it now becomes possible to distinguish the different ways this life is carried on, though in all cases the world is pregiven and, within this horizon, objects are given. These ways result in the different manners, we could also say, in which we are awake to the world and to the objects in the world. The first, the naturally normal one which absolutely must precede the others not for accidental but for essential reasons, is that of straightforwardly living toward whatever objects are given, thus toward the world-horizon, in normal, unbroken constancy, in a synthetic coherence running through all acts. This normal, straightforward living, toward whatever objects are given, indicates that all our interests have their goals in objects. The pregiven world is the horizon which includes all our goals, all our ends, whether fleeting or lasting, in a flowing but constant manner, just as an intentional horizon-consciousness implicitly “encompasses” [everything] in advance. We, the subjects, in our normal, unbroken, coherent life, know no goals which extend beyond this; indeed we have no idea that there could be others. All our theoretical and practical themes, we can also say, lie always within the normal coherence of the life-horizon “world.” World is the universal field into which all our acts, whether of experiencing, of knowing, or of outward action, are directed. From this field, or from objects in each case already given, come all affections, transforming themselves in each case into actions.

Yet there can be a completely different sort of waking life involved in the conscious having of the world. It would consist in a transformation of the thematic consciousness of the world which breaks through the normality of straightforward living. Let us direct our attention to the fact that in general the world or, rather, objects are not merely pregiven to us all in such a way that we simply have them as the substrates of their properties but that we become conscious of them (and of everything ontically meant) through subjective manners of appearance, or manners of givenness, without noticing it in particular; in fact we are for the most part not even aware of it at all. Let us now shape this into a new universal direction of interest; let us establish a consistent universal interest in the “how” of the manners of givenness and in the ontia themselves, not straightforwardly but rather as objects in respect to their “how”- that is, with our interest exclusively and constantly directed toward how, throughout the alteration of relative validities, subjective appearances, and opinions, the coherent, universal validity world — the world -comes into being for us; how, that is, there arises in us the constant consciousness of the universal existence, of the universal horizon, of real, actually existing objects, each of which we are conscious of only through the alterations of our relative conceptions [Auffassungen] of it, of its manners of appearing, its modes of validity, even when we are conscious of it in particularity as something simply being there.

In this total change of interest, carried out with a new consistency founded on a particular resolve of the will, we notice that we acquire a number of never thematically investigated types, not only of individual things but also of syntheses, in an inseparable synthetic totality which is constantly produced by intentionally overlapping horizon-validities; and the latter influence each other reciprocally in the form of corroborating verifications of existence, or refuting cancelings-out, or other modalizations. This is the essential character of the synthetic totality in which we can take possession of something previously completely unknown, something never envisioned or grasped as a task for knowledge; this is the universal accomplishing life in which the world comes to be as existing for us constantly in flowing particularity, constantly “pregiven” to us. We can also say: this is the synthetic totality in which we now discover, for the first time, that and how the world, as correlate of a discoverable universe of synthetically connected accomplishments, acquires its ontic meaning and its ontic validity in the totality of its ontic [ontische] structures.

But here we do not need to go into more detailed expositions, into everything that can become thematic. What is essential for us here is the distinction between the two types of investigation,<sup>1</sup> each regarded as a universal investigation.

The natural life, whether it is prescientifically or scientifically, theoretically or practically interested, is life within a universal unthematic horizon. This horizon is, in the natural attitude, precisely the world always pregiven as that which exists. Simply living on in this manner, one does not need the word “pregiven”; there is no need to point out that the world is constantly actuality for us. All natural questions, all theoretical and practical goals taken as themes — as existing, as perhaps existing, as probable, as questionable, as valuable, as project, as action and result of action — have to do with something or other within the

world-horizon. This is true even of illusions, non-actualities, since everything characterized through some modality

1. This could refer either to the “two ways of making the lifeworld thematic” (cf. section heading) or to the investigation of the “how” of the objects vs. the investigation of the subjective syntheses.

of being is, after all, related to actual being. For, in advance, “world” has the meaning “the universe of the ‘actually’ existing actualities”: not the merely supposed, doubtful, or questionable actualities but the actual ones, which as such have actuality for us only in the constant movement of corrections and revisions of validities [Umgeltungen von Geltungen]-all this considered as the anticipation of an ideal unity.

Instead of persisting in this manner of “straightforwardly living into the world,” let us attempt a universal change of interest in which the new expression “pregivenness of the world” becomes necessary because it is the title for this differently directed and yet again universal theme of the manners of pre-givenness. In other words, nothing shall interest us but precisely that subjective alteration of manners of givenness, of manners of appearing and of the modes of validity in them, which, in its constant process, synthetically connected as it incessantly flows on, brings about the coherent consciousness of the straightforward “being” of the world.

Among the objects of the life-world we also find human beings, with all their human action and concern, works and suffering, living in common in the world-horizon in their particular social interrelations and knowing themselves to be such. All this, too, then, shall be included as we carry out our new universal direction of interest. A coherent theoretical interest shall now be directed exclusively toward the universe of the subjective, in which the world, in virtue of the universality of synthetically bound accomplishments in this universe, comes to have its straightforward existence for us. In the natural and normal world-life this subjective manifold constantly goes on, but there it remains constantly and necessarily concealed. How, by what method, is it to be revealed? Can it be shown to be a self-enclosed universe with its own theoretical and consistently maintained inquiry, revealing itself as the all-encompassing unity of ultimately functioning and accomplishing subjectivity which is to account for the existence of the world- the world for us, our natural life-horizon? If this is a legitimate and a necessary task, its execution implies the creation of a new science of a peculiar sort. In opposition to all previously designed objective sciences, which are sciences on the ground of the world, this would be a science of the universal how of the pre-givenness of the world, i.e., of what makes it a universal ground for any sort of objectivity. And included in this is the creation of a science of the ultimate grounds [Grnde] which supply the true force of all objective grounding, the force arising from its ultimate bestowal of meaning.

Our historically motivated path, moving from the interpretation of the interplay of problems between Hume and Kant, has now led us to the postulate of clarifying the pre-given world’s character of universally “being the ground” for all objective sciences and-what followed of itself-for all objective praxis; it has led us, then, to the postulate of that novel

universal science of subjectivity as pre-giving the world. We shall now have to see how we can fulfill this postulate. We notice thereby that the first step which seemed to help at the beginning, that epochs through which we freed ourselves from all objective sciences as grounds of validity, by no means suffices. In carrying out this epochs, we obviously continue to stand on the ground of the world; it is now reduced to the life-world which is valid for us prescientifically; it is just that we may use no sort of knowledge arising from the sciences as premises, and we may take the sciences into consideration only as historical facts, taking no position of our own on their truth.

But nothing about this affects our interested looking-around in the prescientifically intuited world or our paying attention to its relative features. In a certain way, concern with this sort of thing belongs continually even to [one type of] objective investigation, namely, that of the historians, who must, after all, reconstruct the changing, surrounding life-worlds of the peoples and periods with which they deal. In spite of this, the pre-given world is still valid as a ground [for them] and has not been transposed into the universe of the purely subjective, a universal framework in its own right, which is our concern now.

The same thing holds [even] if we take as our subject of investigation, in the unity of a systematic survey, all [historical] periods and peoples and finally the entire spatiotemporal world, paying constant attention to the relativity of the surrounding life-worlds of particular human beings, peoples, and periods as mere matters of fact. It is clear that the same thing is true of this world survey, in the form of an iterated synthesis of relative, spatiotemporal life-worlds, that is true of a survey of one such life-world individually. It is taken one part at a time and then, at a higher level, one surrounding world, one temporal period, at a time; each particular intuition [yields] an ontic validity, whether in the mode of actuality or possibility. As each intuition occurs, it presupposes others having objective validity — presupposes for us, the observers, the general ground of the validity of the world.

### **39 The peculiar character of the transcendental epoche as a total change of the natural attitude of life.**

Now, How can the pre-giveness of the life-world become a universal subject of investigation in its own right? Clearly, only through a total change of the natural attitude, such that we no longer live, as heretofore, as human beings within natural existence, constantly effecting the validity of the pre-given world; rather, we must constantly deny ourselves this. Only in this way can we arrive at the transformed and novel subject of investigation, “pre-giveness of the world as such”: the world purely and exclusively as- and in respect to how — it has meaning and ontic validity, and continually attains these in new forms, in our conscious life. Only thus can we study what the world is as the ground-validity for natural life, with

all its projects and undertakings, and, correlatively, what natural life and its subjectivity ultimately are, i.e., purely as the subjectivity which functions here in effecting validity. The life which effects world-validity in natural world-life does not permit of being studied from within the attitude of natural world-life. What is required, then, is a total transformation of attitude, a completely unique, universal epoche.

#### **40 The difficulties surrounding the genuine sense of performing the total epoche. The temptation to misconstrue it as a withholding of all individual validities, carried out step by step.**

THE UNIVERSALITY of the epoche in regard to the totality of natural and normal life does indeed have an incomparable, peculiar character, and as such it is at first open to question in several respects. From the start it is not clear how it is to be carried out in such a way as to be capable of the methodical accomplishment expected of it, which in turn, in view of its generality, is still in need of clarification. Here many tempting blind alleys offer themselves, as we shall find out, i.e., ways of understanding the performance of the epoche which surely do not lead to the goal—as we can make evident to ourselves in advance.

In order to gain a conception of how this total transformation of attitude is to be carried out, let us consider again the style of natural, normal life. There we move in a current of ever new experiences, judgments, valuations, decisions. In each of these acts the ego is directed toward objects in its surrounding world, dealing with them in one way or another. It is of them that we are conscious in these acts themselves, sometimes simply as actual, sometimes in modalities of actuality (for example, as possible, as doubtful, etc.). None of these acts, and none of the validities involved in them, is isolated: in their intentions they necessarily imply an infinite horizon of inactive [inaktuelle] validities which function with them in flowing mobility. The manifold acquisitions of earlier active life are not dead sediments; even the background (for example, that of the perceptual field), of which we are always concurrently conscious but which is momentarily irrelevant and remains completely unnoticed, still functions according to its implicit validities. All things of this sort, even though they are momentarily not actualized, are in a constant motion involving modes of being awakened, immediately or mediately, and modes of affecting the ego and possibly passing over into active apperception, intervening as validities in the complex of acts. Thus the particular object of our active consciousness, and correlatively the active, conscious having of it, being directed toward it, and dealing with it — all this is forever surrounded by an atmosphere of mute, concealed, but cofunctioning validities, a vital horizon into which the active ego can also direct itself voluntarily, reactivating old acquisitions, consciously grasping new apperceptive ideas, transforming them into intuitions. Because of this constantly flowing

horizontal character, then, every straightforwardly performed validity in natural world-life always presupposes validities extending back, immediately or mediately, into a necessary subsoil of obscure but occasionally available reactivatable validities, all of which together, including the present acts, make up a single indivisible, interrelated complex of life.

This consideration is of significance for the clarification of how the universal epoche is to be performed. We see, namely, that as an abstention from performing validity, carried out in individual steps, it cannot lead to the goal.

The abstention from performing individual validities (similar to the way this occurs in a critical attitude, caused by theoretical or practical demands) only creates for each instance a new mode of validity on the natural ground of the world; and the situation is not improved if we wish to exercise, through an anticipatory, universal resolve, the abstention from the performance, one by one, of all validities, even to infinity, i.e., in respect to all of one's own or alien validities which from now on could ever suggest themselves.

Instead of this universal abstention in individual steps, a completely different sort of universal epoche is possible, namely, one which puts out of action, with one blow, the total performance running through the whole of natural world-life and through the whole network (whether concealed or open) of validities—precisely that total performance which, as the coherent “natural attitude,” makes up “simple” “straightforward” ongoing life. Through the abstention which inhibits this whole hitherto unbroken way of life a complete transformation of all of life is attained, a thoroughly new way of life. An attitude is arrived at which is above the pregivenness of the validity of the world, above the infinite complex whereby, in concealment, the world's validities are always founded on other validities, above the whole manifold but synthetically unified flow in which the world has and forever attains anew its content of meaning and its ontic validity. In other words, we thus have an attitude above the universal conscious life (both individual-subjective and intersubjective) through which the world is “there” for those naively absorbed in ongoing life, as unquestionably present, as the universe of what is there,<sup>1</sup> as the field of all acquired and newly established life-interests. They are all put out of action in advance by the epoche, and with them the whole natural ongoing life which is directed toward the actualities of “the” world.

It is to be noted also that the present, the “transcendental” epoche is meant, of course, as a habitual attitude which we resolve to take up once and for all. Thus it is by no means a temporary act, which remains incidental and isolated in its various repetitions. And again, everything we said about the earlier

1. als fraglos vorhandene, als Universum der Vorhandenheiten.

epoche, in comparing it with vocational attitudes, still holds during “vocational time,” while it does put all other interests “out of play,” it by no means gives up their manner of being as belonging to us (or our own manner of being as those who are “interested”), as if we were to sacrifice them or even reconsider whether or not they should continue to be upheld. But we must also not forget what was said as a protest against a degrading equation [of this]



with other vocations and what was said about the possibility of radically changing all human existence through this epoche which reaches into its philosophical depths.

## **41 The genuine transcendental epoche makes possible the “transcendental reduction” the discovery and investigation of the transcendental correlation between world and world-consciousness.**

WE PERFORM the epoche- we who are philosophizing in a new way- as a transformation of the attitude which precedes it not accidentally but essentially, namely, the attitude of natural human existence which, in its total historicity, in life and science, was never before interrupted. But it is necessary, now, to make really transparent the fact that we are not left with a meaningless, habitual abstention; rather, it is through this abstention that the gaze of the philosopher in truth first becomes fully free: above all, free of the strongest and most universal, and at the same time most hidden, internal bond, namely, of the pre-giveness of the world. Given in and through this liberation is the discovery of the universal, absolutely self-enclosed and absolutely self-sufficient correlation between the world itself and world-consciousness. By the latter is meant the conscious life of the subjectivity which effects the validity of the world, the subjectivity which always has the world in its enduring acquisitions and continues actively to shape it anew. And there results, finally, taken in the broadest sense, the absolute correlation between beings of every sort and every meaning, on the one hand, and absolute subjectivity, as constituting meaning and ontic validity in this broadest manner, on the other hand. What must be shown in particular and above all is that through the epoche a new way of experiencing, of thinking, of theorizing, is opened to the philosopher; here, situated above his own natural being and above the natural world, he loses nothing of their being and their objective truths and likewise nothing at all of the spiritual acquisitions of his world-life or those of the whole historical communal life; he simply forbids himself -as a philosopher, in the uniqueness of his direction of interest — to continue the whole natural performance of his world-life; that is, he forbids himself to ask questions which rest upon the ground of the world at hand, questions of being, questions of value, practical questions, questions about being or not-being, about being valuable, being useful, being beautiful, being good, etc. All natural interests are put out of play. But the world, exactly as it was for me earlier and still is, as my world, our world, humanity's world, having validity in its various subjective ways, has not disappeared; it is just that, during the consistently carried-out epoche, it is under our gaze purely as the correlate of the subjectivity which gives it ontic meaning, through whose validities 1 the world “is” at all.

This is not a “view,” an “interpretation” bestowed upon the world. Every view about . . . , every opinion about “the” world, has its ground in the pre-given world. It is from this

very ground that I have freed myself through the epoche; I stand above the world, which has now become for me, in a quite peculiar sense, a phenomenon.

1. Reading Geltungen for Gelten.

## **42 The task of concretely plotting ways in which the transcendental reduction can actually be carried out.**

BUT HOW IS THE indicated accomplishment, made possible by the epoche- we call it the “transcendental reduction”- and how is the scientific task which is thus opened up to be made understandable in more concrete terms? [We are referring to the] accomplishment of a reduction of “the” world to the transcendental phenomenon “world,” a reduction thus also to its correlate, transcendental subjectivity, in and through whose “conscious life” the world, valid for us straightforwardly and naively prior to all science, attains and always has attained its whole content and ontic validity. How can we make it more concretely understandable that the reduction of mankind to the phenomenon “mankind,” which is included as part of the reduction of the world, makes it possible to recognize mankind as a self-objectification of transcendental subjectivity which is always functioning ultimately and is thus “absolute”? How does it become possible, thanks to the epoche, to display this subjectivity in its accomplishment, in its transcendental “conscious life,” extending into hidden subsoils, in the distinct manners in which it “brings about,” within itself, the world as ontic meaning? How can we bring this to light with self-evidence, not inventing or mythically constructing? If this is a matter of a new sort of scientific discipline, of a new sort of theoretical questioning and resolving of questions, then the ground for these questions, too, must be prepared. Natural questions about the world have their ground in the pre-given world as the world of actual and possible experiences. And the gaze made free by the epoche must likewise be, in its own way, an experiencing gaze. [But] the accomplishment of the total transformation of attitude must consist in the fact that the infinity of actual and possible world-experience transforms itself into the infinity of actual and possible “transcendental experience,” in which, as a first step, the world and the natural experience of it are experienced as “phenomenon.”

But how do we begin this, and how do we progress? How, at first concretely feeling our way, do we attain our first results, even if only as material for new reflections through which the method of systematic progressive work and, at the same time, the genuine and pure sense of our whole project and the quite peculiar character of this new scientific discipline will become fully clear? The following reflections will show how much such material is needed when we no longer move on the old familiar ground of the world but rather stand, through our transcendental reduction, only at the gate of entrance to the realm, never before entered, of the “mothers of knowledge”; 1 they will show how great the temptation

is, here, to misunderstand oneself and how much— indeed, ultimately, the actual success of a transcendental philosophy — depends upon self-reflective clarity carried to its limits.

1. Cf. Faust, Part II, line 6216.

### **43 Characterization of a new way to the reduction, as contrasted with the “Cartesian way.”**

WE WISH TO PROCEED, here, by beginning anew, starting purely from natural world-life, and by asking after the how of the world’s pregivenness. At first we understand the question of the world’s pregivenness just as it arises within the natural attitude and is understandable by all: namely, as the pregivenness of the world of existing things through the constant alteration of relative manners of givenness, the world just as it essentially, always, obviously exists for us, throughout the whole of naturally flowing life, with an inexhaustible plenitude of what is taken for granted and constantly underlies the alteration of subjective appearances and validities. As such we now consistently make the world our subject of investigation, i.e., as the ground of all our interests and life-projects, among which the theoretical projects of the objective sciences make up only a particular group. But the latter is now to be in no way privileged as it was when it motivated our inquiries earlier. In this manner, then, let our subject now be not the world simply, but the world exclusively as it is constantly pregiven to us in the alteration of its manners of givenness.

At this point novel and ever broadening systematic tasks are opened up within a universal epoche which at first offers itself quite obviously as an immediate necessity. In systematically carrying out the epoche, or reduction, understood in this way, however, we find that in all the tasks it sets it requires a clarification and a transformation of its meaning if the new science is to become capable of being executed in a really concrete way and without absurdity; or if— what amounts to the same thing— it is actually to accomplish a reduction to the absolutely ultimate grounds [Grnde] and to avoid unnoticed, nonsensical admixtures of naturally naive prior validities. Thus we arrive once again at the transcendental epoche which was introduced in advance in our previous presentation in a general way. But now it has not only been enriched by the samples of significant insights attained along the way; it has also attained a self-understanding in principle which procures for these insights and for the epoche itself their ultimate meaning and value.

I note in passing that the much shorter way to the transcendental epoche in my Ideas toward a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, which I call the “Cartesian way” (since it is thought of as being attained merely by reflectively engrossing oneself in the Cartesian epoche of the Meditations while critically purifying it of Descartes’s prejudices and confusions), has a great shortcoming: while it leads to the transcendental ego in one leap, as it were, it brings this ego into view as apparently empty of content, since there can

be no preparatory explication; so one is at a loss, at first, to know what has been gained by it, much less how, starting with this, a completely new sort of fundamental science, decisive for philosophy, has been attained. Hence also, as the reception of my Ideas showed, it is all too easy right at the very beginning to fall back into the naive-natural attitude- something that is very tempting in any case.<sup>1</sup>

## **44 The life-world as subject matter for a theoretical interest determined by a universal epoche in respect to the actuality of the things of the life-world.**

LET US BEGIN our new way by devoting an exclusive, consistently theoretical interest to the “life-world” as the general “ground” of human world-life and, specifically, to just the way in which it fulfills this general “ground” function. Since we seek in vain in world literature for investigations that could serve as preparatory studies for us-investigations which might have understood this task as that of a science in its own right (a peculiar science, to be sure, since it concerns the disparaged doxa, which now suddenly claims the dignity of a foundation for science,

1. It is to be remembered that the German version of the Cartesian Meditations had never been released for publication by Husserl. These remarks support the theory that Husserl had given up the project of a final version of the Meditations altogether in favor of the Crisis as the definitive introduction to phenomenology.

episteme)-we ourselves must make a completely new beginning. As is the case with all undertakings which are new in principle, for which not even an analogy can serve as guide, this beginning takes place with a certain unavoidable naiveté. In the beginning is the deed.<sup>1</sup> It makes the still insecure project more definite and at the same time clearer and clearer by means of samples of successful execution. After this, reflection on method is required (as the second step) which expressly delimits the general sense of such a project, the extent to which it can be fulfilled, and the scope of what has already been accomplished in aspiring to it.

We wish, then, to consider the surrounding life-world concretely, in its neglected relativity and according to all the manners of relativity belonging essentially to it-the world in which we live intuitively, together with its real entities [Realitäten]; but [we wish to consider them] as they give themselves to us at first in straightforward experience, and even [consider] the ways in which their validity is sometimes in suspense (between being and illusion, etc.). Our exclusive task shall be to comprehend precisely this style, precisely this whole merely subjective and apparently incomprehensible “Heraclitean flux.” Thus we are not concerned with whether and what the things, the real entities of the world, actually are (their being actual, their actually being such and such, according to properties, relations, interconnec-

tions, etc.); we are also not concerned with what the world, taken as a totality, actually is, what in general belongs to it in the way of a priori structural lawfulness or factual “natural laws.” We have nothing like this as our subject matter. Thus we exclude all knowledge, all statements about true being and predicative truths for it, such as are required in active life for its praxis (i.e., situational truths); but we also exclude all sciences, genuine as well as pseudosciences, with their knowledge of the world as it is “in itself,” in “objective truth.” Naturally, in the present thematic sphere, we also take no part in all the interests which set any kind of human praxis in motion, especially since the latter, because of its rootedness in the already existing world, is always at the same time interested in the true existence or the nonexistence of the things with which it deals.

This involves a type of universal epoche, then, which serves here only to isolate the subject matter of subsequent investigations, of whose possible results, by the way, we still have no conception. The motivation arising out of the need to clarify the

1. Faust, Part I, line 1237: “Im Anfang war die Tat.”

obvious accomplishments of the positive sciences originally required this topic. But we have already detached ourselves from this motivation. Deeper reflections are required in order to understand how this topic can become an independent task, a field of working problems.

## **45 Beginnings of a concrete exposition of what is given in sense-intuition purely as such.**

ONE OF OUR FIRST steps will have to be that of filling in the empty generality of our theme. As fully “disinterested” spectators (in the indicated sense of the epoche) of the world purely as subjective-relative world (the one in which our whole everyday communal life—our efforts, concerns, and accomplishments—takes place), let us now take a first, naive look around; our aim shall be, not to examine the world’s being and beingsuch, but to consider whatever has been valid and continues to be valid for us as being and being-such in respect to how it is subjectively valid, how it looks, etc.

For example, there are various individual things of experience at any given time; I focus on one of them. To perceive it, even if it is perceived as remaining completely unchanged, is something very complex: it is to see it, to touch it, to smell it, to hear it, etc.; and in each case I have something different. What is seen in seeing is in and for itself other than what is touched in touching. But in spite of this I say: it is the same thing; it is only the manners of its sensible exhibition, of course, that are different. If I remain purely within the realm of seeing, I find new differences, arising in very manifold form in the course of any normal seeing, which, after all, is a continuous process; each phase is itself a seeing, but actually what is seen in each one is something different. I express this somewhat in the following way: the pure thing seen, what is visible “of” the thing, is first of all a surface, and in the changing

course of seeing I see it now from this “side,” now from that, continuously perceiving it from ever differing sides. But in them the surface exhibits itself to me in a continuous synthesis; each side is for consciousness a manner

1. Reading uninteressierte for uninteressierter.

of exhibition of it. This implies that, while the surface is immediately given, I mean more than it offers. Indeed, I have ontic certainty of this thing [as that] to which all the sides at once belong, and in the mode in which I see it “best.” Each side gives me something of the seen thing. In the continuous alteration of seeing, the side just seen ceases being actually still seen, but it is “retained” and “taken” together with those retained from before; and thus I “get to know” the thing. Similar observations should be developed at length in respect to nearness and farness.

Even if I stop at perception, I still have the full consciousness of the thing, just as I already have it at the first glance when I see it as this thing. In seeing I always “mean” it with all the sides which are in no way given to me, not even in the form of intuitive, anticipatory presentifications. Thus every perception has, “for consciousness,” a horizon belonging to its object (i.e., whatever is meant in the perception).

But considered more exactly, what we have displayed so far, i.e., what I attribute to the thing itself—for example, its seen, colored shape in the alteration of near-and-far orientation—is again something which exhibits itself in manifold ways. I am speaking now of the alteration of perspectives. The perspectives of the shape and also of its color are different, but each is in this new way an exhibiting of — of this shape, of this color. Something similar to this can be studied in every modality of the sense-perception (touching, hearing, etc.) of the same thing. In the course of alteration they all play their role as exhibitings, now being interrupted, now beginning again; they offer many types of manifolds of exhibitings, appearances, each of which functions precisely as an exhibiting of. In running their course they function in such a way as to form a sometimes continuous and sometimes discrete synthesis of identification or, better, of unification. This happens not as a blending of externals; rather, as bearers of “sense” in each phase, as meaning something, the perspectives combine in an advancing enrichment of meaning and a continuing development of meaning, such that what no longer appears is still valid as retained and such that the prior meaning which anticipates a continuous flow, the expectation of “what is to come,” is straightway fulfilled and more closely determined. Thus everything is taken up into the unity of validity or into the one, the thing. For now, this rough beginning of a description must suffice.

2. Reading die eben gesehene for eben die gesehene.

## 46 The universal a priori of correlation.

AS SOON AS WE BEGIN to be on the lookout for things or objects in the life-world, not in order to know them as what they [really] are but rather in order to inquire into the modes of their subjective manners of givenness, i.e., into how an object-in our example a perceived object-exhibits itself as being and beingsuch, we enter a realm of more and more involved and very remarkable expositions. Ordinarily we notice nothing of the whole subjective character of the manners of exhibiting “of” the things, but in reflection we recognize with astonishment that essential correlations obtain here which are the component parts of a farther-reaching, universal a priori. And what remarkable “implications” appear, ones that can even be quite immediately, descriptively displayed. As it was already pointed out briefly above: I am directly conscious of the thing existing there, yet changing from moment to moment I have the experience [Erlebnis] [of an] “exhibiting of,” although the latter, with its remarkable “of,” becomes visible only in reflection. Implied in the particular perception of the thing is a whole “horizon” of nonactive [nichtaktuelle] and yet cofunctioning manners of appearance and syntheses of validity.

Every first description here is of necessity rough, and soon one is faced with the enigmas caused by this implication of nonactive manifolds of appearances, without which no things, no world of experience, would be given to us. And soon we are also faced with the difficulties of concretely unfolding this a priori of correlation. The latter can be displayed only in relativity, in an unfolding of horizons in which one soon realizes that unnoticed limitations, horizons which have not been felt, push us on to inquire into new correlations inseparably bound up with those already displayed. For example, we involuntarily begin such an “intentional analysis” of perception by giving privileged status to a thing at rest, remaining qualitatively unchanged. But the things of the perceptual surrounding world give themselves only temporarily in this way, and soon the intentional problem of motion and change arises. But was such a beginning, with the unchanged thing at rest, actually only accidental? Does the privileged status of rest not itself have a motive in the necessary course of such investigations? Or, to look at the matter from another and very important side: involuntarily, we began with the intentional analysis of perception (purely as perception of its perceived object) and in fact gave privileged status thereby to intuitively given bodies. Might this not also point to essential necessities? The world exists as a temporal, a spatiotemporal, world in which each thing has its bodily extension and duration and, again in respect to these, its position in universal time and in space. It is as such that we are ever conscious of the world in waking consciousness, as such that it is valid as universal horizon. Perception is related only to the present. But this present is always meant as having an endless past behind it and an open future before it. We soon see that we need the intentional analysis of recollection as the original manner of being conscious of the past; but we also see that such an analysis presupposes in principle that of perception, since memory, curiously enough, implies having-perceived. If we consider perception abstractly, by itself, we find its intentional accomplishment to be presentation, making something present: the object gives

itself as “there,” originally there, present. But in this presence, as that of an extended and enduring object, lies a continuity of what I am still conscious of, what has flowed away and is no longer intuited at all, a continuity of “retentions”-and, in the other direction, a continuity of “protentions.” Yet this is not, like memory in the usual sense of intuitive “recollection,” a phenomenon which openly, so to speak, plays a part in object- and world-apperception. And thus the different modes of presentification in general enter into the universal investigation we are undertaking here, namely, that of inquiring consistently and exclusively after the how of the world’s manner of givenness, its open or implicit “intentionalities.” In displaying these, we must say to ourselves again and again that without them the objects and the world would not be there for us and that the former exist for us only with the meaning and the mode of being that they receive in constantly arising or having arisen out of those subjective accomplishments.

## **47 Indication of further directions of inquiry: the basic subjective phenomena of kinesthesia, alteration of validity, horizon-consciousness, and the communalization of experience.**

BUT FIRST IT WILL be necessary to continue our groping entrance into this unknown realm of subjective phenomena and to carry out several further expositions, which will be understandably still rough and in many respects still imperfectly determined. Let us again give a privileged status to perception. Previously our gaze was directed at the multiplicity of side-exhibitings of one and the same thing and to the alteration of near and far perspectives. We soon note that these systems of “exhibiting of” are related back to correlative multiplicities of kinesthetic processes having the peculiar character of the “I do,” “I move” (to which even the “I hold still” must be added). The kinestheses are different from the movements of the living body which exhibit themselves merely as those of a physical body, yet they are somehow one with them, belonging to one’s own living body with its two-sided character (internal kinestheses, external physical-real movements). If we inquire into this “belonging,” we notice that in each case “my living body” requires particular and extensive descriptions, that it has its special peculiarities in the manner of exhibiting itself in multiplicities.

Another extraordinarily important thematic direction has not yet been named; it is characterized by the phenomenon of the alteration of validity — for example, the alteration of being into illusion. In continuous perception a thing is there for me in the straightforward ontic certainty of immediate presence - though I must add: normally; for only when, giving my kinestheses free play, I experience concurrent exhibitings as belonging to it is the consciousness sustained of the one thing in actual presence, exhibiting itself in manifold fashion as itself. But if I ask what is implied in the fact that the thing-exhibitings belong to



the altering kinestheses, I recognize that a hidden intentional “if-then” relation is at work here: the exhibitings must occur in a certain systematic order; it is in this way that they are indicated in advance, in expectation, in the course of a harmonious perception. The actual kinestheses here lie within the system of kinesthetic capacity, which is correlated with the system of possible following events harmoniously belonging to it. This is, then, the intentional background of every straightforward ontic certainty of a presented thing.<sup>1</sup>

Often, however, a break in this harmony occurs: being is transformed into illusion or simply into being doubtful, being merely possible, being probable, being after all not completely illusory, etc. The illusion is undone through “correction,” through changing the sense in which the thing had been perceived. It is easy to see that the change of apperceptive sense takes place through a change of the expectation-horizon of the multiplicities anticipated as normal (i.e., as running on harmoniously). For example, one saw a man, but then, upon touching him, had to reinterpret him as a mannequin (exhibiting itself visually as a man).

When our interest is turned in this direction, unexpectedly manifold phenomena can be noticed in every perception, and not only in connection with the individual thing. For consciousness the individual thing is not alone; the perception of a thing is perception of it within a perceptual field. And just as the individual thing in perception has meaning only through an open horizon of “possible perceptions,” insofar as what is actually perceived “points” to a systematic multiplicity of all possible perceptual exhibitings belonging to it harmoniously, so the thing has yet another horizon: besides this “internal horizon” it has an “external horizon” precisely as a thing within a field of things; and this points finally to the whole “world as perceptual world.” The thing is one out of the total group of simultaneously actually perceived things; but this group is not, for us, for consciousness, the world; rather, the world exhibits itself in it; such a group, as the momentary field of perception, always has the character for us of a sector of the world, of the universe of things for possible perceptions. Such, then, at any time, is the present world; it exhibits itself to me in every case through a nucleus of “original presence” (this designates the continuously subjective character of what is directly perceived as such) as well as through its internal and external horizon-validities.

In our — or, for each of us, my<sup>2</sup> — waking life, the world is

1. Cf. the similar passage on pp. 106 f., above.
2. in unserem, je-meinem — a very Heideggerian turn of phrase.

always perceived in this way; it always flows on in the unity of my perceptual conscious life; yet it does so in remarkable fashion, such that, in individual details, a harmonious flow of the pre-indicated multiplicities, which results in the consciousness of the straightforward existence of the thing in question, does not always occur. Ontic certainty, which involves an anticipatory certainty of bringing the appropriate multiplicities harmoniously into a fulfilling flow in the course of further perception through a voluntary direction of the kinestheses, is often not sustained; and yet a harmony in the total perception of the world is always sustained

through a correction which actually constantly functions along with it. This includes, for example, the correction involved in seeing something close up, whereby what was seen from afar is determined more precisely and thus at the same time corrected (e.g., what was an undifferentiated red at a distance shows itself from close up to be spotted).

But instead of inquiring further in the sphere of our own intuitions, let us turn our attention to the fact that in our continuously flowing world-perceiving we are not isolated but rather have, within it, contact with other human beings. Each one has his perceptions, his presentifications, his harmonious experiences, devaluation of his certainties into mere possibilities, doubts, questions, illusions. But in lining with one another each one can take part in the life of the others. Thus in general the world exists not only for isolated men but for the community of men; and this is due to the fact that even what is straightforwardly perceptual is communalized.

In this communalization, too, there constantly occurs an alteration of validity through reciprocal correction. In reciprocal understanding, my experiences and experiential acquisitions enter into contact with those of others, similar to the contact between individual series of experiences within my (one's own) experiential life; and here again, for the most part, intersubjective harmony of validity occurs, [establishing what is] "normal" in respect to particular details, and thus an intersubjective unity also comes about in the multiplicity of validities and of what is valid through them; here again, furthermore, intersubjective discrepancies show themselves often enough; but then, whether it is unspoken and even unnoticed, or is expressed through discussion and criticism, a unification is brought about or at least is certain in advance as possibly attainable by everyone. All this takes place in such a way that in the consciousness of each individual, and in the overarching community consciousness which has grown up through [social] contact, one and the same world achieves and continuously maintains constant validity as the world which is in part already experienced and in part the open horizon of possible experiences for all; it is the world as the universal horizon, common to all men, of actually existing things. Each individual, as a subject of possible experiences, has his experiences, his aspects, his perceptual interconnections, his alteration of validity, his corrections, etc.; and each particular social group has its communal aspects, etc. Here again, properly speaking, each individual has his experienced things, that is, if we understand by this what in particular is valid for him, what is seen by him and, through the seeing, is experienced as straightforwardly existing and being-such. But each individual "knows" himself to be living within the horizon of his fellow human beings, with whom he can enter into sometimes actual, sometimes potential contact, as they also can do (as he likewise knows) in actual and potential living together. He knows that he and his fellows, in their actual contact, are related to the same experienced things in such a way that each individual has different aspects, different sides, perspectives, etc., of them but that in each case these are taken from the same total system of multiplicities of which each individual is constantly conscious (in the actual experience of the same thing) as the horizon of possible experience of this thing. If one attends to the distinction between things as "originally one's own" and as "empathized" from others, in respect to the how of the manners of appearance,

and if one attends to the possibility of discrepancies between one's own and empathized views, then what one actually experiences originaliter as a perceptual thing is transformed, for each of us, into a mere "representation of" ["Vorstellung von"], "appearance of," the one objectively existing thing. From the synthesis these have taken on precisely the new sense "appearance of," and as such they are henceforth valid. "The" thing itself is actually that which no one experiences as really seen, since it is always in motion, always, and for everyone, a unity for consciousness of the openly endless multiplicity of changing experiences and experienced things, one's own and those of others. The co-subjects of this experience themselves make up, for me and for one another, an openly endless horizon of human beings who are capable of meeting and then entering into actual contact with me and with one another.

## **48     Anything that is-whatever its meaning and to whatever region it belongs-is an index of a subjective system of correlations.**

IN THIS EXCLUSIVE concentration on the multiplicities of subjective manners of appearing through which the world is pregiven to us, we arrive, again and again-even though we have really considered only the world of perception, indeed only its corporeal features-at the insight that we are not dealing merely with contingent matters of fact. Rather, no conceivable human being, no matter how different we imagine him to be, could ever experience a world in manners of givenness which differ from the incessantly mobile relativity we have delineated in general terms, i.e., as a world pregiven to him in his conscious life and in community with fellow human beings. The fact which is naively taken for granted, that each person sees things and the world in general as they appear to him, concealed, as we now realize, a great horizon of remarkable truths whose uniqueness and systematic interconnection never entered the philosophical purview. The correlation between world (the world of which we always speak) and its subjective manners of givenness never evoked philosophical wonder (that is, prior to the first breakthrough of "transcendental phenomenology" in the Logical Investigations), in spite of the fact that it had made itself felt even in pre-Socratic philosophy and among the Sophists - though here only as a motive for skeptical argumentation. This correlation never aroused a philosophical interest of its own which could have made it the object of an appropriate scientific attitude. Philosophers were confined by what was taken for granted, i.e., that each thing appeared differently in each case to each person.

But as soon as we begin to examine carefully the how of the appearance of a thing in its actual and possible alteration and to pay consistent attention to the correlation it involves between appearance and that which appears as such, and if we consider the alteration as an alteration of validity for the intentionality occurring in the ego-subjects and their communalization, we are forced to recognize a fixed typology with ever widening ramifications.

It applies not only to perceiving, to bodies, and to the penetrable depths of immediate sensibility but to any and every entity within the spatiotemporal world and to its subjective manners of givenness. Everything thus stands in correlation with its own manners of givenness, which are by no means merely sensible in character, within a possible experience; and everything has its modes of validity and its particular manners of synthesis. Experience, self-evidence, is not an empty generality but is differentiated according to the species, genera, and regional categories of what is and also according to all spatiotemporal modalities. Whatever exists, whether it has a concrete or abstract, real or ideal, meaning, has its manners of self-givenness and, on the side of the ego, its manners of intention in modes of validity; to this belong the manners of the subjective variation of these modes in syntheses of individual-subjective and intersubjective harmony and discrepancy. We also foresee (as even the first trials made clear in a preliminary way) that this confusingly manifold typology of correlations, comprising further differentiations at every turn, is not a mere though generally established fact but rather that the factual indicates an essential necessity which, with the proper method, can be translated into essential generalities, into an immense system of novel and highly astounding a priori truths. No matter where we turn, every entity that is valid for me and every conceivable subject as existing in actuality is thus correlatively-and with essential necessity-an index of its systematic multiplicities. Each one indicates an ideal general set of actual and possible experiential manners of givenness, each of which is an appearance of this one entity, such that every actual concrete experience brings about, from this total multiplicity, a harmonious flow of manners of givenness which continuously fulfills the experiencing intention.\*

\* The first breakthrough of this universal a priori of correlation between experienced object and manners of givenness (which occurred during work on my *Logical Investigations* around 1898) affected me so deeply that my whole subsequent life-work has been dominated by the task of systematically elaborating on this a priori of correlation. The further course of the reflections in this text will show how, when human subjectivity was brought into the problems of correlation, a radical transformation of the meaning of these problems became necessary which finally led to the phenomenological reduction to absolute, transcendental subjectivity.

The first, though still unclarified, emergence of the phenomenological reduction occurred several years after the publication of the *Logical Investigations* (1900-1901); the first attempt at a systematic introduction to the new philosophy of the transcendental reduction appeared in 1913 as a fragment (Volume I of *Ideas toward a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy*).

Contemporary philosophy of the decades since then- even that of the so-called phenomenological schools — preferred to persist in the old philosophical naiveté. To be sure, the first breakthroughs of such a radical change, a total transformation of the whole natural manner of life, were difficult to present adequately, especially since certain considerations, which will become understandable in the following, constantly give rise to misinterpretations resulting from relapses into the natural attitude.

The total multiplicity of manners of givenness, however, is a horizon of possibly realizable processes, as opposed to the actual process, and as such it belongs to each experience, or

rather to the intention which is operative within it. For each subject this intention is the cogito; the manners of givenness (understood in the widest sense) make up its cogitatum according to the “what” and the “how,” and the manners of givenness in turn bring to “exhibition” the one and the same entity which is their unity.

## **49 Preliminary concept of transcendental constitution as “original formation of meaning.” The restricted character of the exemplary analyses carried out so far; an indication of further horizons of exposition.**

WE SEE HOW FAR we must take all this when we realize that, while we are dealing with the total intentional accomplishment, having many levels, of the subjectivity in question, it is not that of the isolated subject. We are dealing, rather, with the entire intersubjectivity which is brought together in the accomplishment—and here the concepts of “what is,” of “manners of givenness,” of “syntheses,” etc., are repeatedly relativized. Again and again we realize that, beginning with the superficially visible, the manners of appearing belonging to the unifying multiplicities are themselves unities of multiplicities which lie deeper and which constitute them through appearances, so that we are led back to an obscure horizon—which, however, can still be opened up through methodical regressive inquiry. All the levels and strata through which the syntheses, intentionally overlapping as they are from subject to subject, are interwoven form a universal unity of synthesis; through it the objective universe comes to be — the world which is and as it is concretely and vividly given (and pre-given for all possible praxis). In this regard we speak of the “intersubjective constitution” of the world, meaning by this the total system of manners of givenness, however hidden, and also of modes of validity for egos; through this constitution, if we systematically uncover it, the world as it is for us becomes understandable as a structure of meaning formed out of elementary intentionalities. The being of these intentionalities themselves is nothing but one meaningformation operating together with another, “constituting” new meaning through synthesis. And meaning is never anything but meaning in modes of validity, that is, as related to intending ego-subjects which effect validity. Intentionality is the title which stands for the only actual and genuine way of explaining, making intelligible. To go back to the intentional origins and unities of the formation of meaning is to proceed toward a comprehension which, once achieved (which is of course an ideal case), would leave no meaningful question unanswered. But every serious and genuine move from a “ready-made entity” back to its intentional origins gives us, in respect to those strata already uncovered and the clarification of what is accomplished in them, an understanding which, though merely relative, is yet an actual understanding as far as it goes.

What we dealt with in the manner of examples was naturally only a beginning, in fact

a beginning of the clarification of merely the world of perception, which is itself, taken as a whole, only a “stratum.” The world is a spatiotemporal world; spatiotemporality (as “living,” not as logico-mathematical) belongs to its own ontic meaning as life-world. Our focus on the world of perception (and it is no accident that we begin here) gives us, as far as the world is concerned, only the temporal mode of the present; this mode itself points to its horizons, the temporal modes of past and future. Recollection, above all, exercises the intentional function of forming the meaning of the past — apart from the fact that perception itself, as the “flowing-static” present, is constituted only through the fact that the static “now” (as a deeper intentional analysis shows) has a horizon with two differently structured sides, known in intentional language as a continuum of retentions and protentions. These first prefigurations of temporalization and time, however, remain in the background. In the recollection founded upon them we have before us, in original intuition, a past — a present which has passed. It too has “being”: it has its multiplicities of manners of givenness, its manners of coming to original self-givenness (to immediate self-evidence) as what has passed. Likewise, in expectation or anticipatory recollection, again understood as an intentional modification of perception (the future is a present-to-come), is found the meaning-formation from which arises the ontic meaning of that which is in the future. And the deeper structure of this can be revealed in more detail. This represents the beginnings of new dimensions of temporalization, or of time and its time content — quite apart from the fact (which is not to be elucidated here) that the constitution of every level and sort of entity is a temporalization which gives to each distinctive meaning of an entity in the constitutive system its own temporal form, whereas only through the all-inclusive, universal synthesis which constitutes the world do all these times come together synthetically into the unity of one time. One thing more should be pointed out : in the elucidation of the accomplishment of the intentional syntheses, privileged status is given to the clarification of the syntheses of continuity (for example, the one contained in the flowing unity of perception); these serve as a ground for elucidating on a higher level the discrete syntheses. I give as an example [of the latter] the identification of something perceived as the same thing that, according to recollection, was there before. This rerecognition, its exposition through the continuity of recollection, the corresponding deeper analyses of these “obvious” matters — all this leads to difficult investigations.

Here, as everywhere, we can investigate first only what is nearest to our comprehension. But it should be clear from the preceding that as soon as one has progressed far enough in the reorientation of the epoche to see the purely subjective in its own self-enclosed pure context as intentionality and to recognize it as the function of forming ontic meaning, the theoretical interest grows quickly, and one becomes more astonished at each step by the endless array of emerging problems and important discoveries to be made. To be sure, one is soon beset by extraordinary difficulties: that of preserving the pure frame of mind, of finding one’s way in an unknown world, where all the concepts, all the ways of thinking and scientific methods based on the natural world, as well as all the logical methods of objective science, are of no help; and that of bringing about a novel and yet scientific way of thinking through the

required method which is developing in a precursory way. In truth, this is a whole world-and if we could equate this subjectivity with the yuc of Heraclitus, his saying would doubtless be true of it: “You will never find the boundaries of the soul, even if you follow every road; so deep is its ground.”’ Indeed, every “ground” [Grund] that is reached points to further grounds, every horizon opened up awakens new horizons, and yet the endless whole, in its infinity of flowing movement, is oriented toward the unity of one meaning; not, of course, in such a way that we could ever simply grasp and understand the whole; rather, as soon as one has fairly well mastered the universal form of meaning-formation, the breadths and depths of this total meaning, in its infinite totality, take on valuative [axiotische] dimensions: there arise problems of the totality as that of a universal reason. Yet all this is far from the beginner; he starts by exhibiting only a few interconnections, and only gradually does he learn to discover the essential order of the work to be done or (what amounts to the same thing) to do justice to those important considerations which, in the course of exhibiting and describing, are belatedly recognized as determining everything else. Here we can only sketch them in broad outlines.

## **50 First ordering of all working problems under the headings ego-cogito-cogitatum.**

WHEN WE TAKE AN INTEREST in the subjective-relative life-world, what first arrests our gaze is, naturally: appearance and that which appears; and we remain at first in the sphere of the intuitively given, i.e., the sphere of the modes of experience. The nonintuitive manners of being conscious and their relatedness back to possibilities of intuition remain unconsidered. So we pursue the synthesis through which the manifold appearances bear within themselves “that which is” as their “objectpole.” The latter is in the appearances not as a component part

1.Husserl slightly misquotes Diels’s version of Fragment 45: the last phrase reads “so tiefen Sinn hat sie” (rather than Grund). Cf. *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, ed. W. Kranz, 12th ed. (Dublin and Zurich: Weidman, 1966), p. 161.

[reell] but intentionally, as that of which each, in its own way, is an appearance. A thing, for example, in the harmonious synthesis of unification, is just this one thing, showing itself one side at a time, revealing its identical being through its properties, which are exhibited in different perspectives. In terms of intentionality, anything straightforwardly experienced as a “thishere,” as a thing, is an index of its manners of appearing, which become intuitable (or experienceable, in their own peculiar way) when our gaze is reflectively turned. All the above considerations, of course, touch upon the ego in passing, but the ego ultimately claims its right as the subject matter of a far-reaching investigation in its own right, namely, as the performer (also identical, in its own way) of all validities, the intending ego, directed toward the unity-pole “through” the alterations of the many-leveled manners

of appearing. That is, it is directed toward its sought-after goal (its project [Vorhabe]), which is meant in advance with greater or less clarity and distinctness, which fulfills itself, being and becoming, phase by phase — fulfilling the ego's intention. At the same time the ego- as the ego-pole — continuously carries out a retaining function such that, while it actively explicates the object through its properties (i.e., its particular "is"-qualities, which give it its particularity), it does not let what has been explicated originaliter sink away into nothingness as perception proceeds but rather holds it in its meaning grasp even though it is now unperceived. Everything is centered in the ego-pole, including the modalization of the ontic certainties — "crossing out" what is illusory, attending to the decision about uncertainties, doubt, etc. Affections, on the other hand, go toward the ego-pole; they attract the ego with greater or less insistence, possibly motivating it to turn to them in a truly active way. These and similar matters point to special analyses in depth of the ego as ego-pole.

Accordingly we have, in the Cartesian manner of speaking, the three headings, ego-cogitatio-cogitata: the ego-pole (and what is peculiar to its identity), the subjective, as appearance tied together synthetically, and the object-poles. These are different directions our analyses can take, and to them correspond different aspects of the general notion of intentionality: direction toward something, appearance of something, and something, an objective something, as the unity in its appearances toward which the intention of the ego-pole, through these appearances, is directed. Although these headings are inseparable from one another, one must pursue them one at a time and in an order opposite to that suggested by the Cartesian approach. First comes the straightforwardly given life-world, taken initially as it is given perceptually: as "normal," simply there, unbroken, existing in pure ontic certainty (undoubted). When the new direction of interest is established, and thus also its strict epoche, the life-world becomes a first intentional heading, an index or guideline for inquiring back into the multiplicities of manners of appearing and their intentional structures. A further shift of direction, at the second level of reflection, leads to the ego-pole and what is peculiar to its identity. Let us here point out only what is most important, the most general aspect of the ego's form, namely, the peculiar temporalization by which it becomes an enduring ego, constituting itself in its time-modalities: the same ego, now actually present, is in a sense, in every past that belongs to it, another-i.e., as that which was and thus is not now and yet, in the continuity of its time it is one and the same, which is and was and has its future before it. The ego which is present now, thus temporalized, has contact with its past ego, even though the latter is precisely no longer present: it can have a dialogue with it and criticize it, as it can others.

Now everything becomes complicated as soon as we consider that subjectivity is what it is an ego functioning constitutively only within intersubjectivity. From the "ego" perspective this means that there are new themes, those of the synthesis applying specifically to ego and other ego (each taken purely as ego) the I-you-synthesis and, also, the more complicated we synthesis. In a certain sense this is also a temporalization, namely, that of the simultaneity of the ego-poles or, what amounts to the same thing, that of the constitution of the personal horizon (pure ego-horizon) in which every ego knows itself to be. It is universal sociality (in



this sense, “mankind”), the “space” of all ego-subjects. But the synthesis of intersubjectivity, of course, covers everything else as well: the intersubjectively identical lifeworld-for-all serves as an intentional “index” for the multiplicities of appearance, combined in intersubjective synthesis, through which all ego-subjects (and not merely each through the multiplicities which are peculiar to him individually) are oriented toward a common world and the things in it, the field of all the activities united in the general “we,” etc.

## 51 The task of an “ontology of the life-world.”

BUT ALL THIS — and this is what makes scientific discipline, description, phenomenological transcendental truth possible — is pervaded by a set of fixed types which, as we have said, is one of essential types’ and can be methodically encompassed as a pure a priori. Here it is remarkable, and philosophically very important, that this also applies to the first of our topics, the life-world, constituted throughout all its relative aspects as a unity, the universe of life-world objects. Even without any transcendental interest—that is, within the “natural attitude” (in the language of transcendental philosophy the naive attitude, prior to the epoche)-the life-world could have become the subject matter of a science of its own, an ontology of the life-world purely as experiential world (i.e., as the world which is coherently, consistently, harmoniously intuitable in actual and possible experiencing intuition). For our part we, who up to now have constantly carried out our systematic reflections within the reorientation of the transcendental epoche, can at any time restore the natural attitude and, within it, inquire after the invariant structures of the life-world.

The world of life, which as a matter of course takes up into itself all practical structures (even those of the objective sciences as cultural facts, though we refrain from taking part in their interests), is, to be sure, related to subjectivity throughout the constant alteration of its relative aspects. But however it changes and however it may be corrected, it holds to its essentially lawful set of types, to which all life, and thus all science, of which it is the “ground,” remain bound. Thus it also has an ontology to be derived from pure self-evidence.

We have already spoken of the possibility and the significance of such an ontology of the life-world on the natural ground, i.e., outside the transcendental horizon of interest, and we shall have occasion to speak of it again in another connection. We must keep firmly in mind the fact that this ontology’s own sense of an a priori science contrasts sharply with that of the tradition. We must never ignore the fact that modern philosophy, with its objective sciences, is guided by a constructive concept of a world which is true in itself, one substructured in mathematical form, at least in respect to nature. Modern philosophy’s concept of an a priori science, which is ultimately a universal mathematics (logic, logistic), cannot therefore have the dignity of actual self-evidence, i.e., the dignity of essential insight obtained from direct self-giving (experiencing intuition), much as it would like to claim this for itself.

If we return again, after this reminder, to the transcendental attitude, i.e., the epoche,

the life-world transforms itself, within our transcendental-philosophical framework, into the mere transcendental “phenomenon.” It remains thereby in its own essence what it was before, but now it proves to be a mere “component,” so to speak, within concrete transcendental subjectivity; and correspondingly its a priori shows itself to be a “stratum” within the universal a priori of the transcendental [in general]. To be sure, words taken from the sphere of the natural world, such as “component” and “stratum,” are dangerous, and the necessary transformation of their sense must therefore be noticed. Within the epoche we are free consistently to direct our gaze exclusively at this life-world or at its a priori essential forms; on the other hand, by correspondingly shifting our gaze we can direct it at the correlates which constitute its “things” or thing-forms, i.e., at the multiplicities of manners of givenness and their correlative essential forms. Further, we can also consider the subjects and communities of subjects, which function in all this, with regard to the essential ego-forms belonging to them. In the alteration of these partial attitudes, which are founded upon one another — whereby the attitude focused upon life-world phenomena serves as point of departure, namely, as transcendental guideline for correlative attitudes on higher levels — the universal task of inquiry, that of the transcendental reduction, is brought to realization.

## **52 The emergence of paradoxical enigmas. The necessity of new radical reflections.**

THE FIRST SURVEY of the pure problems of correlation, which opened up to us the reorientation from the life of natural interest in the world into the attitude of the “disinterested” spectator, has resulted, though with a certain naivete and thus preliminarily, in an abundance of obviously very strange insights which, if they were perfectly secured methodically, would imply a radical reshaping of our whole way of looking at the world. For purposes of thus securing our method, a reflection is required concerning the ground of ultimate presuppositions in which all these problems are rooted and from which, then, their theoretical decisions ultimately take their meaning. But immediately we become involved in great difficulties, in unexpected and at first insoluble paradoxes, which place our whole undertaking in question—and this in spite of the self-evidences which offered themselves to us and which we cannot simply give up out of hand. Perhaps only a new inquiry back into the ground of this knowledge (as opposed to the inquiry back into the ground of objective knowledge) will lead to the clarification and thus the corresponding limitation of its true sense. In the study of correlation our constant theme was the world and mankind as the subjectivity which, in community, intentionally brings about the accomplishment of world-validity. Our epoche (the one determining our present investigation) denied us all natural worldlife and its worldly interests. It gave us a position above these. Any interest in the being, actuality, or non-being of the world, i.e., any interest theoretically oriented toward knowledge of the world, and even any interest which is practical in the usual sense, with its dependence on the

presuppositions of its situational truths, is forbidden; this applies not only to the pursuit, for ourselves, of our own interests (we who are philosophizing) but also to any participation in the interests of our fellow men -for in this case we would still be interested indirectly in existing actuality. No objective truth, whether in the prescientific or the scientific sense, i.e., no claim about objective being, ever enters our sphere of scientific discipline, whether as a premise or as a conclusion. Here we could discover a first difficulty. Are not we also doing science? Are we not establishing truths about true being? Are we not entering upon the dangerous road of double truth? Can there be, next to objective truth, yet a second truth, the subjective? The answer, of course, is as follows: it is precisely the result of inquiry within the epoche-a strange but self-evident result, which can be ultimately clarified only through our present reflection-that the natural, objective world-life is only a particular mode of the transcendental life which forever constitutes the world, [but] in such a way that transcendental subjectivity, while living on in this mode, has not become conscious of the constituting horizons and never can become aware of them. It lives in "infatuation," so to speak, with the poles of unity without being aware of the constituting multiplicities belonging essentially to them-for this, precisely, would require a complete reorientation and reflection. Objective truth belongs exclusively within the attitude of natural human worldlife. It arises originally out of the needs of human praxis as the intent to secure what is straightforwardly given as existing (the object-pole anticipated in ontic certainty as persisting) against the possible modalizations of certainty. In the reorientation of the epoche nothing is lost, none of the interests and ends of world-life, and thus also none of the ends of knowledge. But for all these things their essential subjective correlates are exhibited, and thus the full and true ontic meaning of objective being, and thus of all objective truth, is set forth. Philosophy as universal objective science-and this is what all philosophy of the ancient tradition was-together with all the objective sciences, is not universal science at all. It brings into its sphere of inquiry only the constituted object-poles and remains blind to the full concrete being and life that constitutes them transcendentially. But, as we said, though we shall hold onto this as truth, we must still carry out a final clarification of its meaning.

A second difficulty emerges. The epoche in respect to all natural human life-interests appears to be a turning-away from them (which is, by the way, one of the most common misunderstandings of the transcendental epoche). But if it were meant in this way, there would be no transcendental inquiry. How could we take perception and the perceived, memory and the remembered, the objective and every sort of verification of the objective, including art, science, and philosophy, as a transcendental theme without living through these sorts of things as examples and indeed with [their] full self-evidence? This is, in fact, quite true. Thus in a certain sense the philosopher within the epoche must also "naturally live through" the natural life; yet the epoche effects an immense difference in that it changes the entire manner of investigation and, furthermore, reshapes the goal of knowledge in the whole of its ontic meaning. In straightforward natural life all purposes terminate in "the" world and all knowledge terminates in what actually exists as secured by verification. The world is the open universe, the horizon of "termini," the universal field of what exists which

is presupposed by all praxis and is continually enriched by its results. Thus the world is the totality of what is taken for granted as verifiable; it is “there” through an aiming [Abzielung] and is the ground for ever new aimings at what is-what “actually” is. In the epoche, however, we go back to the subjectivity which ultimately aims, which already has results, already has the world through previous aims and their fulfillment; and [we go back] to the ways in which this subjectivity has, “has brought about,” and continues to shape the world through its concealed internal “method.” The interest of the phenomenologist is not aimed at the ready-made world or at external, purposeful activity in it, which itself is something “constituted.” The phenomenologist carries out every sort of praxis, either actually or in sympathetic understanding, but not in such a way that its fulfilling “end” is his end, the one in which he terminates. Rather, he takes being-an-end as such, this living toward goals in world-life and terminating in them, as the subject of his own investigation in respect to the subjective aspects pervading them; and thus the naive ontic meaning of the world in general is transformed for him into the meaning “system of poles for a transcendental subjectivity,” which “has” a world and real entities within it, just as it has these poles, by constituting them. This is obviously something fundamentally different from the transformation of “ends” into “means,” into premises for new worldly ends, a transformation which remains within the world itself.

What has been said here presupposes that one is fully clear about our way of explicating intentional life, through the epoche, as accomplishing life, and that one has first achieved the insight that even in the most straightforward perception, and likewise in every consciousness of something having the simple, straightforward validity of existence, there lies an aiming, one that is realized in the harmoniousness of ever new ontic validities (those of the manners of givenness themselves) and, in the case of intuition, realizes the “thing itself.” No matter what variations we may find in intentionality as we proceed on from its first exhibition in the ways of being actually directed toward objects, they are all variational forms of accomplishments which are ultimately those of the ego.

A third difficulty is that we cannot see how, in the epoche, the “Heraclitean flux” of constituting life can be treated descriptively in its individual facticity. Here we are guided by the distinction common in objective world-science between descriptive sciences-which, on the basis of experience, describe and classify factual existence and sketch out inductive generalities within intuitive experience so as to establish such existence for everyone who has the same experience-and sciences of laws, the sciences of unconditional generalities. Still, whatever the status of this objective difference, no real difficulty results for us, since it would be illegitimate to make demands on the transcendental sphere which originate in the sphere of objectivity. It is, however, correct that there can be no analogue to an empirical science of fact, no “descriptive” science of transcendental being and life understood as an inductive science based on experience alone, in the sense of establishing individual transcendental correlations as they factually occur and disappear. Not even the single philosopher by himself, within the epoche, can hold fast to anything in this elusively flowing life, repeat it with always the same content, and become so certain of its this-ness and its being-such

that he could describe it, document it, so to speak (even for his own person alone), in definitive statements. But the full concrete facticity of universal transcendental subjectivity can nevertheless be scientifically grasped in another good sense, precisely because, truly through an eidetic method, the great task can and must be undertaken of investigating the essential form of the transcendental accomplishments in all their types of individual and intersubjective accomplishments, that is, the total essential form of transcendently accomplishing subjectivity in all its social forms. The fact is here, as belonging to its essence, and it is determinable only through its essence; there is no way of documenting it empirically in a sense analogous to what is done in the objective sphere through inductive experience.

### **53 The paradox of human subjectivity: being a subject for the world and at the same time being an object in the world.**

BUT NOW A TRULY serious difficulty arises which assails our whole undertaking and the sense of its results and indeed necessitates a reshaping of both. By virtue of our present method

of epoche, everything objective is transformed into something subjective. Clearly this cannot be meant in such a way that through this method the existing world and the human worldrepresentation are set over against each other and that, on the ground of the world, taken for granted as actually existing, we inquire into the subjective, i.e., into the psychic occurrences in men through which they gain experience of the world, everyday or scientific opinions about the world, their particular sensible and conceptual “world-pictures.” Scientific discipline for us is not that of the psychologist. Through the radical epoche every interest in the actuality or nonactuality of the world (in all modalities, thus including possibility and conceivability, as well as the decidability of this sort of thing) is put out of play. By the same token, we are not concerned here with any scientific psychology and its problems. For the latter the world, presupposed by it as unquestionably existing, is the ground; and it is precisely this ground that the epoche has taken from us. And in the pure attitude focused upon correlations, created by the epoche, the world, the objective, becomes itself something subjective. In this attitude, paradoxically, even the “subjective” is relativized, namely, in the following way. The world (called “transcendental phenomenon” in the transformed attitude) is from the start taken only as a correlate of the subjective appearances, views, subjective acts and capacities through which it constantly has, and ever attains anew, its changeable [but] unitary sense. Now if the inquiry gets underway, proceeding from the world (which already has merely the manner of being of a unity of meaning) back to the essential forms of these “appearances and views” of it, the latter count as its “subjective manners of givenness.” If, then, through yet another reflection and regressive inquiry the ego-poles and everything about them of a specifically ego-character become the subject of essential inquiry,

they now become, in a new and still higher sense, the subjective aspect of the world and also of its manners of appearing. But within the epoche a universal concept of the subjective encompasses everything: ego-pole and universe of ego-poles, multiplicities of appearance or object-poles and the universe of object-poles.

But precisely here lies the difficulty. Universal intersubjectivity, into which all objectivity, everything that exists at all, is resolved, can obviously be nothing other than mankind; and the latter is undeniably a component part of the world. How can a component part of the world, its human subjectivity, constitute the whole world, namely, constitute it as its intentional formation, one which has always already become what it is and continues to develop, formed by the universal interconnection of intentionally accomplishing subjectivity, while the latter, the subjects accomplishing in cooperation, are themselves only a partial formation within the total accomplishment?

The subjective part of the world swallows up, so to speak, the whole world and thus itself too. What an absurdity! Or is this a paradox which can be sensibly resolved, even a necessary one, arising necessarily out of the constant tension between the power of what is taken for granted in the natural objective attitude (the power of “common sense”) 1 and the opposed attitude of the “disinterested spectator”? The latter is, to be sure, extremely difficult to carry out in a radical way, since it is constantly threatened by misunderstandings. Furthermore, by carrying out the epoche the phenomenologist by no means straightway commands a horizon of obviously possible new projects; a transcendental field of work does not immediately spread before him, preformed in a set of obvious types. The world is the sole universe of what is pregiven as obvious. From the beginning the phenomenologist lives in the paradox of having to look upon the obvious as questionable, as enigmatic, and of henceforth being unable to have any other scientific theme than that of transforming the universal obviousness of the being of the world -for him the greatest of all enigmas-into something intelligible. 2 If the paradox just developed were insoluble, it would mean that an actually universal and radical epoche could not be carried out at all, that is, for the purposes of a science rigorously bound to it. If the disinterestedness and the epoche were merely those of the psychologist, to which no one objects since they move on the ground of the world, then anything that is really tenable about our insights would be reduced to objective-psychological essential insights, though of a new style. But can we be content with this? Can we be satisfied simply with the notion that human beings are subjects for the world (the world which for consciousness is their world) and at the same time are objects in this world? As scientists, can we content ourselves with the view that God created the world and human beings within it, that he endowed the latter with consciousness and reason, that is, with the capacity for knowledge, the highest instance of which is scientific knowledge? For the naivete that belongs to the essence of positive religion this may be undoubted truth and remain a truth forever, even though the philosophers cannot be content with such naivete. The enigma of the creation and that of God himself are essential component parts of positive religion. For the philosopher, however, this, and also the

1. Husserl uses the English term.
2. I.e., of transforming this *Selbstverstndlichkeit* into a *Verstndlichkeit*.

juxtaposition “subjectivity in the world as object” and at the same time “conscious subject for the world,” contain a necessary theoretical question, that of understanding how this is possible. The *epoche*, in giving us the attitude above the subject-object correlation which belongs to the world and thus the attitude of focus upon the transcendental subject-object correlation, leads us to recognize, in self-reflection, that the world that exists for us, that is, our world in its being and being-such, takes its ontic meaning entirely from our intentional life through a priori types of accomplishments that can be exhibited rather than argumentatively constructed or conceived through mythical thinking.

One can make no headway with this, and with the profound difficulties contained in it, if one hastily overlooks it and spares oneself the trouble of making consistent regressive inquiries and investigations or if one adduces arguments from the workshops of past philosophers, say Aristotle or Thomas, and carries on a game of logical argumentations and refutations. In the *epoche* neither logic nor any a priori nor any philosophical demonstration in the venerable old style can provide us with artillery. Rather, like all objective-scientific discipline, they are naive and are themselves to be subjected to the *epoche*. On the other hand, what is peculiarly proper to the essence of the incipient philosophy of this phenomenological-transcendental radicalism is that, as we have said before, rather than having a ground of things taken for granted and ready in advance, as does objective philosophy, it excludes in principle a ground of this or any other sort. Thus it must begin without any underlying ground. But immediately it achieves the possibility of creating a ground for itself through its own powers, namely, in mastering, through original self-reflection, the naive world as transformed into a phenomenon or rather a universe of phenomena. Its beginning course, like that carried out above in rough outlines, is necessarily one of experiencing and thinking in naive self-evidence. It possesses no formed logic and methodology in advance and can achieve its method and even the genuine sense of its accomplishments only through ever renewed self-reflections. Its fate (understood subsequently, to be sure, as an essentially necessary one) is to become involved again and again in paradoxes, which, arising out of uninvestigated and even unnoticed horizons, remain functional and announce themselves as incomprehensibilities.

## 54 The resolution of the paradox.

### a. We as human beings, and we as ultimately functioning-accomplishing subjects.

WHAT IS THE STATUS, now, of the paradox presently under discussion-that of humanity as world-constituting subjectivity and yet as incorporated in the world itself? In the naivete of our first approach we were interested in the horizons of remarkable discoveries which opened up again and again; and in the direction of our gaze which naturally came first, we held fast to the correlation belonging to the first level of reflection: i.e., objectpole vs. manner of givenness (manner of appearance in the broadest sense). The ego was mentioned as the subject matter of the highest level of reflection; but in the careful analytic-descriptive procedure, which naturally favors the more detailed interconnections, it did not receive its full due. For the depths of its functioning being make themselves felt only belatedly. In connection with this, what was lacking was the phenomenon of the change of signification of [the form] "I"-just as I am saying "I" right now-into "other I's," into "all of us," we who are many "I's," and among whom I am but one "I." What was lacking, then, was the problem of the constitution of intersubjectivity-this "all of us"-from my point of view, indeed "in" me. These are problems which did not announce themselves on the pathway we allowed ourselves to be drawn into, along which we allowed ourselves to be propelled. Now they will compel our attention. For the necessity of stopping here and entering into self-reflection makes itself felt most sharply through the question which at last and unavoidably arises: who are we, as subjects performing the meaning- and validity-accomplishment of universal constitution-as those who, in community, constitute the world as a system of poles, as the intentional structure of community life? Can "we" mean "we human beings," human beings in the natural-objective sense, i.e., as real entities in the world? But are these real entities not themselves "phenomena" and as such themselves object-poles and subject matter for inquiry back into the correlative intentionalities of which they are the poles, through whose function they have, and have attained, their ontic meaning? Naturally this question must be answered in the affirmative. Indeed, as in the case of all regional categories of the world, of all essential ontic types, we can actually exhibit the constitutive formation of meaning provided we have proceeded far enough in the method to ask the appropriate questions. Here it is a case of inquiries proceeding from real human beings back to their "manners of givenness," their manners of "appearing," first of all in perceptual appearance, i.e., in the mode of original self-givenness, of manners of harmonious verification and correction, of identification through rerecognition as the same human person: as the person previously known "personally" to us, the same one of whom others speak, with whom they also have become acquainted, etc. In other words, the obviousness of: "There stands a man, in this social group of persons well known to one another," must be resolved into its transcendental questions.

But are the transcendental subjects, i.e., those functioning in the constitution of the



world, human beings? After all, the epoche has made them into “phenomena,” so that the philosopher within the epoche has neither himself nor the others naively and straightforwardly valid as human beings but precisely only as “phenomena,” as poles for transcendental regressive inquiries. Clearly here, in the radical consistency of the epoche, each “I” is considered purely as the ego-pole of his acts, habitualities, and capacities and thence as being directed at what appears in ontic certainty “through” the appearances, the manners of givenness of the latter -i.e., as directed toward the particular object-pole and its pole-horizon, the world. To all this, then, belong further regressive inquiries in all these directions of reflection. Concretely, each “I” is not merely an ego-pole but an “I” with all its accomplishments and accomplished acquisitions, including the world as existing and being-such. But in the epoche and in the pure focus upon the functioning ego-pole, and thence upon the concrete whole of life and of its intentional intermediary and final structures, it follows eo ipso that nothing human is to be found, neither soul nor psychic life nor real psychophysical human beings; all this belongs to the “phenomenon,” to the world as constituted pole.

**b. As primal ego, I constitute my horizon of transcendental others as cosubjects within the transcendental intersubjectivity which constitutes the world.**

Nevertheless, we cannot be content; we are still caught in the paradox. Indeed, our naive procedure was not quite correct, and this is because we have forgotten ourselves, the philosophers; or, to put it more distinctly: I am the one who performs the epoch; and, even if there are others, and even if they practice the epoche in direct community with me, [they and] all other human beings with their entire act-life are included, for me, within my epoche, in the world-phenomenon which, in my epoche, is exclusively mine. The epoche creates a unique sort of philosophical solitude which is the fundamental methodical requirement for a truly radical philosophy. In this solitude I am not a single individual who has somehow willfully cut himself off from the society of mankind, perhaps even for theoretical reasons, or who is cut off by accident, as in a shipwreck, but who nevertheless knows that he still belongs to that society. I am not an ego, who still has his you, his we, his total community of cosubjects in natural validity. All of mankind, and the whole distinction and ordering of the personal pronouns, has become a phenomenon within my epoche; and so has the privilege of I-the-man among other men. The “I” that I attain in the epoche, which would be the same as the “ego” within a critical reinterpretation and correction of the Cartesian conception, is actually called “I” only by equivocation-though it is an essential equivocation since, when I name it in reflection, I can say nothing other than: it is I who practice the epoche, I who interrogate, as phenomenon, the world which is now valid for me according to its being and being-such, with all its human beings, of whom I am so fully conscious; it is I who stand above all natural existence that has meaning for me, who am the ego-pole of this transcendental life, in which, at first, the world has meaning for me purely as world; it is I who, taken in full concreteness, encompass all that. This does not mean that our earlier

insights, already expressed as transcendental ones, were illusions and that it is not justifiable to speak, in spite of the above, of a transcendental intersubjectivity constituting the world as “world for all,” in which I again appear, this time as “one” transcendental “I” among others, whereby “we all” are taken as functioning transcendentially.

But it was wrong, methodically, to jump immediately into transcendental intersubjectivity and to leap over the primal “I,” the ego of my epoche, which can never lose its uniqueness and personal indeclinability. It is only an apparent contradiction to this that the ego — through a particular constitutive accomplishment of its own — makes itself declinable, for itself, transcendentially; that, starting from itself and in itself, it constitutes transcendental intersubjectivity, to which it then adds itself as a merely privileged member, namely, as “I” among the transcendental others. This is what philosophical self-exposition in the epoche actually teaches us. It can show how the always singular “I,” in the original constituting life proceeding within it, constitutes a first sphere of objects, the “primordial” sphere; how it then, starting from this, in a motivated fashion, performs a constitutive accomplishment through which an intentional modification of itself and its primordiality achieves ontic validity under the title of “alien-perception,” perception of others, of another “I” who is for himself an “I” as I am. This becomes understandable by analogy if we already understand, through the transcendental exposition of recollection, that to what is recollected, what is past (which has the ontic meaning of a present having passed) there belongs also a past “I” of that present, whereas the actual, original “I” is that of immediate presence; to this presence, recollection belongs as a present experience, in addition to what appears as the present sphere of facts. Thus the immediate “I” performs an accomplishment through which it constitutes a variational mode of itself as existing (in the mode of having passed). Starting from this we can trace how the immediate “I,” flowingly-statically present, constitutes itself in self-temporalization as enduring through “its” pasts. In the same way, the immediate “I,” already enduring in the enduring primordial sphere, constitutes in itself another as other. Self-temporalization through de-presentation [Ent-Gegenwärtigung], so to speak (through recollection), has its analogue in my self-alienation [Ent-Fremdung] (empathy as a de-presentation of a higher level-de-presentation of my primal presence [Urprsenz] into a merely presentified [vergegenwärtigte] primal presence). Thus, in me, “another I” achieves ontic validity as copresent [komprsent] with his own ways of being self-evidently verified, which are obviously quite different from those of a “sense”-perception.

Only by starting from the ego and the system of its transcendental functions and accomplishments can we methodically exhibit transcendental intersubjectivity and its transcendental communalization, through which, in the functioning system of ego-poles, the “world for all,” and for each subject as world for all, is constituted. Only in this way, in an essential system of forward steps, can we gain an ultimate comprehension of the fact that each transcendental “I” within intersubjectivity (as coconstituting the world in the way indicated) must necessarily be constituted in the world as a human being; in other words, that each human being bears within himself a transcendental “I” — not as a real part or a stratum of his soul (which would be absurd) but rather insofar as he is the self-objectification, as

exhibited through phenomenological self-reflection, of the corresponding transcendental “I”. Nevertheless, every human being who carried out the epoche could certainly recognize his ultimate “I,” which functions in all his human activity. The naiveté of the first epoche had the result, as we immediately saw, that I, the philosophizing “ego,” in taking myself as functioning “I,” as ego-pole of transcendental acts and accomplishments, proceeded in one leap and without grounding, that is, illegitimately, to attribute to the mankind in which I find myself the same transformation into functioning transcendental subjectivity which I had carried out alone in myself. In spite of the methodical illegitimacy, this contained a truth. At all events, however, we must — for the most profound philosophical reasons, which we cannot go into further, and which are not only methodical in character — do justice to the absolute singularity of the ego and its central position in all constitution.

## **55 The correction in principle of our first application of the epoche by reducing it to the absolutely unique, ultimately functioning ego.**

ACCORDINGLY, AS AGAINST the first application of the epoche, a second is required, or rather a conscious reshaping of the epoche through a reduction to the absolute ego as the ultimately unique center of function in all constitution. This determines henceforth the whole method of transcendental phenomenology. In advance there is the world, ever pregiven and undoubted in ontic certainty and self-verification. Even though I have not [explicitly] “presupposed” it as a ground, it still has validity for me, the “I” of the cogito, through constant self-verification, together with everything that it is for me, in particular details sometimes objectively and legitimately so, sometimes not, and together with all sciences and arts, together with all social and personal configurations and institutions, insofar as it is just the world that is actual for me. There can be no stronger realism than this, if by this word nothing more is meant than: “I am certain of being a human being who lives in this world, etc., and I doubt it not in the least.” But the great problem is precisely to understand what is here so “obvious.” The method now requires that the ego, beginning with its concrete world-phenomenon, systematically inquire back, and thereby become acquainted with itself, the transcendental ego, in its concreteness, in the system of its constitutive levels and its incredibly intricate [patterns of] validity-founding.<sup>1</sup> At the onset of the epoche the ego is given apodictically, but as a “mute concreteness.” It must be brought to exposition, to expression, through systematic intentional “analysis” which inquires back from the world-phenomenon. In this systematic procedure one at first attains the correlation between the world and transcendental subjectivity as objectified in mankind.

But then new questions impose themselves in regard to this mankind: are the insane also objectifications of the subjects being discussed in connection with the accomplishment of world-constitution? And what about children, even those who already have a certain

amount of world-consciousness? After all, it is only from the mature and normal human beings who bring them up that they first become acquainted with the world in the full sense of the world-for-all, that is, the world of culture. And what about animals? There arise problems of intentional modifications through which we can and must attribute to all these conscious subjects—those that do not cofunction in respect to the world understood in the hitherto accepted (and always fundamental) sense, that is, the world which has truth through “reason” — their manner of transcendentality, precisely as “analogues” of ourselves. The meaning of this analogy will then itself represent a transcendental problem. This naturally extends into the realm of the transcendental problems which finally encompass

1. Geltungsfundierungen, i.e., the manner in which some validities are founded upon or presuppose others. For the notion of Fundierung see *Ideen*, Vol. I, §§116, 117.

all living beings insofar as they have, even indirectly but still verifiably, something like “life,” and even communal life in the spiritual [geistige] sense. Also appearing thereby, in different steps, first in respect to human beings and then universally, are the problems of genesis [Generativität], the problems of transcendental historicity [Geschichtlichkeit], the problems of the transcendental inquiry which starts from the essential forms of human existence in society, in personalities of a higher order,<sup>2</sup> and proceeds back to their transcendental and thus absolute signification; further, there are the problems of birth and death and of the transcendental constitution of their meaning as world occurrences, and there is the problem of the sexes. And finally, concerning the problem of the “unconscious” that is so much discussed today — dreamless sleep, loss of consciousness, and whatever else of the same or similar nature may be included under this title — this is in any case a matter of occurrences in the pre-given world, and they naturally come under the transcendental problem of constitution, as do birth and death. As something existing in the world common to all, this sort of thing has its manners of ontic verification, of “self-giving,” which are quite particular but which originally create the ontic meaning for beings of such particularity. Accordingly, within the absolutely universal epoche, in respect to beings having this or any other kind of meaning, the appropriate constitutional questions have to be posed.

In accord with all this it is clear that there is no conceivable meaningful problem in previous philosophy, and no conceivable problem of being at all, that could not be arrived at by transcendental phenomenology at some point along its way. This includes the problems that phenomenology itself poses, at a higher level of reflection, to the phenomenologist: that is, not only problems corresponding to the language, truth, science, and reason, in all their forms, which are constituted within the natural world, but problems of phenomenological language, truth, reason.

From this one also understands the sense of the demand for apodicticity in regard to the ego and all transcendental knowledge gained upon this transcendental basis. Having arrived at the ego, one becomes aware of standing within a sphere of self-evidence of such a nature that any attempt to inquire behind it would be absurd. By contrast, every ordinary appeal to self-evidence, insofar as it was supposed to cut off further regressive

2. I.e., communities, states, etc.

inquiry, was theoretically no better than an appeal to an oracle through which a god reveals himself. All natural self-evidences, those of all objective sciences (not excluding those of formal logic and mathematics), belong to the realm of what is “obvious,” what in truth has a background of incomprehensibility. Every [kind of] self-evidence is the title of a problem, with the sole exception of phenomenological self-evidence, after it has reflectively clarified itself and shown itself to be ultimate self-evidence. It is naturally a ludicrous, though unfortunately common misunderstanding, to seek to attack transcendental phenomenology as “Cartesianism,” as if its ego cogito were a premise or set of premises from which the rest of knowledge (whereby one naively speaks only of objective knowledge) was to be deduced, absolutely “secured.” The point is not to secure objectivity but to understand it. One must finally achieve the insight that no objective science, no matter how exact, explains or ever can explain anything in a serious sense. To deduce is not to explain. To predict, or to recognize the objective forms of the composition of physical or chemical bodies and to predict accordingly — all this explains nothing but is in need of explanation. The only true way to explain is to make transcendently understandable. Everything objective demands to be understood. Natural-scientific knowing about nature thus gives us no truly explanatory, no ultimate knowledge of nature because it does not investigate nature at all in the absolute framework through which its actual and genuine being reveals its ontic meaning; thus natural science never reaches this being thematically. This does not detract in the least from the greatness of its creative geniuses or their accomplishments, just as the being of the objective world in the natural attitude, and this attitude itself, have lost nothing through the fact that they are, so to speak, “understood back into” [zurckverstanden] the absolute sphere of being in which they ultimately and truly are. To be sure, the knowledge [attained through] the constitutive “internal” method, through which all objective-scientific method acquires its meaning and possibility, cannot be without significance for the scientist of nature or any other objective scientist. It is, after all, a matter of the most radical and most profound self-reflection of accomplishing subjectivity; how could it not be of service in protecting the naive, ordinary accomplishment from misunderstandings such as are to be observed in abundance, for example, in the influence of naturalistic epistemology and in the idolization of a logic that does not understand itself?

## **B. The Way into Phenomenological Transcendental Philosophy from Psychology.**

### **56 Characterization of the philosophical development after Kant from the perspective of the struggle between physicalistic objectivism and the constantly reemerging “transcendental motif.”**

IN THE COURSE Of its development philosophy encounters theoretical situations in which momentous decisions have to be made, situations in which philosophers must reconsider, must place in question, and possibly redefine the whole sense of the purpose of their project and must accordingly resolve to undertake a radical change of method. The authors of the theoretical ideas that create these situations occupy, in the history of philosophy, a quite distinguished place. They are the representatives of developments which have a unified meaning because of their work, because of the new universal objectives outlined in their developed theories. Every great philosopher continues to have his effect in all subsequent historical periods; he exerts an influence. But not every one contributes a motif which gives unity to a historical sequence and possibly concludes one line of development, a motif which works as a driving force and sets a task that must be fulfilled, such that its fulfillment brings to an end [this particular] historical period of development. Those who have become significant for us as representatives of the philosophy of the modern period are Descartes, who marks a turning point in respect to all previous philosophy; Hume (in all justice Berkeley should actually also be mentioned); and — aroused by Hume — Kant, who in turn determines the line of development of the German transcendental philosophies. (We see, by the way, that the creators of the greatest, most intellectually massive systems do not as such belong in this series; no one would equate Hume and Berkeley in this respect with Kant or, among later philosophers, with Hegel.)

In the first series of lectures<sup>1</sup> we carried out a deeper analysis of the motifs of Cartesian philosophizing which continue to determine the whole modern development: on the one hand, those motifs which announce themselves in his first Meditations and, on the other hand, those which stand in internal contrast with these, i.e., the physicalistic (or mathematizing) idea of philosophy according to which the world in its full concreteness bears within itself an objectively true being in the form of the *ordo geometricus* and according to which, as interwoven with this (and this must be especially emphasized here), the metaphysical “in-itself” ascribed to the world involves a dualistic world of bodies and spirits. This was characteristic of the philosophy of objectivistic rationalism in the Enlightenment. Then we attempted the analysis of the Hume-Kant situation, and in the end we could elucidate it only by penetrating into its presuppositions and by proceeding from there to pose ques-

tions of our own, alien to the period itself, and by making clear to ourselves in a preliminary sketch, through a systematic process of thinking, the style of a truly scientific transcendental philosophy—"truly scientific" in the sense that it works up from the bottom in self-evident single steps and is thus in truth ultimately grounded and ultimately grounding. We attempted thereby to awaken the full insight that only such a philosophy, through such a regressive inquiry back to the last conceivable ground [Grund] in the transcendental ego, can fulfill the meaning which is inborn in philosophy from its primal establishment. Thus transcendental

1. I.e., Part II. It may seem strange that Husserl should continue to refer to the Crisis as a series of lectures. Comparison with the original lecture shows that this is not a matter of fragments inadvertently left over from Prague. But recall that the Cartesian Meditations, which even in the published French edition was expanded far beyond the scope of the original lectures, retained the references to the talks at the Sorbonne.

philosophy in its first immature forms in the English and in Kant, even though these philosophers hardly accomplished a serious scientific grounding, and even though Hume withdrew into an unhealthy academic skepticism, does not, on the whole, represent a wrong path, nor "one" among other possible paths at all, but the one path of the future which the development of philosophy absolutely had to take in order to penetrate to the fulfilled methodical form through which alone it could be truly scientific, a philosophy working in the actual self-understanding of the sense of its task, in the spirit of finality, working with an apodictic self-evidence of its ground, its goals, its methods. This fulfilled form could enter into historical actuality only as the result of the most radical self-reflections, in the form of a first beginning, a first attainment of the clarified task, of the apodictic ground and the method of access to it, a first beginning of an actual setting-to-work, the work of inquiring into the things themselves. As phenomenological transcendental philosophy (but exclusively in the sense prescribed here), this has become a truly living beginning. I may go so far as to say that from now on not only modern physicalistic naturalism but every objectivistic philosophy, whether of earlier or of future times, must be characterized as "transcendental naivet."

Still, with this our task is not [yet] fulfilled. We ourselves, and the ideas we necessarily had to construct in order to evoke a genuine resonance from the ideas of the past, i.e., so that their directedness, as seminal forms toward a final form, would become evident—we ourselves, I say, also belong to the same unity of history. Thus we also have the task of meaningfully explicating the developments of philosophy up to our time and in our present situation. Precisely this is indicated, as we shall soon understand, by the mention of psychology in the title of these lectures.<sup>2</sup> The completion of our task does not require a detailed investigation of the many philosophies and particular currents of the subsequent period. Only a general characterization is needed, and this will proceed from the understanding we have attained of the history which has preceded us.

Philosophical objectivism of the modern sort, with its physicalistic tendency and its psychophysical dualism, does not die out; that is, many feel quite comfortable here in their

“dogmatic slumbers.” On the other side, those who have been aroused from

2. Again, a reference to the original title of the Prague lecture series: “The Crisis of European Sciences and Psychology.”

them have been first aroused primarily by Kant. Here, then, originates the current of German transcendental idealisms, proceeding from Kant’s transcendental philosophy. The great momentum which earlier, from Descartes on, had animated objectivistic philosophy sustains itself in them and is even renewed with a special force in the new form of the transcendental approach to the world. To be sure, even German Idealism was not fated to endure, in spite of the overwhelming impression temporarily made by the Hegelian system, which seemed to promise its total dominance for all time. The swelling reaction which rapidly took effect soon assumed the sense of a reaction against any sort of transcendental philosophy in this style; and although the style did not completely die out, the subsequent attempts at such philosophizing lost their original force and the vitality of their development.

As for the momentum of objectivistic philosophy, in a certain way it sustained itself as the momentum in the development of the positive sciences. But examined more closely, this is anything but a philosophical momentum. Recall the transformation of meaning these sciences, along with their development as special disciplines, had undergone, through which they finally completely lost the important sense which was alive in them earlier of being branches of philosophy. We have already spoken of this, but for the clarification of the situation which arose in the nineteenth century it is very important to go into it—here in somewhat more detail. What had been sciences in that other sense, the only genuine one, had turned unnoticed into remarkable new arts, to be entered in the list of the other arts of higher and lower dignity on the scale, such as the fine arts, architecture, and also the arts at lower levels. They could be taught and learned in their institutes, their seminars, in collections of models, in museums. One could display skill, talent, even genius in them — for example, in the art of inventing new formulae, new exact theories, in order to predict the course of natural phenomena, in order to make inductions of a scope which would have been unthinkable in earlier times; or, also, in the art of interpreting historical documents, grammatically analyzing languages, constructing historical interconnections, etc. On all sides we find great trail-blazing geniuses who gain the highest admiration of their fellow men and abundantly deserve it. But art is not science, whose origin and intention, which can never be sacrificed, is to attain, through a clarification of the ultimate sources of meaning, a knowledge of what actually is and thus to understand it in its ultimate sense. Radically presuppositionless and ultimately grounded science, or philosophy — this is simply another expression for the same thing. Of course, this art of theory<sup>3</sup> has the peculiar property that, since it has developed out of philosophy (though out of an imperfect one), it has a meaning belonging to all its artful products, a meaning which comes from that philosophy but is concealed, such that it cannot be elicited by inquiring into mere methodical technique and its history but can be aroused only by the true philosopher and can be unfolded in its genuine depths only by the transcendental philosopher. Thus there is actually scientific knowledge



concealed within the art of theory, but access to it is difficult.

We have already spoken of this in our systematic discussions; we have shown what is necessary in order to attain knowledge ultimately grounded and have shown that the like can be attained only in the universal framework, never as a naive “special science” and certainly not with the prejudice of modern objectivism. The much lamented specialization [in the sciences] is not in itself a lack, since it is a necessity within universal philosophy, just as the development of an art-like method is necessary in every special discipline. What certainly is portentous, however, is the separation of the art of theory from philosophy. However, though the specialized scholars dropped out, there remained among them and alongside them philosophers who continued to treat the positive sciences as branches of philosophy; thus the statement is still valid that objectivistic philosophy did not die out after Hume and Kant. Alongside this runs the line of development of transcendental philosophies, and not only those derived from Kant. For there must be added to this a series of transcendental philosophers who owe their motivation to a continuation, or in the case of Germany a revival, of the influence of Hume. In England J. S. Mill is especially to be mentioned, who in the period of great reaction against the systemphilosophies of German Idealism exercised a strong influence in Germany itself. But in Germany there arose much more seriously intended attempts at a transcendental philosophy basically determined by English empiricism (Schuppe, Avenarius), though their supposed radicalism falls far short of the genuine kind which alone can help. The renewal of positivistic empiricism is closely allied, though this is unnoticed, with the revivals of earlier and especially transcendental philosophies due to the

3. die theoretische Kunst, the art of making theories, as above.

growing urgency of transcendental motifs. By going back to these philosophies and critically overhauling them along lines prescribed by positivistic motifs, some hoped to arrive again at a philosophy of their own. Like Hume and Berkeley, Kant too is revived—a multicolored Kant, through the multiplicity of attempted interpretations and the reconstructions of neo-Kantianism. Kant is reinterpreted even in empiricist fashion, as the historical traditions are mixed and interwoven, creating for all scientists a quasiphilosophical atmosphere involving a widely discussed but by no means deeply or autonomously conceived “theory of knowledge.” Alongside Kant, particularly, all the other idealists have had their renaissance; even a neo-Friesianism has been able to appear as a school. Everywhere, when we also take into account the rapid growth of bourgeois education, erudition, and literature in the nineteenth century, we observe that the confusion was becoming unbearable. More and more a skeptical mood spread which crippled from the inside the philosophical energy even of those who held fast to the idea of a scientific philosophy. The history of philosophy is substituted for philosophy, or philosophy becomes a personal world-view, and finally some even try to make out of a necessity a virtue: philosophy can exercise no other function at all for humanity than that of outlining a world-picture appropriate to one’s individuality, as the summation of one’s personal education.

Although the genuine though never radically clarified idea of philosophy has by no means

been completely sacrificed, the multiplicity of philosophies, which can hardly be comprehended any more, nevertheless has the result that it is no longer divided into scientific directions, such that they could still seriously work together, carry on a scientific dialogue through criticism and counter-criticism, and still guide the common idea of one science toward the path of realization, in the manner of the directions within modern biology or mathematics and physics; rather, they are contrasted as societies of aesthetic style, so to speak, analogous to the “directions” and “currents” in the fine arts. Indeed, in the splintering of philosophies and their literature, is it still possible at all to study them seriously as works of one science, to make use of them critically and to uphold the unity of the work done? The philosophies have their effects. But must one not honestly say that they have their effects as impressions, that they “inspire,” that they move the feelings like poems, that they arouse vague “intimations”? But is this not done in a similar fashion (sometimes in a nobler style but even here, unfortunately, all too often in one of a rather different kind) by the many literary products of the day? We may credit the philosophers with the noblest intentions, we may even be firmly convinced of the teleological sense of history and accord even to their constructs a significance — but is it the significance that was historically entrusted to philosophy, given to it as a task? When one withdraws into this kind of philosophizing, has not something else, something of the highest value and necessity, been sacrificed? Even what we have already dealt with by way of criticism and the exhibiting of self-evidence gives us the right to ask this question, not as a question of romantic moods — since our aim is to turn all romanticism into responsible work — but as a question of the scientific conscience that calls to us in universal and radical reflection, which, when carried out with the greatest self-responsibility, must itself become the actual and highest truth.

After what was set forth in the first series of lectures, we hardly need to say what the [above] factual situation had to mean for the existential plight of European humanity, which sought — as the result of the Renaissance, determining the whole meaning of the modern period — to create the universal science as the instrument for giving itself a new rootedness and for transforming itself into a humanity based on pure reason. But our duty here is to make understandable the obvious failure of the great intention to realize gradually the idea of a *philosophia perennis*, a true and genuine universal science ultimately grounded. At the same time we have to justify our boldness in still daring to give a favorable prognosis (now and for our time) — as can be foreseen in our systematic-critical presentations — for the future development of a philosophy conceived as a science. The rationalism of the Age of Enlightenment is now out of the question; we can no longer follow its great philosophers or any other philosophers of the past. But their intention, seen in its most general sense, must never die out in us. For, as I emphasize once again, true and genuine philosophy or science and true and genuine rationalism are one. Realizing this rationalism, rather than the rationalism of the Enlightenment, which is laden with hidden absurdity, remains our own task if we are not to let specialized science, science lowered to the status of art or technique or the fashionable degenerations of philosophy into irrationalistic busy-work be substituted for the inextinguishable idea of philosophy as the ultimately grounding and universal science.

## 57 The fateful separation of transcendental philosophy and psychology.

LET US GO BACK to the times in which modern man and the modern philosopher still believed in themselves and in a philosophy, when, in the context of the transcendental motivation, they struggled for a new philosophy with the responsible seriousness of an inner, absolute calling that one senses in every word of the genuine philosopher, Even after the so-called collapse of the Hegelian philosophy, in which the line of development determined by Kant culminated, this seriousness remained intact for a time in the philosophies reacting against Hegel (even though its original force was weakened). But why did transcendental philosophy not achieve the unity of a development running through all its interruptions? Why did self-criticism and reciprocal criticism among those still animated by the old spirit not lead to the integration of compelling cognitive accomplishments into the unity of an edifice of knowledge which grew from generation to generation, which merely needed perfecting through constantly renewed criticism, correction, and methodical refinement? In this regard the following general remark must first be made: an absolutely novel procedure like that of transcendental science, which was lacking any sort of guidance by analogy, could be before the mind at first only as a sort of instinctive anticipation. An obscure dissatisfaction with the previous way of grounding in all science leads to the setting of new problems and to theories which exhibit a certain self-evidence of success in solving them in spite of many difficulties that are unnoticed or, so to speak, drowned out. This first self-evidence can still conceal within itself more than enough obscurities which lie deeper, especially in the form of unquestioned, supposedly quite obvious presuppositions. Yet such first theories continue to be helpful historically; the obscurities become more troublesome, what is supposedly obvious is questioned, the theories are criticised for this, and this creates the stimulus for new attempts.

Furthermore, transcendental philosophy, for essential reasons (which are perfectly clear from our systematic presentations), can never undergo the unnoticed transformation into a mere *techni* and thus into a process of depletion whereby what has become a technique retains only a hidden meaning — one whose full depths, indeed, can be revealed only transcendently. We can understand, accordingly, that the history of transcendental philosophy first had to be a history of renewed attempts just to bring transcendental philosophy to its starting point and, above all, to a clear and proper self-understanding of what it actually could and must undertake. Its origin is a “Copernican turn,” that is, a turning-away in principle from the manner of grounding in naive-objective science. As we know, transcendental philosophy appears in its primal form, as a seed, in the first Cartesian Meditations as an attempt at an absolutely subjectivistic grounding of philosophy through the apodictic ego; but here it is unclear and ambiguous, and it immediately subverts its genuine sense. Neither the new stage, the reaction of Berkeley and Hume against the philosophical naiveté of mathematical, natural-scientific exactness, nor even Kant’s new beginning led to the genuine sense of the required Copernican turn — the sense, that is, of grounding once and for all a system-

atic transcendental philosophy in the rigorous scientific spirit. A true beginning, achieved by means of a radical liberation from all scientific and prescientific traditions, was not attained by Kant. He does not penetrate to the absolute subjectivity which constitutes everything that is, in its meaning and validity, nor to the method of attaining it in its apodicticity, of interrogating it and of explicating it apodictically.

From then on, the history of this philosophy was necessarily a continued struggle precisely for the clear and genuine sense of the transcendental turn to be carried out and of its method of work; to put it in another way, it was a struggle for the genuine “transcendental reduction.” Our critical reflections on Kant have already made clear to us the danger of impressive and yet still unclear insights or, if you will, the illumination of pure insights in the form of vague anticipations while one is still working with questions posed on an unclarified ground (that of what is “obvious”); and this also made comprehensible how he was forced into a mythical concept-construction and into a metaphysics in the dangerous sense inimical to all genuine science. All the transcendental concepts of Kant — those of the “I” of transcendental apperception, of the different transcendental faculties, that of the “thing in itself” (which underlies souls as well as bodies) — are constructive concepts which resist in principle an ultimate clarification. This is even more true in the later idealistic systems. This is the reason for the reactions, which were in fact necessary, against those systems, against their whole manner of philosophising. To be sure, if one became willingly engrossed in such a system, one could not deny the force and moment of its thought-constructions. Yet their ultimate incomprehensibility gave rise to profound dissatisfaction among all those who had educated themselves in the great new sciences. Even though these sciences, according to our clarification and manner of speaking, furnish a merely “technical” self-evidence, and even though transcendental philosophy can never become such a techni, this techni is still an intellectual accomplishment which must be clear and understandable at every step, must possess the self-evidence of the step made and of the ground upon which it rests; and to this extent (taken thus formally) the same thing holds for it that holds for every technically self-evident science practiced artfully, such as mathematics, for example. It helps not at all to try to explain the incomprehensibility of the transcendental constructions by outlining, in the same spirit, a constructive theory of the necessity of such incomprehensible things; nor does it help to try to suggest that the overwhelming profundity of the transcendental theories implies corresponding difficulties of understanding and that people are too lazy to overcome them. So much is correct, that any transcendental philosophy must, and with essential necessity, create extraordinary difficulties for the natural man’s understanding — for “common sense” — and thus for all of us, since we cannot avoid having to rise from the natural ground to the transcendental region. The complete inversion of the natural stance of life, thus into an “unnatural” one, places the greatest conceivable demands upon philosophical resolve and consistency. Natural human understanding and the objectivism rooted in it will view every transcendental philosophy as a flighty eccentricity, its wisdom as useless foolishness; or it will interpret it as a psychology which seeks to convince itself that it is not psychology. No one who is truly receptive to philosophy is ever frightened off

by difficulties. But modern man, as man shaped by science, demands insight; and thus, as the image of sight correctly suggest, he demands the self-evidence of “seeing” the goals and the ways to them and every step along the way. The way may be long, and many years of toilsome study may be necessary; this is true in mathematics, but it does not frighten him whose life-interest is mathematics. The great transcendental philosophies did not satisfy the scientific need for such self-evidence, and for this reason their ways of thinking were abandoned.

Turning back to our subject, we shall now be able to say, without being misunderstood: just as the emerging incomprehensibility of the rationalistic philosophy of the Enlightenment, understood as “objective” science, called forth the reaction of transcendental philosophy, so the reaction against the incomprehensibility of the attempted transcendental philosophies had to lead beyond them.

But now we are faced with the question: How is it to be understood that such an unscientific style could be developed and propagated at all, in great philosophers and their philosophies, when the development of modern philosophy was so animated by the will to science? These philosophers were by no means mere poets of ideas. They were not at all lacking in the serious will to create philosophy as an ultimately grounding science, however one may wish to transform the sense of ultimate grounding. (Consider, for example, the emphatic declarations of Fichte in the drafts of his *Wissenschaftslehre* or those of Hegel in the “Preface” to his *Phenomenology of Mind*.) How is it that they remained bound to their style of mythical concept-constructions and of world-interpretations based on obscure metaphysical anticipations and were not able to penetrate to a scientifically rigorous type of concepts and method and that every successor in the Kantian series conceived one more philosophy in the same style? Part of transcendental philosophy’s own meaning was that it arose out of reflections on conscious subjectivity through which the world, the scientific as well as the everyday intuitive world, comes to be known or achieves its ontic validity for us; thus transcendental philosophy recognised the necessity of developing a purely mental approach to the world. But if it had to deal with the mental, why did it not turn to the psychology that had been practiced so diligently for centuries? Or, if this no longer sufficed, why did it not work out a better psychology? One will naturally answer that the empirical man, the psychophysical being, himself belongs, in soul as well as body, to the constituted world. Thus human subjectivity is not transcendental subjectivity, and the psychological theories of knowledge of Locke and his successors serve as continued admonitions against “psychologism,” against any use of psychology for transcendental purposes. But in exchange, transcendental philosophy always had to bear its cross of incomprehensibility.

The difference between empirical and transcendental subjectivity remained unavoidable; yet just as unavoidable, but also incomprehensible, was their identity. I myself, as transcendental ego, “constitute” the world, and at the same time, as soul, I am a human ego in the world. The understanding which prescribes its law to the world is my transcendental understanding, and it forms me, too, according to these laws; yet it is my — the philosopher’s —

psychic faculty. Can the ego which posits itself, of which Fichte speaks, be anything other than Fichte's own? If this is supposed to be not an actual absurdity but a paradox that can be resolved, what other method could help us achieve clarity than the interrogation of our inner experience and an analysis carried out within its framework? If one is to speak of a transcendental "consciousness in general," if I, this singular, individual ego, cannot be the bearer of the nature-constituting understanding, must I not ask how I can have, beyond my individual self-consciousness, a general, a transcendental intersubjective consciousness? The consciousness of intersubjectivity, then, must become a transcendental problem; but again, it is not apparent how it can become that except through an interrogation of myself, [one that appeals to] inner experience, i.e., in order to discover the manners of consciousness through which I attain and have others and a fellow mankind in general, and in order to understand the fact that I can distinguish, in myself between myself and others and can confer upon them the sense of being "of my kind." Can psychology be indifferent here? Must it not deal with all this? The same or similar questions address themselves, as they do to Kant, to all his successors who became so lost in obscure metaphysics or mythology. One would think, after all, that we could attain a scientific concept even of an absolute reason and its accomplishments only after working out a scientific concept of our human reason and of human, or of humanity's, accomplishments — that is, only through a genuine psychology.

The first answer to this question is that transcendental philosophy (and also philosophy of any other attempted style), quite apart from concern about psychologism, had reason enough not to hope for any counsel from psychology. This was due to psychology itself and to the fateful, erroneous path forced upon it by the peculiarity of the modern idea of an objectivistic universal science more geometrico, with its psychophysical dualism. In the following I shall try to show (paradoxical as this thesis must appear here) that it is precisely this restriction placed upon psychology, which falsifies its meaning and to the present day has kept it from grasping its peculiar task, that bears the primary responsibility for the fact that transcendental philosophy found no way out of its uncomfortable situation and was thus caught in the concepts and construction it used to interpret its — in themselves valuable — empirical observations, concepts, and constructions, which are completely devoid of any legitimation from original self-evidence. If psychology had not failed, it would have performed a necessary mediating work for a concrete, working transcendental philosophy, freed from all paradoxes. Psychology failed, however, because, even in its primal establishment as a new kind of [science] alongside the new natural science, it failed to inquire after what was essentially the only genuine sense of its task as the universal science of psychic being. Rather, it let its task and method be set according to the model of natural science or according to the guiding idea of modern philosophy as objective and thus concrete universal science — a task which, of course, considering the given historical motivation, appeared to be quite obvious. So remote was any sort of doubt in this matter that it was not until the end of the nineteenth century that it became a philosophical motif of thought at all. Thus the history of psychology is actually only a history of crises. And for this reason psychology could also not aid in the development of a genuine transcendental philosophy, since this was possible only

after a radical reform through which psychology's essentially proper task and method were clarified through the deepest sort of reflection upon itself. The reason for this is that the consistent and pure execution of this task had to lead, of itself and of necessity, to a science of transcendental subjectivity and thus to its transformation into a universal transcendental philosophy.

## **58 The alliance and the difference between psychology and transcendental philosophy. Psychology as the decisive field.**

ALL THIS WILL BECOME understandable if, in order to elucidate the difficult, even paradoxical, relation between psychology and transcendental philosophy, we make use of the systematic considerations through which we made clear to ourselves the sense and the method of a radical and genuine transcendental philosophy. By now we are without doubt that a scientific psychology of the modern style — no matter which of the many attempts since Hobbes and Locke we may consider — can never take part in the theoretical accomplishments, can never provide any premises for those accomplishments, which are the task of transcendental philosophy. The task set for modern psychology, and taken over by it, was to be a science of psychophysical realities, of men and animals as unitary beings, though divided into two real strata. Here all theoretical thinking moves on the ground of the taken-for-granted, pre-given world of experience, the world of natural life; and theoretical interest is simply directed as a special case to one of the real aspects of it, the souls, while the other aspect is supposed to be already known, or is yet to be known, by the exact natural sciences according to its objective, true being-in-itself. For the transcendental philosopher, however, the totality of real objectivity — not only the scientific objectivity of all actual and possible sciences but also the prescientific objectivity of the life-world, with its “situational truths” and the relativity of its existing objects — has become a problem, the enigma of all enigmas. The enigma is precisely the taken-for-grantedness in virtue of which the “world” constantly and pre-scientifically exists for us, “world” being a title for an infinity of what is taken for granted, what is indispensable for all objective sciences. As I, philosophising, reflect in pure consistency upon myself as the constantly functioning ego throughout the alteration of experiences and the opinions arising out of them, as the ego having consciousness of the world and dealing with the world consciously through these experiences, as I inquire consistently on all sides into the what and the how of the manners of givenness and the modes of validity, and the manner of ego-centeredness, I become aware that this conscious life is through and through an intentionally accomplishing life through which the life-world, with all its changing representational contents, in part attains anew and in part has already attained its meaning and validity. All real mundane objectivity is constituted accomplishment in this sense, including that of men and animals and thus also that of the “souls.” Psychic being,

accordingly, and objective spirit of every sort (such as human societies, cultures), and in the same manner psychology itself, are among the transcendental problems. It would be absurdly circular to want to deal with such problems on a naive, objective basis through the method of the objective sciences.

Nevertheless, psychology and transcendental philosophy are allied with each other in a peculiar and inseparable way, namely, in virtue of the alliance of difference and identity — which is no longer an enigma for us, but has been clarified — between the psychological ego (the human ego, that is, made worldly in the spatio-temporal world) and the transcendental ego, its ego-life, and its accomplishment. According to our clarifications, the ultimate self-understanding here allows us to say: in my naive selfconsciousness as a human being knowing himself to be living in the world, for whom the world is the totality of what for him is valid as existing, I am blind to the immense transcendental dimension of problems. This dimension is in a hidden [realm of] anonymity. In truth, of course, I am a transcendental ego, but I am not conscious of this; being in a particular attitude, the natural attitude, I am completely given over to the object-poles, completely bound by interests and tasks which are exclusively directed toward them. I can, however, carry out the transcendental reorientation — in which transcendental universality opens itself up — and then I understand the one-sided, closed, natural attitude as a particular transcendental attitude, as one of a certain habitual one-sidedness of the whole life of interest. I now have, as a new horizon of interest, the whole of constituting life and accomplishment with all its correlations — a new, infinite scientific realm — if I engage in the appropriate systematic work. In this reorientation our tasks are exclusively transcendental; all natural data and accomplishments acquire a transcendental meaning, and within the transcendental horizon they impose completely new sorts of transcendental tasks. Thus, as a human being and a human soul, I first become a theme for psychophysics and psychology; but then in a new and higher dimension I become a transcendental theme. Indeed, I soon become aware that all the opinions I have about myself arise out of self-apperceptions, out of experiences and judgments which I — reflexively directed toward myself — have arrived at and have synthetically combined with other apperceptions of my being taken over from other subjects through my contact with them. My ever new self-apperceptions are thus continuing acquisitions of my accomplishments in the unity of my self-objectification; proceeding on in this unity, they have become habitual acquisitions, or they become such ever anew. I can investigate transcendentially this total accomplishment of which I myself, as the “ego,” am the ultimate ego-pole, and I can pursue its intentional structure of meaning and validity.

By contrast, as a psychologist I set myself the task of knowing myself as the ego already made part of the world, objectified with a particular real meaning, mundanised, so to speak — concretely speaking, the soul — the task of knowing myself precisely in the manner of objective, naturally mundane knowledge (in the broadest sense), myself as a human being among things, among other human beings, animals, etc. Thus we understand that in fact an indissoluble inner alliance obtains between psychology and transcendental philosophy. But from this perspective we can also foresee that there must be a way whereby a concretely ex-



ecuted psychology could lead to a transcendental philosophy. By anticipation, one can say: If I myself effect the transcendental attitude as a way of lifting myself above all world — apperceptions and my human self-apperception, purely for the purpose of studying the transcendental accomplishment in and through which I “have” the world, then I must also find this accomplishment again, later, in a psychological internal analysis — though in this case it would have passed again into an apperception, i.e., it would be apperceived as something belonging to the real soul as related in reality to the real living body.\*

\*If I learn to clarify, to understand from my own point of view as an ego, how other human beings are simply human beings for themselves, how the world is constantly valid for them as existing, the world in which they live together with others and with me, and how they, too, are ultimately transcendental subjects through their accomplishments of world — and self-objectification, then once again I must say to myself: I must take the results of my transcendental clarification in respect to the transcendental self-objectification of others and apply them to their human existence, which is to be judged psychologically.

And, conversely: a radical, psychological unfolding of my apperceptive life and of the particular world appearing in it, in respect to the how of the particular appearances (thus of the human “world-picture”) — this, in the transition to the transcendental attitude, would immediately have to take on transcendental significance as soon as I now, at the higher level, constantly take into account the meaning-conferring accomplishment which is responsible for the objective apperception, i.e., the accomplishment through which the world-representation has the sense of something really existing, something human and psychic, the sense of being my psychic life and that of other human beings — the life in which everyone has his world-representations, finds himself as existing, representing, acting according to purposes in the world.

This to us rather obvious consideration, which is nevertheless still in need of a deeper grounding, could of course not be accessible prior to the transcendental reduction; but was not the alliance between psychology and transcendental philosophy always strongly noticeable, in spite of all obscurity? Indeed, this alliance was, in fact, a motif which constantly codetermined the [historical] development. Thus it must at first appear curious that transcendental philosophy since Kant found no real usefulness at all in the psychology which, since the time of Locke, after all, wanted to be psychology grounded in inner experience. On the contrary, every transcendental philosophy which was not erring in the direction of empiricism and skepticism saw the slightest admixture of psychology as a betrayal of its true undertaking, and waged a constant battle against psychologism — a battle that was meant to have, and did have, the effect that the philosopher was not permitted to concern himself at all with objective psychology.

To be sure, even after Hume and Kant it remained a great temptation, for all those who were not to be aroused from their dogmatic slumbers, to want to deal psychologically with epistemological problems. In spite of Kant, Hume was still not understood; the very fundamental systematic work of his skepticism, the *Treatise*, was little studied; English

empiricism, i.e., the psychological theory of knowledge in the Lockean style, continued to spread, even flourished. Thus it is true that transcendental philosophy, posing completely new kinds of questions, naturally had to struggle against this psychologism. But our present question is no longer concerned with this, for it is directed not at the philosophical naturalists but at the true transcendental philosophers, including the creators of the great systems themselves. Why did they not concern themselves at all with psychology, not even with analytic psychology based on inner experience? The answer already indicated, which still demands further exposition and grounding, is: psychology since Locke in all its forms, even when it sought to be analytic psychology based on “inner experience,” mistook its peculiar task.

All of modern philosophy, in the original sense of a universal ultimately grounding science, is, according to our presentation, at least since Kant and Hume, a single struggle between two ideas of science: the idea of an objectivistic philosophy on the ground of the pre-given world and the idea of a philosophy on the ground of absolute, transcendental subjectivity — the latter being something completely new and strange historically, breaking through in Berkeley, Hume, and Kant. Psychology is constantly involved in this great process of development, involved, as we have seen, in different ways; indeed, psychology is the truly decisive field. It is this precisely because, though it has a different attitude and is under the guidance of a different task, its subject matter is universal subjectivity, which in its actualities and possibilities is one.

## **59 Analysis of the reorientation from the psychological attitude into the transcendental attitude. Psychology “before” and “after” the phenomenological reduction. (The problem of “flowing in.”)**

HERE WE AGAIN take up the notion which we previously anticipated from the transcendental-philosophical point of view, the notion which already suggested to us the idea of a possible way from psychology into transcendental philosophy. In psychology the natural, naive attitude has the result that the human self-objectifications of transcendental intersubjectivity, which belong with essential necessity to the makeup of the constituted world pre-given to me and to us, inevitably have a horizon of transcendently functioning intentionalities which are not accessible to reflection, not even psychological-scientific reflection. “I, this man,” and likewise “other men” — these signify, respectively, a self-apperception and an apperception of others which are transcendental acquisitions involving everything psychic that belongs to them, acquisitions which flowingly change in their particularity through transcendental functions which are hidden from the naive attitude. We can inquire back into the transcendental historical dimension, from which the meaning and

validity — accomplishment of these apperceptions ultimately stems, only by breaking with naivet through the method of transcendental reduction. In the unbroken naivet in which all psychology, all humanistic disciplines, all human history persists, I, the psychologist, like everyone else, am constantly involved in the performance of self-apperceptions and apperceptions of others. I can, of course, in the process thematically reflect upon myself, upon my psychic life and that of others, upon my and others' changing apperceptions; I can also carry out recollections; observingly, with theoretical interest, I can carry out self-perceptions and self-recollections, and through the medium of empathy I can make use of the self-apperceptions of others. I can inquire into my development and that of others; I can thematically pursue history, society's memory, so to speak — but all such reflection remains within transcendental naivet; it is the performance of the transcendental world-apperception which is, so to speak, ready-made, while the transcendental correlate — i.e., the (immediately active or sedimented) functioning intentionality, which is the universal apperception, constitutive of all particular apperceptions, giving them the ontic sense of “psychic experiences of this and that human being” — remains completely hidden. In the naive attitude of world-life, everything is precisely worldly: that is, there is nothing but the constituted object-poles — though they are not understood as that. Psychology, like every objective science, is bound to the realm of what is prescientifically pre-given, i.e., bound to what can be named, asserted, described in common language — in this case, bound to the psychic, as it can be expressed in the language of our linguistic community (construed most broadly, the European community). For the life-world — the “world for us all” — is identical with the world that can be commonly talked about. Every new apperception leads essentially, through apperceptive transference, to a new typification of the surrounding world and in social intercourse to a naming which immediately flows into the common language. Thus the world is always such that it can be empirically, generally (intersubjectively) explicated and, at the same time, linguistically explicated.

But with the break with naivet brought about by the transcendental-phenomenological reorientation there occurs a significant transformation, significant for psychology itself. As a phenomenologist I can, of course, at any time go back into the natural attitude, back to the straightforward pursuit of my theoretical or other life-interests; I can, as before, be active as a father, a citizen, an official, as a “good European,” etc., that is, as a human being in my human community, in my world. As before — and yet not quite as before. For I can never again achieve the old naivet; I can only understand it. My transcendental insights and purposes have become merely inactive, but they continue to be my own. More than this: my earlier naive self-objectification as the empirical human ego of my psychic life has become involved in a new movement. All the new sorts of apperceptions which are exclusively tied to the phenomenological reduction, together with the new sort of language (new even if I use ordinary language, as is unavoidable, though its meanings are also unavoidably transformed) — all this, which before was completely hidden and inexpressible, now flows into the self-objectification, into my psychic life, and becomes apperceived as its newly revealed intentional background of constitutive accomplishments. I know through my phenomenolog-

ical studies that I, the previously naive ego, was none other than the transcendental ego in the mode of naive hiddenness; I know that to me, as the ego again straightforwardly perceived as a human being, there belongs inseparably a reverse side which constitutes and thus really first produces my full concreteness; I know of this whole dimension of transcendental functions, interwoven with one another throughout and extending into the infinite. As was the case previously with the psychic, everything that has newly flowed in is now concretely localised in the world through the living body, which is essentially always constituted along with it. I — the-man, together with the transcendental dimension now ascribed to me, am somewhere in space at some time in the world's time. Thus every new transcendental discovery, by going back into the natural attitude, enriches my psychic life and (apperceptively as a matter of course) that of every other.

## **60 The reason for the failure of psychology: dualistic and physicalistic presuppositions.**

THIS IMPORTANT SUPPLEMENT to our systematic expositions clarifies the essential difference between the essentially limited thematic horizon, beyond which a psychology on the basis of the naive having of the world (i.e., any psychology of the past prior to transcendental phenomenology) cannot think in principle — it would have not the least conception of a plus ultra — and, on the other hand, the new thematic horizon which a psychology receives only when the transcendental, coming from transcendental phenomenology, flows into psychic being and life, i.e., only when naiveté is overcome.

With this the alliance between psychology and transcendental philosophy is illuminated and understood in a new way; and at the same time we are provided with a new guideline for understanding the failure of psychology throughout its whole modern history, over and above everything we have attained in our earlier systematic considerations by way of motives for evaluating it.

Psychology had to fail because it could fulfill its task, the investigation of concrete, full subjectivity, only through a radical, completely unprejudiced reflection, which would then necessarily open up the transcendental-subjective dimension. For this it would obviously have required considerations and analyses in the pre-given world similar to those we carried out in an earlier lecture in connection with Kant [ §28 ff., above] . There our gaze was guided at first by bodies, in their manners of pre-giveness in the life-world, whereas, in the analyses required here, we would have to take our point of departure from the manners in which souls are pre-given in the life-world. An original reflective question is now directed toward what and how souls — first of all human souls — are in the world, the life-world, i.e., how they “animate” physical living bodies, how they are localised in space-time, how each one ‘lives’ psychically in having “consciousness” of the world in which it lives and is conscious of living; how each one experiences “its” physical body, not merely in general, as

a particular physical body, but in a quite peculiar way as “living body,” as a system of its “organs” which it moves as an ego (in holding sway over them); how it thus “takes a hand” in its consciously given surrounding world as “I strike,” “I push,” “I lift” this and that, etc. The soul “is”, of course, “in” the world. But does this mean that it is in the world in the way that the physical body is and that, when men with living bodies and souls are experienced in the world as real, their reality, as well as that of their living bodies and souls, could have the same or even a similar sense to that of the mere physical bodies? Even though the human living body is counted among the physical bodies, it is still “living” — “my physical body,” which I “move,” in and through which I “hold sway,” which I “animate.” If one fails to consider these matters — which soon become quite extensive — thoroughly, and actually without prejudice, one has not grasped at all what is of a soul’s own essence as such (the word “soul” being understood here not at all metaphysically but rather in the sense of the original givenness of the psychic in the life-world); and thus one has also failed to grasp the genuine ultimate substrate for a science of “souls.” Rather than beginning with the latter, psychology began with a concept of soul which was not at all formulated in an original way but which stemmed from Cartesian dualism, a concept furnished by a prior constructive idea of a corporeal nature and of a mathematical natural science. Thus psychology was burdened in advance with the task of being a science parallel to physics and with the conception that the soul — its subject matter — was something real in a sense similar to corporeal nature, the subject matter of natural science. As long as the absurdity of this century-old prejudice is not revealed, there can be no psychology which is the science of the truly psychic, i.e., of what has its meaning originally from the life-world; for it is to such a meaning that psychology, like any objective science, is inevitably bound. It is no wonder, then, that psychology was denied that constant, advancing development displayed by its admired model, natural science, and that no inventive spirit and no methodical art could prevent its repeated involvement in crisis. Thus we have just witnessed a crisis in the psychology which only a few years ago, as an international institute — psychology, was filled with the inspiring certainty that it could finally be placed on a level with natural science. Not that its work has been completely fruitless. Through scientific objectivity many remarkable facts relating to the life of the human soul have been discovered. But did this make it seriously a psychology, a science in which one learned something about the mind’s own essence? (I emphasise once again that this refers not to a mystical “metaphysical” essence but to one’s own being-in-onself and for-onself which, after all, is accessible to the inquiring, reflecting ego through so-called “inner” or “self-perception.”)

## 61 Psychology in the tension between the (objectivistic-philosophical) idea of science and empirical procedure: the incompatibility of the two directions of psychological inquiry (the psychophysical and that of “psychology based on inner experience”).

ALL SCIENTIFIC empirical inquiry has its original legitimacy and also its dignity. But considered by itself, not all such inquiry is science in that most original and indispensable sense whose first name was philosophy, and thus also in the sense of the new establishment of a philosophy or science since the Renaissance. Not all scientific empirical inquiry grew up as a partial function within such a science. Yet only when it does justice to this sense can it truly be called scientific. But we can speak of science as such only where, within the indestructible whole of universal philosophy, a branch of the universal task causes a particular science, unitary in itself, to grow up, in whose particular task, as a branch, the universal task works itself out in an originally vital grounding of the system. Not every empirical inquiry that can be pursued freely by itself is in this sense already a science, no matter how much practical utility it may have, no matter how much confirmed, methodical technique may reign in it. Now this applies to psychology insofar as, historically, in the constant drive to fulfill its determination as a philosophical, i.e., a genuine, science, it remains entangled in obscurities about its legitimate sense, finally succumbs to temptations to develop a rigorously methodical psychophysical — or better, a psychophysicist’s empirical inquiry, and then thinks that it has fulfilled its sense as a science because of the confirmed reliability of its methods. By contrast to the specialists’ psychology of the present, our concern — the philosopher’s concern — is to move this “sense as a science” to the central point of interest — especially in relation to psychology as the “place of decisions” for a proper development of a philosophy in general — and to clarify its whole motivation and scope. In this direction of the original aim toward — as we say — “philosophical” scientific discipline, motifs of dissatisfaction arose again and again, setting in soon after the Cartesian beginnings. There were troublesome tensions between the [different] tasks which descended historically from Descartes: on the one hand, that of methodically treating souls in exactly the same way as bodies and as being connected with bodies as spatio-temporal realities, i.e., the task of investigating in a physicalistic way the whole life-world as “nature” in a broadened sense; and, on the other hand, the task of investigating souls in their being in-themselves and for-themselves by way of “inner experience” — the psychologist’s primordial inner experience of the subjectivity of his own self — or else by way of the intentional mediation of likewise internally directed empathy (i.e., directed toward what is internal to other persons taken thematically) . The two tasks seemed obviously connected in respect to both method and subject matter, and yet they refused to harmonise. Modern philosophy had prescribed to itself from the very

beginning the dualism of substances and the parallelism of the methods of *mos geometricus* — or, one can also say, the methodical ideal of physicalism. Even though this became vague and faded as it was transmitted, and failed to attain even the serious beginnings of an explicit execution, it was still decisive for the basic conception of man as a psychophysical reality and for all the ways of putting psychology to work in order to bring about methodical knowledge of the psychic. From the start, then, the world was seen “naturalistically” as a world with two strata of real facts regulated by causal laws. Accordingly, souls too were seen as real annexes of their physical living bodies (these being conceived in terms of exact natural science); the souls, of course, have a different structure from the bodies; they are not *res extensae*, but they are still real in a sense similar to bodies, and because of this relatedness they must also be investigated in a similar sense in terms of “causal laws,” i.e., through theories which are of the same sort in principle as those of physics, which is taken as a model and at the same time as an underlying foundation.

## **62 Preliminary discussion of the absurdity giving equal status in principle to souls and bodies as realities; indication of the difference in principle between the temporality, the causality, and the individuation of natural things and those of souls.**

THIS EQUALISATION in principle of bodies and souls in the naturalistic method obviously presupposes their more original equalisation in principle in respect to their prescientific, experiential givenness in the life-world. Body and soul thus signified two real strata in this experiential world which are integrally and really connected similarly to, and in the same sense as, two pieces of a body. Thus, concretely, one is external to the other, is distinct from it, and is merely related to it in a regulated way. But even this formal equalisation is absurd; it is contrary to what is essentially proper to bodies and souls as actually given in life-world experience, which is what determines the genuine sense of all scientific concepts. Let us first of all pick out several concepts which are common to natural science and psychology and which supposedly have the same sense in both instances, and let us test this sameness of sense against what actual experience, as determining sense quite originally, shows, prior to the theoretical superstructures which are the concern of procuring exact science; that is, let us test it against what is given as physical and as psychic in straightforward life-world experience. What we must do now is something that has never been done seriously on either side and has never been done radically and consistently: we must go from the scientific fundamental concepts back to the contents of “pure experience,” we must radically set aside all presumptions of exact science, all its peculiar conceptual superstructures — in other words, we must consider the world as if these sciences did not yet exist, the world precisely

as life-world, just as it maintains its coherent existence in life throughout all its relativity, as it is constantly outlined in life in terms of validity.

Let us first reduce spatio-temporality (temporality as simultaneity and successivity) to the spatio-temporality of this pure life-world, the real world in the prescientific sense. Taken in this way it is the universal form of the real world in and through which everything real in the life-world is formally determined. But do souls have spatio-temporality in the true sense, in existence in this form, as do bodies? It has always been noted that psychic being in and for itself has no spatial extension and no location. This denial of the spatiality of the psychic was obviously oriented around the actual content of experience, [though] without a radical distinction between life-world and scientifically thought world. But can world-time (the form of successivity) be separated from spatiality? Is it not, as full space-time, the proper essential form of mere bodies, in which form the souls take part only indirectly? All objects in the world are in essence “embodied,” and for that very reason all “take part” in the space-time of bodies — “indirectly,” then, in respect to what is not bodily about them. This applies to spiritual objects of every sort, primarily to souls, but also to spiritual objects of every other sort (such as art works, technical constructions, etc.). According to what gives them spiritual signification, they are “embodied” through the way in which they “have” bodily character. In an inauthentic way they are here or there and are coextended with their bodies. Equally indirectly they have past being and future being in the space-time of bodies. Everyone experiences the embodiment of souls in original fashion only in his own case. What properly and essentially makes up the character of a living body I experience only in my own living body, namely, in my constant and immediate holding sway [over my surroundings] through this physical body alone. Only it is given to me originally and meaningfully as “organ” and as articulated into particular organs; each of its bodily members has its own features, such that I can hold sway immediately through it in a particular way — seeing with the eyes, touching with the fingers, etc. — that is, such that I can hold sway in a particular perception in just the ways peculiar to these functions. Obviously it is only in this way that I have perceptions and, beyond this, other experiences of objects in the world. All other types of holding-sway, and in general all relatedness of the ego to the world, are mediated through this. Through bodily “holding sway” in the form of striking, lifting, resisting, and the like, I act as ego across distances, primarily on the corporeal aspects of objects in the world. It is only my being — as ego, as holding sway, that I actually experience as itself, in its own essence; and each person experiences only his own. All such holding-sway occurs in modes of “movement,” but the “I move” in holding-sway (I move my hands, touching or pushing something) is not in itself the spatial movement of a physical body, which as such could be perceived by everyone. My body — in particular, say, the bodily part “hand” — moves in space; [but] the activity of holding sway, “kinesthesia,” which is embodied together with the body’s movement, is not itself in space as a spatial movement but is only indirectly co-localised in that movement. Only through my own originally experienced holding sway, which is the sole original experience of living — bodiliness as such, can I understand another physical body as a living body in which another “I” is embodied and holds sway; this again,



then, is a mediation, but one of a quite different sort from the mediation of inauthentic localisation upon which it is founded. Only in this way do other ego-subjects firmly belong to “their” bodies for me and are localised here or there in space-time; that is, they are inauthentically inexistent in this form of bodies, whereas they themselves, and thus souls in general, considered purely in terms of their own essence, have no existence at all in this form. Furthermore, causality too — if we remain within the life-world, which originally grounds ontic meaning — has in principle quite a different meaning depending on whether we are speaking of natural causality or of “causality” among psychic events or between the corporeal and the psychic. A body is what it is as this determined body, as a substrate of “causal” properties which is, in its own essence, spatio-temporally localised. Thus if one takes away causality, the body loses its ontic meaning as body, its identifiability and distinguishability as a physical individual. The ego, however, is “this one” and has individuality in and through itself; it does not have individuality through causality. To be sure, because of the character of the physical living body, the ego can become distinguishable by any other ego and thus by everyone in respect to its position in the space of physical bodies, a position which is inauthentic and which it owes to its physical, living body. But its distinguishability and identifiability in space for everyone, with all the psychophysically conditioned factors that enter in here, make not the slightest contribution to its being as *ens per se*. As such it already has, in itself, its uniqueness. For the ego, space and time are not principles of individuation; it knows no natural causality, the latter being, in accord with its meaning, inseparable from spatio-temporality. Its effectiveness is its holding-sway-as-ego; this occurs immediately through its kinesthesia, as holding-sway in its living body, and only mediately (since the latter is also a physical body) extends to other physical bodies.

In terms of the life-world, this means nothing other than that a body, which as such can already be explicated with its experiential meaning through its own essential properties, is always at the same time a body, in its being-such, under particular “circumstances.” First of all, it belongs to the most general structure of the life-world that the body has, so to speak, its habits of being in its being-such, that it belongs within a type which is either known or, if it is “new?” to us, is still to be discovered, a type within which the explicable properties belong together in typical ways. But it is also part of the life-world’s formal typology that bodies have typical ways of being together, in coexistence (above all in a given perceptual field) and in succession — i.e., a constant universal spatio-temporal set of types. It is due to the latter that each particular experienced body is not only necessarily there together with other bodies in general but is there as being of this type, among other bodies typically belonging to it, in a typical form of belonging together which runs its course within a typical pattern of succession. Accordingly each body “is”, in the way that it is, under “circumstances”; a change of properties in one body indicates changes of properties in another — though this must be understood roughly and relatively, just as it is, essentially, in the life-world; there can be no question of “exact” causality, which pertains to the idealising substructions of science.

### **63 The questionable character of the concepts of “outer” and “inner” experience. Why has the experience of the bodily thing in the life-world, as the experience of something “merely subjective,” not previously been included in the subject matter of psychology?**

THE FUNDAMENTAL MISTAKE of wanting to view men and animals seriously as double realities, as combinations of two different sorts of realities which are to be equated in the sense of their reality, and accordingly the desire to investigate souls also through the method of the science of bodies, i.e., souls as existing within natural causality, in space-time, like bodies — this gave rise to the supposed obviousness of a method to be formed as an analogue to natural science. The understandable result of both natural-scientific method and the new psychological method was the false parallelism of “inner” and “outer” experience. Both concepts remained unclear in respect to sense and function (their scientific function for physics, psychology, psychophysics).

On both sides, experiences are conceived as being performed in theoretical function; natural science is supposed to be based on outer, psychology on inner, experience. In the former, physical nature is given; and in the latter, psychic being, that of the soul. In accord with this, “psychological experience” becomes an equivalent expression for “inner experience.” To put it more precisely: what is actually experienced is the world as simply existing, prior to all philosophy and theory — existing things, stones, animals, men. In natural, direct life, this is experienced as simply, perceptually “there” (as simply existing, ontically certain presence) or, just as simply, in terms of memory, as “having been there,” etc. Even to this natural life, possible and occasionally necessary straightforward reflection belongs. Then relativity comes into view, and what is valid as simply being there, in the particularity of its manners of givenness in life itself, is transformed into a “merely subjective appearance”; and specifically it is called an appearance in relation to the one thing, the “entity itself,” which emerges — though again only relatively — through corrections when the gaze is directed upon the alteration of such “appearances.” And the same thing is true in respect to the other modalities of experience or their correlative temporal modalities.

This has already been carefully thought through in another connection, and if we bring it to mind here with renewed, lively clarity, there results the question: Why does the whole flowing life-world not figure at the very beginning of a psychology as something “psychic,” indeed as the psychic realm which is primarily accessible, the first field in which immediately given psychic phenomena can be explicated according to types? And correlatively: why is the experience which actually, as experience, brings this life-world to givenness and, within it, especially in the primal mode of perception, presents mere bodily things — why is this

experience not called psychological experience rather than “outer experience,” supposedly by contrast to psychological experience? Naturally there are differences in the manner of life-world experience, depending on whether one experiences stones, rivers, mountains or, on the other hand, reflectively experiences one’s experiencing of them or other ego-activity, one’s own or that of others, such as holding sway through the living body. This may be a significant difference for psychology and may lead to difficult problems. But does this change the fact that everything about the life-world is obviously “subjective”? Can psychology, as a universal science, have any other theme than the totality of the subjective? Is it not the lesson of a deeper and not naturalistically blinded reflection that everything subjective is part of an indivisible totality?

## **64 Cartesian dualism as the reason for the parallelisation. Only the formal and most general features of the schema “descriptive vs. explanatory science” are justified.**

FOR GALILEAN natural science, mathematical-physical nature is objective-true nature; it is this nature that is supposed to manifest itself in the merely subjective appearances. It is thus clear — and we have already pointed this out — that nature, in exact natural science, is not the actually experienced nature, that of the life-world. It is an idea that has arisen out of idealisation and has been hypothetically substituted for actually intuited nature. [Cf. §36.] The conceptual method of idealisation is the fundament of the whole method of natural science (i.e., of the pure science of bodies), the latter being the method of inventing “exact” theories and formulae and also of reapplying them within the praxis which takes place in the world of actual experience.

Here, then, lies the answer — sufficient for our present train of thought — to the question posed, as to how it happens that nature, as given in the life-world, this merely subjective aspect of “outer experience,” is not included under psychological experience in traditional psychology and that psychological experience is instead opposed to outer experience. Cartesian dualism requires the parallelisation of *mens* and *corpus*, together with the naturalisation of psychic being implied in this parallelisation, and hence also requires the parallelisation of the required methods. To be sure, because of the way in which the ready-made geometry of the ancients was taken over, the idealisation which thoroughly determines its sense was almost forgotten; and on the psychic side such an idealisation, as an actually executed and original accomplishment in a manner appropriate to the nature of the psychic, was not required, or rather not missed. Of course it should have been evident that idealisation in fact has no place on this side, since there could be no question here of anything like perspectivation and kinestheses, of measurement or of anything analogous to measurement.

The prejudice of the appropriateness of the same method produced the expectation that, by practicing this method in its appropriate version, one could arrive, without any deeper subjective-methodical considerations, at stable theorising and a methodical technique. But it was a vain hope. Psychology never became exact; the parallelisation could not actually be carried out, and — as we understand — for essential reasons. This much we can say even here, though much still needs to be done for the sake of the much needed ultimate clarity on all sides, so that we can also understand the survival of those various forms in which modern dualistic and psychophysiological (or psychophysical) psychology for long periods could have the appearance of a properly aimed methodical execution and the conviction of continued success as truly a fundamental science of the psychic; also, so that we can understand why psychophysical empirical inquiry, which is thoroughly legitimate and quite indispensable could not count as the pathway to or the execution of a genuine psychology which would do justice to the proper essence of the psychic itself. In any case, we can already say in advance, on the basis of insight, that the psychic, considered purely in terms of its own essence, has no physical nature, has no conceivable in-itself in the natural sense, no spatio-temporally causal, no idealisable and mathematisable in-itself, no laws after the fashion of natural laws; here there are no theories with the same relatedness back to the intuitive life-world, no observations or experiments with a function for theorising similar to natural science — in spite of all the self-misunderstandings of empirical experimental psychology. But because the fundamental insight has been lacking, the historical inheritance of dualism, with its naturalisation of the psychic, retains its force, but it is so vague and unclear that the need is not even felt for a genuine execution of the dualism of the exact sciences on both sides, such as is required by the sense of this dualism.

Thus the schema of descriptive vs. theoretically explanatory science, too, was kept in readiness as being obvious; we find it sharply emphasised in respect to psychology in Brentano and Dilthey, and in general in the nineteenth century — the time of passionate efforts finally to bring about a rigorously scientific psychology which could show its face alongside natural science. By no means do we wish to imply by this that the concept of a pure description and of a descriptive science, or beyond that ' even the difference between descriptive and explanatory method, can find no application at all in psychology, any more than we deny that the pure experience of bodies must be distinguished from the experience of the psychic or the spiritual. Our task is critically to make transparent, down to its ultimate roots, the naturalistic — or, more exactly, the physicalistic — prejudice of the whole of modern psychology, on the one hand in respect to the never clarified concepts of experience which guide the descriptions and on the other hand in respect to the way in which the contrast between descriptive and explanatory disciplines is interpreted as parallel and similar to the same contrast in natural science.

It has already become clear to us that an “exact” psychology, as an analogue to physics (i.e., the dualistic parallelism of realities, of methods, and of sciences), is an absurdity. Accordingly there can no longer be a descriptive psychology which is the analogue of a descriptive natural science. In no way, not even in the schema of description vs. explanation,

can a science of souls be modelled on natural science or seek methodical counsel from it. It can only model itself on its own subject matter, as soon as it has achieved clarity on this subject matter's own essence. There remains only the formal and most general notion that one must not operate with empty word-concepts, must not move in the sphere of vagueness, but must derive everything from clarity, from actually self-giving intuition, or, what is the same thing, from self-evidence — in this case from the original life-world experience of, or from what is essentially proper to, the psychic and nothing else. This results, as it does everywhere, in an applicable and indispensable sense of description and of descriptive science and also, at a higher level, of “explanation” and explanatory science. Explanation, as a higher-level accomplishment, signifies in this case nothing but a method which surpasses the descriptive realm, a realm which is realisable through actually experiencing intuition. This surpassing occurs on the basis of the “descriptive” knowledge, and, as a scientific method, it occurs through a procedure of insight which ultimately verifies itself by means of the descriptive data. In this formal and general sense there is in all sciences the necessary fundamental level of description and the elevated level of explanation. But this must be taken only as a formal parallel and must find its meaning-fulfillment in each science through its own essential sources; and the concept of ultimate verification must not be falsified in advance by assuming, as in physics, that certain propositions in the specifically physical (that is, the mathematically idealised) sphere are the ultimately verifying propositions.

## **65 Testing the legitimacy of an empirically grounded dualism by familiarising oneself with the factual procedure of the psychologist and the physiologist.**

WHEN DESCRIPTION is understood in this way, then, it must characterise the beginning of the only psychology which is true to its origins, the only possible psychology. But it soon becomes manifest that clarity, genuine self-evidence, in general but especially here, is not to be bought cheaply. Above all, as we have already indicated, the arguments of principle against dualism, against the double stratification which already falsifies the sense of experience purely within the life-world, against the supposed likeness of the reality (in the life-world) of physical and psychic being in respect to the innermost sense of reality, against the likeness of temporality and individuality in the two cases — these arguments are too philosophically oriented, too oriented toward principle, to be able to make any sort of lasting impression on the psychologists and scientists of our time or even on the “philosophers.” One is tired of arguments of principle, which, after all, lead to no agreement; from the start one listens with only half an ear, prefers to trust in the power of the indubitable accomplishments performed in the great experiential sciences, to trust in their actual methods, their actual work of experiencing — experiencing which is, naturally, in each case peculiar to the area in question: experience of the physical for the physicists, of the biological for the biologists, of

the human for the humanists. Certainly it is quite proper that they are called experiential sciences. If we pay attention not to the reflections in which scientists speak about their method and their work, i.e., philosophise (as in the usual academic orations for special occasions), but rather to the actual method and work itself, it is certain that the scientists here constantly have recourse in the end to experience. But if we place ourselves within this experience, the experience itself showed it will be argued against us — that, in respect to the corporeal and the spiritual, the mistaken dualistic interpretation is taken up into the supposed experiential meaning and gives researchers the right to do justice to dualism, which is actually purely empirically grounded, and to operate just as they do with inner and outer experience, with temporality, reality, and causality. The philosopher can speak as insistently as he wants about absurdity in principle, but he cannot prevail against the power of tradition. Now we too, of course, are by no means ready to sacrifice our objections, precisely because they are radically different from argumentations using concepts which are historically inherited and not newly interrogated in respect to their original sense, and because our objections themselves were derived from precisely the most original sources, as anyone can convince himself who tests our presentation. This does not mean, however, that the procedure of the working experiential sciences, the sense and the limitation of their legitimacy, is explicitly made clear; and as for psychology in particular, our present subject, its procedure, always psychophysiological, is not made clear — neither its legitimacy nor the temptations it offers. This is true not only of all the primitive methodical forms of former times but also of the most highly developed forms that have appeared since the second half of the nineteenth century. The necessity of separating the experience of bodies from the experience of the spirit has not been clearly established; nor has the legitimacy, claimed in advance, of taking the experience of bodies, with the constant signification it has for the psychologist as for everyone else, and including it in the psychic, thus making its universality an all-encompassing one. This, of course, involves us in paradoxical difficulties. But difficulties that can be pushed to one side by good, successfully functioning work cannot be pushed to one side by a universal philosophy; rather, they must be overcome, since philosophy exists precisely in order to remove all the blinders of praxis, especially scientific praxis, and to reawaken, indeed to rescue, the true and actual, the full purpose, that science (here psychology) should fulfill as its inborn meaning. Thus we cannot be spared from inquiring back into the most general ground from which the possible tasks of psychology, as of every objective science, arise, namely, the ground of the common experience within which the experiential sciences work, to which, then, they appeal, if — denying all “metaphysics” — they claim to satisfy the inviolable demands of experience.

## 66    **The world of common experience: its set of regional types and the possible universal abstractions within it: “nature” as correlate of a universal abstraction; the problem of “complementary abstractions.”**

WE SHALL BEGIN with a general consideration in which we simply repeat what has been said earlier, though deepening it, in order to be able to say something decisive, with original and vital clarity, about the questions raised. We already know that all theoretical accomplishment in objective science has its place on the ground of the pre-given world, the life-world — that it presupposes prescientific knowing and the purposive reshaping of the latter. Straightforward experience, in which the life-world is given, is the ultimate foundation of all objective knowledge. Correlatively, this world itself, as existing prescientifically for us (originally) purely through experience, furnishes us in advance, through its invariant set of essential types, with all possible scientific topics.

First we consider what is most general here: that the universe is pre-given as a universe of “things.” In this broadest sense “thing” is an expression for what ultimately exists and what “has” ultimate properties, relations, interconnections (through which its being is explicated); the thing itself is not what is “had” in this manner but precisely what ultimately “has” — in short (but understood quite un-metaphysically), it is the ultimate substrate. Things have their concrete set of types, finding their expression in the “substantives” of a given language. But all particular sets of types come under the most general of all, the set of “regional” types. In life it is the latter that determines praxis, in constant factual generality; and it first becomes explicit with essential necessity through a method of inquiry into essences. Here I mention distinctions such as living vs. lifeless things land, within the sphere of living things, the animals, i.e., those living not merely according to drives but also constantly through ego-acts, as opposed to those living only according to drives (such as plants). Among animals, human beings stand out, so much so, in fact, that mere animals have ontic meaning as such only by comparison to them, as variations of them. Among lifeless things, humanised things are distinguished, things that have signification (e.g., cultural meaning) through human beings. Further, as a variation on this, there are things which refer meaningfully in a similar way to animal existence, as opposed to things that are without signification in this sense. It is clear that these very general separations and groupings derived from the life-world, or the world of original experience, determine the separation of scientific areas, just as they also determine the internal interconnections between the sciences in virtue of the internal interconnection and overlapping of the regions. On the other hand, universal abstractions, which encompass all concretions, at the same time also determine subjects for possible sciences. It is only in the modern period that this latter path has been followed; and it is precisely this path that is relevant for us here. The natural science of

the modern period, establishing itself as physics, has its roots in the consistent abstraction through which it wants to see, in the life-world, only corporeity. Each “thing” “has” corporeity even though, if it is (say) a human being or a work of art, it is not merely bodily but is only “embodied,” like everything real. Through such an abstraction, carried out with universal consistency, the world is reduced to abstract-universal nature, the subject matter of pure natural science. It is here alone that geometrical idealisation, first of all, and then all further mathematising theorisation, has found its possible meaning. It is based on the self-evidence of “outer experience,” which is thus in fact an abstracting type of experience. But within the abstraction it has its essential forms of explication, its relativities, its ways of motivating idealisations, etc.

Now what about human souls? It is human beings that are concretely experienced. Only after their corporeity has been abstracted — within the universal abstraction which reduces the world to a world of abstract bodies — does the question arise, presenting itself now as so obvious, as to the “other side,” that is, the complementary abstraction. Once the bodily “side” has become part of the general task of natural science and has found its theoretically idealising treatment there, the task of psychology is characterised as the “complementary” task, i.e., that of subjecting the psychic side to a corresponding theoretical treatment with a corresponding universality. Does this ground the dualistic science of man and assign to psychology its original sense, as it almost seems to do, in an unassailable manner, i.e., truly purely on the basis of life-world experience, without any metaphysical admixture? Thus it applies first to the realm of human beings and then, obviously in the same manner, to the realm of animals. This would also, then — or so it seems — give order in advance to the procedure of the sciences of social and objectified spirit (the humanistic disciplines). As the correlative abstraction teaches us, man (and everything else that is real in animal form) is, after all, something real having two strata and is given as such in pure experience, purely in the life-world; what is required for the regional science of man, then, is obviously first of all what is sometimes called (by contrast to social psychology) individual psychology. Human beings, concretely, in the space-time of the world, have their abstractly distinguished souls distributed among bodies, which make up, when we adopt the purely naturalistic consideration of bodies, a universe to be considered in itself as a totality. The souls themselves are external to one another only in virtue of their embodiment; that is, in their own abstract stratum they do not make up a parallel total universe. Thus psychology can be the science of the general features of individual souls only; this follows from the way in which they are determined in their own essence by the psychophysical framework, by their being integrated into nature as a whole. This individual psychology must, then, be the foundation for a sociology and likewise for a science of objectified spirit (of cultural things), which after all refers, in its own way, to the human being as person, i.e., to the life of the soul. And all this can be applied by analogy — just as far as the analogy reaches — to animals, to animal society, to the surrounding world with its specifically animal signification.

Do these considerations, which have led us back to the ground of life-world experience — that is, to the source of self-evidence, to which we must ultimately appeal here — not justify



the traditional dualism of body and psychic spirit or the dualistic interrelation between physiology, as the science of the human (and also animal) body, on the one hand, and psychology, as the science of the psychic side of man, on the other? Even more than this: is this not indeed an improvement upon dualism as compared with the rationalistic tradition instituted by Descartes, who also influenced empiricism? Namely, is dualism not freed from all metaphysical substruction by the fact that it wants to be nothing more than a faithful expression of what experience itself teaches? To be sure, this is not quite the case, according to the way in which psychologists, physiologists, and physicists understand “experience”; and we have indicated the sense of experience which is decisive for the scientists’ work, correcting their usual self-interpretation. A metaphysical residuum is to be found in the fact that natural scientists consider nature to be concrete and overlook the abstraction through which their nature has been shaped into a subject matter for science. Because of this, the souls, too, retain something of a substantiality of their own, though it is not a self-sufficient substantiality, since, as experience teaches us, the psychic can be found in the world only in connection with bodies. But before we could pose further and now important questions, we had to take this step. We had first to help empirical inquiry toward an understanding of itself; we had to make visible, through reflection, its anonymous accomplishment, namely, the “abstraction” we described. In doing this, we are thus more faithful to empirical inquiry than the psychologists and the natural scientists; the last residuum of the Cartesian theory of two substances is defeated simply because abstracta are not “substances.”

## **67 The dualism of the abstractions grounded in experience. The continuing historical influence of the empiricist approach (from Hobbes to Wundt); Critique of data-empiricism.**

BUT NOW WE MUST ASK what there is in dualism and in the “stratification” of man and of the sciences, after the new legitimacy of the latter has been shown through the above theory of abstraction, that is and remains truly meaningful. We have deliberately made no use of our first critique of this dualism, of our indication of the way in which the spatio-temporal localisation and individuation of psychic being are secondary in principle; our intention was to familiarise ourselves completely with the psychophysical dualistic empiricism of the scientists in order to arrive at our decisions within the universal framework of the total world of experience as the primal ground. In addition to new insights, which are fundamentally essential, as we shall see, for the understanding of the genuine task of psychology, we shall also find again those earlier insights mentioned above.

Let us take up the abstraction we discussed; it will reveal its hidden difficulties all too soon. Let us take it quite straightforwardly and naturally as a differentiated direction of

gaze and interest on the basis of the concrete experience of man. Obviously we can pay attention to his mere corporeity and be one-sidedly and consistently interested only in it; and likewise we can pay attention to the other side, being interested purely in what is psychic about him. In this way the distinction between “outer” and “inner” experience (and first of all perception) also seems to be automatically clear, to have an inviolable legitimacy, together with the division of man himself into two real sides or strata. To the question of what belongs to the psychic side and what of this is given purely in inner perception, one answers in the familiar way: it is a person, substrate of personal properties, of original or acquired psychic dispositions (faculties, habits). This, however, supposedly refers back to a flowing ‘life of consciousness,’ a temporal process in which the first and especially noticeable feature is that of the ego-acts, though these are on a background of passive states . It is supposedly this current of “psychic experiences” that is experienced in that abstractive attitude of focus upon the psychic. What is directly and actually perceived (and it is even thought to be perceived with a particular sort of apodictic self-evidence) is the presence-sphere of the psychic experiences of one man, and only by that man himself, as his sinner perception”; the experiences of others are given only through the mediated type of experience called “empathy” — unless this latter type of experience is reinterpreted as an inference, as it generally used to be.

However, all this is by no means so simple and so obvious as it was taken to be, without any closer consideration, for centuries. A psychology derived from an abstraction which is parallel to the physicist’s abstraction, on the basis of an “inner perception” and other types of psychological experience which are parallel to outer perception, must be seriously questioned; indeed, taken in this way, it is impossible in principle. This obviously applies to every dualism of the two real sides or strata of man, and every dualism of the sciences of man, which appeals purely to experiencing intuition.

From the historical point of view we must consider the empiricist psychology and the sensationalism that have become dominant since the time of Hobbes and Locke and have corrupted psychology up to our own day. In this first form of naturalism, supposedly on the basis of experience, the soul is set off by itself in the closed unity of a space of consciousness as its own real sphere of psychic data. The naive equation of these data of psychological data-experience with those of the experience of bodies leads to a reification of the former; the constant view to the exemplary character of natural science misleads one into taking these data as psychic atoms or atom-complexes and into considering the tasks of the two sides to be parallel. Psychic faculties or, as they later come to be called, psychic dispositions — become analogues of physical forces, titles for merely causal properties of the soul, either belonging to its own essence or arising from its causal relationship with the living body, but in any case in such a way that reality and causality are understood in the same way on both sides. Of course, right away, in Berkeley and Hume, the enigmatic difficulties of such an interpretation of the soul announce themselves and press toward an immanent idealism which swallows up one of the two “parallels.” Yet up through the nineteenth century this changes nothing about the way in which psychology and physiology, which supposedly

follow experience, in fact do their work. It was easy to carry the “idealistic” naturalism of the immanent philosophy of those successors of Locke over into the dualistic psychology. The epistemological difficulties made so noticeable by Hume’s fictionalism were overcome — precisely through “epistemology.” Reflections which were appealing, but which unfortunately evaded genuine radicalism, were undertaken in order to justify *ex post facto* what one does in any case in the natural striving to follow the evidence of experience. Thus the growing acquisition of obviously valuable empirical facts took on the appearance of having a meaning which could be understood philosophically. We have a perfect example of the sort of epistemological-metaphysical interpretations which follow in the footsteps of science in the reflections of Wundt and his school, in the doctrine of the “two points of view,” of the theoretical utilisation of the one common experience through a twofold “abstraction.” This doctrine appears to be on the way toward overcoming all traditional metaphysics and to lead to a self-understanding of psychology and natural science; but in fact it merely changes empirical dualistic naturalism into a monistic naturalism with two parallel faces — i.e., a variation of Spinozistic parallelism. In addition, this Wundtian way, as well as the other ways of justifying the psychology which is bound to empirical dualism, retains the naturalistic data-interpretation of consciousness in accord with the Lockean tradition; though this does not keep them from speaking of representation and will, of value and the setting of goals as data in consciousness, without radically posing the question of how, through such data and their psychic causality, one is supposed to understand the rational activity presupposed by all psychological theories, which are reason’s accomplishments — whereas here, in the theories themselves, this activity is supposed to appear as one result among the others.

## **68 The task of a pure explication of consciousness as such: the universal problem of intentionality. (Brentano’s attempt at a reform of psychology.)**

THE FIRST THING we must do here is overcome the naiveté which makes the conscious life, in and through which the world is what it is for us — as the universe of actual and possible experience — into a real property of man, real in the same sense as his corporeity, i.e., according to the following schema. In the world we have things with different peculiarities, and among these there are also some that experience, rationally know, etc., what is outside them. Or, what is the same thing: The first thing we must do, and first of all in immediate reflective self-experience, is to take the conscious life, completely without prejudice, just as what it quite immediately gives itself, as itself, to be. Here, in immediate givenness, one finds anything but color data, tone data, other “sense” data or data of feeling, will, etc.; that is, one finds none of those things which appear in traditional psychology, taken for granted to be immediately given from the start. Instead, one finds, as even Descartes did (naturally we ignore his other purposes), the cogito, intentionality, in those familiar forms which, like

everything actual in the surrounding world, find their expression in language: “I see a tree which is green; I hear the rustling of its leaves, I smell its blossoms,” etc.; or, “I remember my schooldays,” “I am saddened by the sickness of a friend,” etc. Here we find nothing other than “consciousness of...” — consciousness in the broadest sense, which is still to be investigated in its whole scope and its modes.

This is the place to recall the extraordinary debt we owe to Brentano for the fact that he began his attempt to reform psychology with an investigation of the peculiar characteristics of the psychic (in contrast to the physical) and showed intentionality to be one of these characteristics; the science of “psychic phenomena,” then, has to do everywhere with conscious experiences. Unfortunately, in the most essential matters he remained bound to the prejudices of the naturalistic tradition; these prejudices have not yet been overcome if the data of the soul, rather than being understood as sensible (whether of outer or inner “sense”), are simply understood as data having the remarkable character of intentionality; in other words, if dualism, psychophysical causality, is still accepted as valid. This also applies to his idea of a descriptive natural science, as is shown by his conception of their parallel procedure — setting the task of classifying and descriptively analysing psychic phenomena completely in the spirit of the old traditional interpretation of the relation between descriptive and explanatory natural sciences. None of this would have been possible if Brentano had penetrated to the true sense of the task of investigating conscious life as intentional — and investigating it first of all on the basis of the pre-given world, since it was a question of grounding psychology as an objective science. Thus Brentano set up a psychology of intentionality as a task only formally, but had no way of attacking it. The same is true of his whole school, which also, like Brentano himself, consistently refused to accept what was decisively new in my *Logical Investigations* (even though his demand for a psychology of intentional phenomena was put into effect here). What is new in the *Logical Investigations* is found not at all in the merely ontological investigations, which had a one-sided influence contrary to the innermost sense of the work, but rather in the subjectively directed investigations (above all the fifth and sixth, in the second volume of 1901) in which, for the first time, the *cogitata qua cogitata*, as essential moments of each conscious experience as it is given in genuine inner experience, come into their own and immediately come to dominate the whole method of intentional analysis. Thus “self-evidence” (that petrified logical idol) is made a problem there for the first time, freed from the privilege given to scientific evidence and broadened to mean original self-giving in general. The genuine intentional synthesis is discovered in the synthesis of several acts into one act, such that, in a unique manner of binding one meaning to another, there emerges not merely a whole, an amalgam whose parts are meanings, but rather a single meaning in which these meanings themselves are contained, but in a meaningful way. With this the problems of correlation, too, already announce themselves; and thus, in fact, this work contains the first, though of course very imperfect, beginnings of “phenomenology.”